Cooper v. County of Los Angeles
Before: Doran
DORAN, J.
The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend and this is an appeal by plaintiffs from the judgment that followed.
The record reveals that some time before the filing of the within action, plaintiffs had filed another and different action in the superior court, which action is still pending, for a review of the action of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Los Angeles. That action did not include, as defendants, the county of Los Angeles or any of the other defendants in the within action. It sought to enjoin the city of Los Angeles and the Board of Zoning Appeals from committing what was alleged to be a violation of the zoning ordinances of the city of Los Angeles. The property involved in that action has been leased to the county of Los Angeles, and it is alleged in the within action that said comity of Los Angeles, unless re
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strained, will commit acts that amount to a violation of valid and existing restrictions affecting said property. It is argued in substance that the county of Los Angeles was not a proper party to the former action, hence the within action is necessary to preserve the
status quo
of the property involved until the issues raised by the pleadings in the former action are settled. It is pointed out that, unless restrained, the county of Los Angeles will proceed to improve the property with permanent buildings in violation of the restrictions and then devote said buildings and property to uses and purposes that also constitute a violation of the restrictions; that such conduct on the part of the county of Los Angeles will defeat the rights of the plaintiffs in the former action; that in such circumstances a judgment, if recovered, will be to no purpose for by that time the remedy relied on in the within action, unless sought now, will be lost by laches.
It is alleged in the within action that the plaintiffs in the former action and, “many hundreds of property owners in the surrounding contiguous territory, duly prosecuted their appeal from the order of the Zoning Administrator, and said order was in due course affirmed and approved by the Board of Zoning Appeals of said City of Los Angeles, and said plaintiffs having exhausted their remedies before the administrative authorities of said City,” brought the former action. It is also alleged in the within action that the “administrative authorities,” referred to above, granted the owners’ application for a variance for a five year period, which, it is further alleged, said administrative authorities were without power to do. The property, it is alleged, is in territory zoned as R-l and restricted to residential purposes. The ordinance is set forth defining zone R-l and it is further alleged that the zoning administration and the Board of Zoning Appeals are powerless to approve a “variance from zone R-l”; that such a “variance” may only be effected by city ordinance. It is also alleged that the city ordinance relating to “variance,” the procedure therefor, when variances may be granted, and the powers and duties of the zoning administrator with regard thereto, contains no provision authorizing or permitting any penal institution or “Probation Camp for Boys.” Other pertinent provisions of the zoning ordinance are particularly set forth. It is also alleged that the granting of the variance was and is in violation of the express provisions of the ordinance, which provisions are specifically set forth. It is also alleged
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