McCOMB, J. Doneral Patterson, a minor aged 17, appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County sitting as a juvenile court, declaring him a ward thereof and committing him to the care and custody of the Youth Authority.
Facts: The minor was charged with entering a residence “with the intent to commit the crime of theft, thereby violating Section 459 of the Penal Code of California.”
He was taken into custody on November 30, 1961. His mother and only available parent, Opal Patterson, was given telephonic notice of the detention hearing before the juvenile court referee, set for December 1, 1961.
Following the detention hearing, the court by order adopted the referee’s recommendation that the minor be committed to the custody of the county probation officer, to be detained in the Juvenile Hall pending hearing of a petition that he be declared a ward of the court.
Written notice of the hearing on the petition, set for December 18, 1961, was personally served on the minor’s mother. After the hearing, the juvenile court declared the minor a ward of the court.
These questions are presented for determination:
First. Was insufficient notice of the detention hearing given to the minor’s mother, resulting in a lack of jurisdiction in the juvenile court ?
No. Section 630 of the Welfare and Institutions Code expressly provides that notice of a detention hearing may be given to a parent orally. Notice by telephone satisfies this requirement and constitutes due process of law. (Drummey [851]v. State Board of Funeral Directors, 13 Cal.2d 75, 80 [2] [87 P.2d 848] ; Litchfield v. County of Marin, 130 Cal.App.2d 806, 813 [7] et seq. [280 P.2d 117].)
It is conceded that notice of the detention hearing was personally served on the mother of the minor by telephone. Under the foregoing rules, this constituted sufficient notice.
Second. Were the minor and his parent adequately apprised of the right to counself
Yes. Section 633 of the Welfare and Institutions Code requires that when a minor appears at a detention hearing he, and his parent or guardian if present, be “informed of the reasons why the minor was taken into custody, the nature of the juvenile court proceedings, and the right of such minor and his parent or guardian to be represented at every stage of the proceedings by counsel.”
An affidavit of Walter A. Schmidt, the referee of the juvenile court, established that the minor was advised at the detention hearing of the right to counsel. The minor’s mother did not attend that hearing.
Section 658 of the Welfare and Institutions Code requires that notice of the hearing on a petition to declare a minor a ward of the court be served upon all the minor’s parents and guardians whose residence addresses are known. Section 659 requires that such notice contain a “statement that the minor, or his parent or guardian, is entitled to have his attorney present at the hearing on the petition, and that, if the parent or guardian is indigent and cannot afford an attorney, and the minor or his parent or guardian desires to be represented by an attorney, such parent or guardian shall promptly notify the clerk of the juvenile court.”
The mother of the minor was personally served with notice of the hearing on the petition, which notice contained the statement required by section 659.
Section 700 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides, among other things, that at the beginning of the hearing on a petition to declare one a ward of the juvenile court the “judge shall ascertain whether the minor or his parent or guardian has been informed of the right of the minor to be represented by counsel, and if not, the judge shall advise the minor and the parent or guardian, if present, of the right to have counsel present. If the parent or guardian is indigent and desires to have the minor represented by counsel, the court may appoint counsel to represent the minor, and in [852]such case the court must appoint counsel if the minor is charged with misconduct which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult.”
Accordingly, the judge is required to ascertain at the beginning of the hearing whether the parent or the minor has been informed of the right to counsel and is then required to advise them of such right only if he has ascertained that they have not previously been informed thereof.
The records before the court at the commencement of the hearing reflected that the minor had been advised at the detention hearing of the right to counsel and that his mother, who was present at the hearing on the petition, had been advised of the right to counsel in the notice of hearing personally served upon her.
Once the judge had ascertained from the records then before him that the minor and his parent had been informed of the right to counsel and that no request had been made for the appointment of counsel, he was justified in proceeding without again advising the minor or his parent of the right to counsel. That duty would have evolved upon him only if it had appeared that they had not previously been advised of such right.
The minor further contends that section 700 of the Welfare and Institutions Code requires that counsel be appointed in every ease where the parent or guardian is indigent if the minor is charged with misconduct which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult.
This contention overlooks the further requirement in the section that such an appointment is mandatory only if the parent or guardian desires the appointment of counsel. The record is devoid of any evidence which would indicate such a desire on the part of the minor’s parent. If, as here, the parent has not indicated any desire for counsel, the court has no obligation to appoint counsel, and its failure to do so did not vitiate the judgment entered.
Third. Was the minor’s admission of the charges against him the equivalent of a plea of guilty and, as such, sufficient to support the judgment?
Tes. The minor argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment and that the probation officer’s report was improperly admitted and considered by the court, since the report contained conclusions and hearsay. This contention has been held to be without merit. (In re Garcia, 201 [853]Cal.App.2d 662, 664 [2] [20 Cal.Rptr. 313]; In re Halamuda, 85 Cal.App.2d 219, 223 [192 P.2d 781].)
In addition to the report that was received in evidence when the minor appeared before the court, the charges were read, and he admitted their truth in open court. The testimony of an accused at his trial not only establishes the corpus delicti of the offense but is sufficient to justify a judgment. (People v. Hill, 2 Cal.App.2d 141, 155 [37 P.2d 849] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court] ; People v. Hudson, 139 Cal.App. 543, 544 [2] [34 P.2d 741].)
It is likewise settled that the admission by a minor of the charges against him in open court is the equivalent of a plea of guilty and therefore raises no issue of fact and precludes the necessity for the presentation of evidence in support of the allegations contained in the petition. (In re Dargo, 81 Cal.App.2d 205, 208 [4] et seq. [183 P.2d 282] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court] ; cf. People v. Johns, 173 Cal.App.2d 38, 42 [2, 3] [343 P.2d 92].)
Fourth. Did the trial judge properly review the report of the probation officer and the other records before him at the time of the hearing?
Yes. It must be presumed, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, that the statutory requirements were followed by the trial judge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 15; People v. Downer, 57 Cal.2d 800, 817 [22 Cal.Rptr. 347, 372 P.2d 107]; People v. Citrino, 46 Cal.2d 284, 287 [2] [294 P.2d 32] ; In re Smith, 33 Cal.2d 797, 801 [2] [205 P.2d 662] ; 28 Cal.Jur.2d (1956) § 5, p. 618. No showing to the contrary was made in the present case. Therefore, the presumption is here applicable.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and White, J.,* concurred.
Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.