SHENK, J. The California Horse Racing Board appeals from a judgment in a mandamus proceeding the effect of which is to cancel its order suspending a trainer’s license for six months. The judgment was entered upon the failure of the board to answer after its demurrer to the petition had been overruled.
W. L. Sandstrom sought the writ of mandate on November 18, 1946, in the Los Angeles Superior Court. He alleged [404]that he was a duly licensed trainer of race horses possessing license 111 for the year 1946; that on October 7, 1946, and pursuant to notice theretofore given, the California Horse Racing Board held a hearing in San Francisco at which he was present; that both documentary and oral evidence was introduced; that the board’s decision ordered that his trainer’s license be suspended for six months from and after August 12, 1946, for violating rule 313 of the board because he was the trainer of the horse Cover Up, and an analysis of a sample of the urine of the horse taken after running in a race at Del Mar Race Track, San Diego County, on August 12, 1946, showed the presence of a caffeine type alkaloid; that rule 313 was unconstitutional because it was arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious in that it assumed to make the trainer the absolute insurer of the condition of horses entered in a race regardless of the acts of third persons, thereby making conclusive that which has not been so declared by the Legislature in sections 1837 and 1978 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that there was no substantial evidence, or any evidence, to support the findings of the board that he administered the stimulant Or had knowledge thereof. As a return to the alternative writ the board interposed a general demurrer to the petition. A transcript of the proceedings had before the board was filed. (See Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners, 21 Cal.2d 790 [136 P.2d 304].) The demurrer was overruled, the board failed to answer and judgment was entered ordering that the suspension of Sandstrom be cancelled. On the appeal the board again attacks the sufficiency of the petition to state facts entitling Sandstrom to any relief.
The propriety of mandamus as the appropriate remedy is established (Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal.2d 164 [105 P.2d 110]).
In this state supervision over horse races upon the results of which wagering is permitted is vested in the California Horse Racing Board (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 19420). A system of licensing is provided for and all licenses are subject to suspension or revocation for noncompliance with any condition of the license, for the violation of any law, or of any rule or regulation of the board (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 19460, 19461). A trainer’s license may not be revoked without just cause (Bus. & Prof. Code, §19513; Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, supra, 16 Cal.2d 164). “The [405]board may prescribe rules, regulations and conditions consistent with the provisions of this chapter [Horse Racing] under which all horse races, upon the results of which there is wagering, shall be conducted in this State.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 19561.)
Pursuant to this authority the California Horse Racing Board adopted rules relating to trainers, their duties and responsibilities. By rule 282 (tit. 4, Cal. Adm. Code, § 1887) it is provided: “Trainers are responsible for the condition of horses in their care and are presumed to know these rules. ’ ’ Rule 285 (tit. 4, Cal. Adm. Code, § 1890) provides: “A trainer shall be responsible for the timely attendance of his horse or horses at the paddock and he shall attend his horse in the paddock and shall be present to supervise the saddling. In case of emergency, he may, with the permission of the Paddock Judge, appoint another licensed trainer as his deputy in these matters.” Rule 286 (tit. 4, Cal. Adm. Code, § 1891) provides: “In the event any licensed trainer is at any time prevented from performing his duties by illness or other sufficient cause, and shall be absent from the track where employed, the Stewards of the Meeting shall be immediately notified of such fact, and at the same time a duly licensed substitute trainer, acceptable to the Stewards, shall be appointed. The Board of Stewards shall be advised immediately when the regular trainer resumes his duties.” Rule 313 (tit. 4, Cal. Adm. Code, § 1930) provides:
“Equipment as prescribed by the California Horse Racing Board for the administration of saliva, or urine, or other tests, shall be required at all meetings. All horses will be subject to these tests, or any other tests prescribed by the Board, or ordered by the Stewards, either before, or after the race, or both.
“The Trainer shall be the absolute insurer of and responsible for the condition of the horses entered in a race, regardless of the acts of third parties. Should the chemical, or other analysis of saliva, or urine samples, or other tests, prove positive, showing the presence of any narcotic, stimulant, chemical, or drug of any kind or description, the Trainer of the horse may be suspended or ruled off, and in addition, the Foreman in charge of the horse, the Groom signing the Pre-Race Examination Slip and Paddock Certificate, and any other person shown to have had the care, [406]or attendance, of the horse may be suspended or ruled off, in the discretion of the Board.”
The import of this rule is to impose strict responsibility upon the trainer for the condition of the horse. The language of the rule can admit of no other conclusion. Two factual elements must exist to bring the rule into operation; first, the licensee must be the trainer of the horse, and secondly, the analysis must show the presence of a stimulating or depressive drug or chemical. Sandstrom’s status as trainer of Cover Up has never been disputed, and the petition for the writ of mandate did not attack the finding of the board that the analysis showed the presence of a caffeine type alkaloid. In fact at the hearing before the board, Sandstrom stipulated that he was both the trainer and owner of Cover Up on August 12, 1946, and expressed satisfaction with the accuracy of the laboratory tests. The question is whether strict liability for the condition of a race horse can be constitutionally imposed on the trainer of the horse.
The general rule is well stated in City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 322 [32 S.Ct. 92, 56 L.Ed. 215]:
“It is a general principle of our law that there is no individual liability for an act which ordinary human care and foresight could not guard against. It is also a general principle of the same law that a loss from any cause purely accidental must rest where it chances to fall. But behind and above these general principles which the law recognizes as ordinarily prevailing, there lies the legislative power, which, in the absence .of organic restraint, may, for the general welfare of society, impose obligations and responsibilities otherwise non-existent.
“Primarily, government exists for the maintenance of social order. Hence it is that the obligation of the government to protect life, liberty and property against the conduct of the indifferent, the careless and the evil-minded may be regarded as laying at the very foundation of the social compact. A recognition of this supreme obligation is found in those exertions of the legislative power which have as an end the preservation of social order and the protection of the welfare of the public and of the individual. If such legislation be reasonably adapted to the end in view, affords a hearing before judgment, and is not forbidden by some other affirmative provisions of constitutional law, it is not to be regarded as- denying due process of law' under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. ’ ’
[407]That the imposition of strict liability whether by statute or judicial decision does not of itself contravene the due process clauses of the federal or state Constitutions may not be disputed. Approval of such liability may be found in St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 [17 S.Ct. 243, 41 L.Ed. 611]—railroad liability for fires; Jones v. Brim, 165 U.S. 180 [17 S.Ct. 282, 41 L.Ed. 677]—liability for destruction of banks of highway when driving livestock over public highways; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Zernecke, 183 U.S. 582 [22 S.Ct. 229, 46 L.Ed. 339]—railroad’s liability for injury to passengers; City of Chicago v. Sturges, supra (222 U.S. 313), Pol. Code, §4452; Agudo v. County of Monterey, 13 Cal.2d 285 [89 P.2d 400]; Bank of California v. Shaber, 55 Cal. 322—liability for damage by mobs and riots; Colton v. Onderdonk, 69 Cal. 155 [10 P. 395, 58 Am.St.Rep. 556]—blasting; Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686 [151 P. 398]—workmen’s compensation; 1 Deering’s Gen. Laws, Act 384a, § 1 (Stats. 1931, p. 1095); Goldberg v. Rabuchin, 65 Cal.App.2d 111 [149 P.2d 861]—scienter eliminated as condition of liability for injury by a dog; 43 American Jurisprudence 113, section 309—public official’s liability for safekeeping of public funds (Gov. Code, § 16508); Restatement of Torts, section 504 et seq.,—possession of animals; Restatement of Torts, section 519 et seq.,—ultrahazardous activities; Wolfe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 143 Ohio St. 643 [56 N.E.2d 230]—unwholesome food. See also Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328 [270 P. 952, 60 A.L.R. 475] (oil gusher); and In re Marley, 29 Cal.2d 525 [175 P.2d 832] (criminal liability for short weight).
The state, in the exercise of its police power, may regulate public race tracks and places of public amusement (Greenberg v. Western Turf Association, 148 Cal. 126 [82 P. 684, 113 Am.St.Rep. 216], affirmed 204 U.S. 359 [27 S.Ct. 384, 51 L.Ed. 520]) and may absolutely prohibit wagering on the results of horse racing (Pen. Code, § 337a; In re Walker, 11 Cal.2d 464 [80 P.2d 990, 117 A.L.R. 825]; Matter of Brown, 156 Cal. 632 [105 P. 739]; People v. Torrey, 16 Cal.App. 470, 472 [60 P.2d 900]; see also State Racing Commission v. Latonia Agricultural Assn., 136 Ky. 173 [123 S.W. 681, 25 L.R.A. N.S. 905]).
When the state sees fit to regulate upon a matter which is within its police power, its authority over the subject is plenary and can be reviewed by the courts only to [408]the extent of determining whether the regulation is reasonable. (Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy & T. Co., 11 Cal.2d 634 [82 P.2d 3, 118 A.L.R. 486]; State Savings etc. Bank v. Anderson, 165 Cal. 437 [132 P. 755, L.R.A. 1915E 65].) Whether the regulation is reasonable depends on the character or nature of the condition to be met or overcome. (Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 65 Cal.App. 534, 549 [224 P. 1008].)
Rule 313 is designed to afford the wagering public a maximum of protection against race horses being stimulated or depressed by making the trainer the insurer of the horse’s condition. That the wagering public merits such protection is evident from the magnitude of its patronage. Revenue to the California Horse Racing Board at 4 per cent of the pari-mutuel wagers amounted to $16,563,763.36 for the fiscal year 1945-1946. (State of California Budget for the Fiscal Year 1947-1948, p. 811.) Should responsibility be imposed only for actual guilty participation or culpable negligence, as petitioner contends, there would exist a possible field of activity beyond the affirmative protection thereby afforded to patrons of the pari-mutuel system. Remedial action subsequent to the pay-off at the pari-mutuel meetings may in some instances be effective as between competitors for the purse money. Such action may constitute a delay in payment of the prize money until the determination of the saliva, urine or other test. In fact rule 316 of the board (tit. 4, Cal. Adm. Code, § 1933) so provides. The recognized interest of the wagering patrons is sought to be safeguarded by rule 3-13. In most instances the very existence of the condemned activities creates a nonremedial situation. Detection of the condition may not be possible until long after the race has' been run and the pari-mutuel winners paid off. The closer the supervision to which the trainer is held, the more difficult it becomes for anyone to administer a drug or chemical to the horse. The exaction of the ultimate in that regard is justified by the peril to be avoided. “Legislation for regulatory purposes, which dispenses with the condition of awareness of wrongdoing and places the burden of acting at his peril on a person otherwise innocent ‘but standing in personal relation to a public danger’ ... is a traditional means of regulation. ’ ’ (People v. Scott, 24 Cal.2d 774, 782 [151 P.2d 517].)
Rule 313 may not be deemed to establish a conclusive presumption to the effect that evidence of the presence [409]of a drug in a horse is proof that the trainer drugged the horse. By express language the rule imposes strict liability for the condition of the horse. Fault in the sense of actual administration of the drug or negligent care by the trainer is neither the basis nor an element of liability. It may not be injected into the case by way of subtle hypothesis. Whether the trainer drugged the horse or knew that it was drugged, or was negligent in not properly seeing that the horse was not drugged are not elements of liability. Since rule 313 may not be considered as establishing a presumption it is not within the scope of the limitations imposed either by sections 1837 and 1978, Code of Civil Procedure, or by Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 [46 S.Ct. 260, 70 L.Ed. 557] ; Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 [52 S.Ct. 358, 76 L.Ed. 772] ; or Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 [63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519].
On the other hand the liability imposed upon “the Foreman in charge of the horse, the Groom signing the PreRace Examination Slip and Paddock Certificate, and any other person shown to have had the care, or attendance, of the horse ’ ’ is not the strict liability imposed upon the trainer, but is necessarily limited to guilty conduct or culpable negligence. That this is so stems from the wording of rule 313 and the consideration that strict liability may not be imposed by inference, or indiscriminately, or upon persons having but a minor part in an activity.
Our attention has been directed to three cases in which the validity of the suspension of a trainer’s license was involved.
In Smith v. Cole (May 17, 1946), 270 App.Div. 675 [62 N.Y.S.2d 226], the suspension was upheld as being “for cause” where the trainer was not present when a 2.6 per cent solution of ephedrine was sprayed into the nasal passages of the horse, but “there was evidence from which his responsibility for the treatment could be found to be established. ’ ’
Next is Mahoney v. Byers (July 23, 1946),-Md.-[48 A.2d 600]. There the Maryland Racing Commission suspended for one year the license of J. D. Byers, trainer of the horse Cosey, because benzedrine was found in the saliva sample taken after the horse had won a steeplechase. This action was pursuant to sections (a) and (d) of rule 146 of the Maryland Racing Commission which provided:
“(a) No person shall administer, or knowingly or carelessly permit to be administered to any horse entered for a [410]race, any drug in any way within forty-eight (48) hours before the time of the race.
“(d) If the Commission finds from analysis of the saliva or urine, or blood taken from a horse on the day of a race in which the horse ran, or from other competent evidence, that any drug has been administered to the horse within forty-eight (48) hours before the race, the trainer shall be subject to the penalties prescribed in sub-section (e) hereof, whether or not he administered the drug, or knowingly or carelessly permitted it to be administered. The fact that the analysis shows the presence of a drug shall be conclusive evidence either that there was knowledge of the fact on the part of the trainer or that he was guilty of carelessness in permitting it to be administered.”
The suspension was cancelled and the license ordered restored by the superior court. In affirming the order, the Court of Appeals held that the rule substituted an irrebuttable presumption for facts necessary to find the trainer guilty; that evidence may not be made conclusive which was not so of its own nature and inherent force, and thus preclude á party from showing the truth; and that a law which prevents one from making a defense to a charge brought against him by substituting an irrebuttable presumption for facts is arbitrary, capricious and unconstitutional.
The third case is State v. Baldwin (on rehearing June 27, 1947),-Fla.- [31 So.2d 627]. There, in an original proceeding in mandate, the Florida Supreme Court considered the validity of the racing board’s action in suspending for 12 months the license of Joseph J. Paoli as a trainer. Paoli was the trainer of the horse James Acker when it won the second race at Sunshine Park on January 30, 1947. Benzedrine was found in the urine sample taken immediately after the race. The commission had purported to act under its rule 117, which provided:
“117. The trainer shall be the absolute insurer of and responsible for the condition of the horses entered in a race regardless of the acts of a third party. Should the chemical or other analysis or saliva or urine samples or other tests prove positive, showing the presence of any narcotic, stimulant, chemical or drug of any kind or description, the trainer of the horse may be suspended or ruled off, and in addition, the foreman in charge of the horse, the groom and any other person shown to have had the care or attendance of the horse may be suspended or ruled off in the discretion of the Com[411]mission, and for a like second or subsequent finding shall be ruled off.”
Also pertinent was rule 109 which provided:
“No person shall administer, or permit to be administered in any manner whatsoever, internally or externally, to any horse entered or to be entered in a race, any stimulant, depressant, hypnotic or narcotic drug, of any kind or description, prior to a race or workout.”
The court held that reading rule 117 with rule 109 readily showed that rule 109 prohibited certain acts while rule 117 purported to specify the proof required to establish the fact that the prescribed acts (rule 109) had been committed by the trainer; that in effect rule 117 provided that proof of the fact that a horse entered in a race had been administered a drug should constitute irrebuttable evidence that the trainer violated rule 109, i. e., that he administered the drug; and that rule 117 violated both the federal and Florida due process constitutional clauses because liability might not be imposed on an assumption of an essential fact, thus denying an opportunity to interpose reasonable and legitimate defenses.
As applied to the present controversy, the foregoing three cases are not controlling. While the suspension was upheld in Smith v. Cole, supra (270 App.Div. 675 [62 N.Y.S.2d 226]), there was evidence that the trainer was knowingly responsible for the treatment. There was no such evidence here. The rule considered in Mahoney v. Byers, supra (- Md. -, [48 A.2d 600]), substituted an irrebuttable presumption for an essential fact. Thus evidence was made conclusive which was not so of its own nature and inherent force. In the case at bar liability is not predicated on administration of the drug nor on the failure to exercise due care, and the presence or absence thereof would neither add nor detract. State v. Baldwin, supra (- Fla. - [31 So.2d 627]), would at first appear persuasive since rule 117, there considered, somewhat parallels rule 313 now under attack. But that case did not consider the power of a state to impose strict liability, the existence of which is the fundamental basis of our determination. Also, it would appear that the decision in the Baldwin case was influenced decisively by analogy to Mahoney v. Byers, supra (-Md.- [48 A. 2d 600]), where the mechanics rested in the employment of a presumption as conclusive evidence.
[412]From the foregoing considerations it follows that it is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious to provide that the trainer guarantee the condition of a horse running in a race upon the results of which there is wagering.
As an additional ground for the issuance of the writ Sandstrom alleged that there was no evidence to support the finding of the board that he administered the stimulant or had knowledge thereof. No such finding was made. Nor would such a finding be essential to the imposition of liability by way of suspension of a trainer’s license for violation of rule 313. That this is so is obvious from a conclusion upholding the imposition of strict liability as a proper exercise of the police power. The board found that Sandstrom was the trainer of Cover Up and that an analysis of the urine sample taken after the race showed the presence of a caffeine type alkaloid. Those findings, supported by undisputed evidence, brought Sandstrom within the operative scope of rule 313.
On appeal Sandstrom has advanced an additional ground for invalidating his suspension. He asserts that rule 313 is not a legitimate exercise of delegated authority, that is, that insofar as that rule is based on the statutory grant of power to the board to prescribe rules, regulations and conditions under which horse racing is conducted (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 19561), it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
The Constitution of the United States has no voice in determining whether power conferred on a board or commission set up by a state statute involves an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Objections that might be worthy of consideration if the court were dealing with an act of Congress are removed. (Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 [57 S.Ct. 549, 81 L.Ed. 835]; 42 Am.Jur. p. 335.) Under the doctrine of the separation of the powers of government the lawmaking function is assigned to the Legislature (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.) It is a cardinal rule that except when authorized by the Constitution the Legislature cannot delegate the power to legislate to any other authority or body. (Cal. Const., art. III, §1; Schaezlein v. Cabaniss, 135 Cal. 466 [67 P. 755, 87 Am.St.Rep. 122, 56 L.R.A. 733]; 11 Am.Jur. § 214, p. 921.)
In 1933, the Legislature passed the Horse Racing Act (Stats. 1933, p. 2046; Deering’s Gen. Laws, 1933 Supp., Act 3420) which created the California Horse Racing Board and [413]granted it “full power to prescribe rules, regulations and conditions” governing the conduct of horse races where there is wagering. By section 19 it was provided that the act should not become effective until the people should ratify a constitutional amendment approving it. At the election held June 27, 1933, section 25a, article IY of the Constitution was adopted. It provides:
“Sec. 25a. The Legislature may provide for the regulation of horse races and horse race meetings and wagering on the results thereof. The provisions of an act entitled •'An act to provide for the regulation and licensing of horse racing, horse racing meetings, and the wagering on the results thereof; to create the California Horse Racing Board for the regulation, licensing and supervision of said horse racing and wagering thereon; to provide penalties for the violation of the provisions of this act, and to provide that this act shall take effect upon the adoption of a constitutional amendment ratifying its provisions,’ are hereby confirmed, ratified, and declared to be fully and completely effective; provided, that said act may at any time be amended or repealed by the Legislature.”
The effect of this constitutional amendment as here material is that it expressly “confirmed, ratified, and declared to be fully and completely effective” the legislative grant of power to the California Horse Racing Board. That the Constitution may permit the Legislature to delegate powers may not be doubted. The Constitution may even authorize the Legislature to confer additional powers which are cognate and germane to its purposes upon a constitutional board or commission, and may further provide that such powers are unlimited by any other provisions of the Constitution. (See Const., art. XII, § 22; Pacific Telephone etc. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640 [137 P. 1119, Ann.Cas. 1915C 822, 50 L.R.A. N.S. 652].) The continuance of the grant of power into section 19561, Business and Professions Code, did not affect its status as previously ratified and confirmed. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2.) The delegation of authority here considered has constitutional support.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.