Cairo v. Cairo

GRIFFIN, Acting P, J.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant for a divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty. The parties were married in Mexico in 1930, and separated in 1947. There were no children.

The complaint alleges the “community property” to be “an automobile, house and lot and miscellaneous household furniture and furnishings. ’ ’ Divorce and equitable division of the community property is sought.

Defendant answered and denied the general allegations as to cruelty but failed to deny the allegations as to the community property above mentioned.

The court granted the divorce and found that the “community property of the parties consists of a house and lot held in the names of plaintiff and defendant as joint tenants, though actually the community property of the parties . . . household furnishings and furniture and a 1946 Plymouth automobile.” It awarded all of the property to the plaintiff save the automobile.

Defendant and appellant now argues first that the finding of extreme cruelty and grievous mental suffering is not supported by the evidence, citing such cases as

Negley

v.

Negley,

82 Cal.App.2d 355 [186 P.2d 151], and

Truax

v. Truax, 62 Cal.App.2d 441 [145 P.2d 88], wherein the rule is stated to be that where the wrong complained of by the injured spouse is grievous mental suffering with no claim of bodily injury, the grievous mental suffering is the ultimate fact which alone will entitle the party to a divorce, and unless such mental suffering is established as a result of the acts of the other party, a judgment awarding a divorce cannot be sustained. Secondly, that plaintiff's testimony is not sufficiently corroborated, cit

[560]

ing

Gleason

v.

Gleason,

13 Cal.App.2d 231 [56 P.2d 973], holding in effect that there must be corroboration as to “at least a considerable number of important and material facts. ’ ’