Guttman v. Berry

California Court of Appeal Feb 6, 1948 No. Civ. 16093Published

Before: McCOMB

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Holding. The court held that parol evidence is admissible to clarify the extent of leased premises when the written lease contains an ambiguous or uncertain description of the property. The evidence supported the trial court's finding that the parties intended the lease to include the rear portion of the lot and the garage structure.

Issues

Whether there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings regarding the scope of the leased premises.
Whether the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting parol evidence to ascertain the extent of the property covered by the written lease.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“If a lease is silent as to the quantity of land to which the lessee is entitled, parol evidence to determine the amount of land leased is admissible.”

“it was proper for the trial court to receive evidence showing the agreement between the parties, if any, as to the property which they intended to be covered by the description”

[508]

McCOMB, J.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants after trial before the court without a jury in an ejectment action.

The evidence being viewed in the light most favorable to defendants (respondents) these are the essential facts:

Several years prior to March 4, 1944, defendants were in possession of premises known as “346 and 346% North LaOienega, Los Angeles, California.” This property was then owned by Charles H. MacDonald. It consists of two stores located upon a lot approximately 135 feet deep which adjoins a 20-foot alley. After taking possession of the property defendants built on the rear of the lot a garage 18 feet wide which was used for sandblasting. When first erected the structure did not meet the building requirements of the city of Los Angeles, and the then owner of the property, Mr. MacDonald, and defendants went to the city attorney’s office, discussed the location of the garage, and subsequently with the full knowledge of Mr. MacDonald defendants removed the garage to the rear of the lot. Thereafter on March 4, 1944, Mr. MacDonald as lessor entered into a written lease with defendants as lessees covering the property described as “346 and 346% North LaCienega Boulevard, Los Angeles.”

At the time Mr. MacDonald leased the property to defendants he understood (1) that they were renting the stores and the yard back of them to the alley; also (2) that they could use the space back of the stores for any purpose they desired. On August 24, 1945, plaintiff purchased the above described property subject to defendants’ lease from Mr. MacDonald and has been the. owner thereof ever since. Plaintiff objected to defendants’ occupying the premises in the rear of the two store buildings, and upon defendants’ insistence upon their right to use the same the present action was instituted.

Plaintiff urges that the judgment should be reversed for the following reasons:

Fibst

There is no substantial evidence to sustain the trial court’s findings: (i) that it is not true that plaintiff is entitled, to the immediate possession of the property in the rear of the store buildings including the garage, and that defendants wrongfully refuse to surrender such premises to plaintiff; (ii) that it is true that defendants are rightfully in possession of the premises including the garage building in the rear of the two

Guttman v. Berry

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