Millick v. Peer

COUGHLIN, P. J.

The defendant appeals from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $310.72, under a contract of sale of an automobile. The agreed purchase price was $1,195. Among other things, the contract shows that a charge of $24 was made for "TR. Lie. ’ ’ It may be inferred that this item covered fees for transfer. The contract provided that, in the event of default, the seller might repossess the automobile ; resell the same at a private sale; and hold the purchaser for the balance due. It was also stated in the contract that “the receipt of a copy of this contract is hereby acknowledged by Purchaser.”

The defendant advances three grounds for reversal:

1. The first ground urged is that the contract is unenforceable because of a failure to comply with section 2982 of the Civil Code. It is contended that the contract does not set forth “A description and itemization of amounts . . .

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which will actually be paid by the seller ... to any public officer as fees in connection with the transaction . . also that the evidence fails to establish that an exact copy of the contract was “delivered by the seller to the buyer at the time of its execution”; and further, that the original or an exact copy of a policy of insurance required by the seller was not delivered to the purchaser within thirty days after execution of the contract.

' It is the opinion of the court that none of these contentions is sustainable under the general rule that, upon appeal, any evidence and all inferences that legally may be drawn therefrom which would sustain a finding in support of the judgment must be accepted by the appellate court in determining the sufficiency of such evidence as a matter of law. The record establishes a substantial compliance with the provisions of section 2982 of the Civil Code for, although the contract under consideration did not itemize the charges made in the order prescribed by subdivision (a) of said section, nevertheless, in substance, the requirements were met. The contract introduced in evidence, which was signed by the defendant, acknowledged receipt of a copy thereof by him. This was substantial evidence that an exact copy thereof was delivered to him at the time of its execution. The insurance policy for which the defendant was charged was issued after the expiration of an existing policy and the charge therefor was not included in the amounts to be paid under the contract and, consequently was not subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) of said section 2982. Moreover, the penalty of unenforceability for failure to comply with the provisions of said section 2982 applies only to the requirements set forth in subdivisions (c) and (d), and not to those set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b) of that section (Civ. Code, § 2982, subd.(e)).