People v. Lilyroth

GRIFFIN, P. J.

Defendant appeals from a judgment upon a jury verdict of guilty of the crime of escape, a violation of section 4532 of the Penal Code. Defendant had pleaded not guilty and “Not guilty by reason of insanity” and at a jury trial was found guilty of the offense charged and was found to be sane at the time of its commission. The evidence indicates that defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor violation of section 12025 of the Penal Code, carrying a concealed weapon, and was committed to the custody of the sheriff of Riverside County for a term of six months. It was determined that he would be confined at the Industrial Road Camp at Banning, California, where he was assigned to work under the supervision of Mr. Rose, an employee of the Riverside County Road Department and not a deputy sheriff. On November 25, 1957, 12 days after defendant’s conviction and sentencing, Mr. Rose took his group of prisoners out to work on the road in a truck which had been converted for use in transporting prisoners. It appears that other crews in custody of deputy sheriffs also were sent to the same project. After completing their day’s work the prisoners, defendant among them, were reloaded on the truck and Mr. Rose drove the truck back to the industrial road camp. While the truck was proceeding along the highway, Mr. Rose heard a noise from the rear and some shouting. He stopped the truck and as he did so he saw the back of a man running through the brush. A roll call was taken and defendant was discovered to be absent although he had not been given permission to leave by anyone in a position to authorize his departure. Mr. Rose was responsible for the custody of prisoners while transporting them.

Defendant seeks a reversal on three grounds: (1) That he was not in lawful custody at the time of the alleged escape because he was under the control of an employee of the county road department who was not a special deputy sheriff; (2) If section 4532 of the Penal Code is construed as prohibiting escape from the control of a county employee who is not a special deputy sheriff, the statute is unconstitutional because it would permit the sheriff to establish a system of “peonage”;

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and (3) That the evidence of defendant’s being lawfully confined at the time of his alleged escape was insufficient.

In the early case of