People v. Doe

172 Cal.App.2d Supp. 812 (1959) THE PEOPLE, Respondent,

v.

JANE DOE, Defendant; NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.

California Court of Appeals.

July 15, 1959. Joseph Joblin for Appellant.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and Robert W. Garcin, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.

Before Swain, Acting P. J., David, J., and Huls, J.

THE COURT.

Defendant Fisher was arrested on a morals charge, and the appellant insurance company became surety on a corporate bail bond, in the sum of $250.

The obligation of the bail bond is contractual. The surety undertakes (Pen. Code, 1459) "that the above-named defendant will appear in the above-named court on the date above set forth to answer the complaint filed against him/her and all duly authorized amendments thereof, in whatever court it may be prosecuted, and will at all times hold him/herself amenable to the orders and process of the court and, if convicted, will appear for pronouncement of judgment. ..."

[1] A bail bond serves a three-fold purpose: (1) it permits release of a defendant from incarceration; (2) it delivers the custody of the defendant to the bail bondsmen; (3) it guarantees the personal appearance of the defendant for trial, and in execution of any judgment. (County of Los Angeles v. [172 Cal.App.2d Supp. 814] Maga (1929), 97 Cal.App. 688, 690 [276 P. 352].) The last above stated is the primary purpose. (Sawyer v. Barbour (1956), 142 Cal.App.2d 827, 833 [300 P.2d 187].)

Penal Code, section 1305, provides in part: "If, without sufficient excuse, the defendant neglects to appear for arraignment or for trial or judgment, or upon any other occasion when his presence in court is lawfully required, or to surrender himself in execution of the judgment, the court must direct the fact to be entered upon its minutes and the undertaking of bail ... must thereupon be declared forfeited."

When a defendant pleads guilty, or is found guilty, the judgment or sentence is required to be pronounced at a time fixed by the court, "which must be within 21 days after the verdict, finding or plea of guilty, during which time the court shall refer the case to the probation officer for a report if eligible to probation. ..." (Pen. Code, 1191.) At the time fixed by the court in this case for judgment and report on the application for probation, the defendant did "appear for pronouncement of judgment." She was granted summary probation, as a condition of which she was committed to jail to serve (and she did serve) 30 days. Upon completion of this imprisonment she left jail pursuant to the order for probation, and not by reason of bail. It cannot be that she was still on bail while committed to jail. Commitment to jail terminates the obligations of bail. (Pen. Code, 1166; People v. McReynolds (1894), 102 Cal. 308 [36 P. 590].)