McPherson v. City of Los Angeles

California Supreme Court May 24, 1937 No. L. A. 16201Published

Before: Thompson

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Holding. The court held that a writ of mandate is a proper remedy to compel the payment of interest on a judgment where such interest is required by statute, overruling prior contrary precedent. However, the court reversed the judgment because the respondents failed to demonstrate that the statutory remedy of execution or the restoration of property under the condemnation statute was inadequate.

Issues

Whether a writ of mandate may be used to compel the payment of interest on a judgment that bears interest by force of statute.
Whether the respondents demonstrated that the statutory remedy of execution or the restoration of property was inadequate to justify the issuance of a writ of mandate.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Where a judgment has been obtained which bears interest by force of statute there seems to be no good reason for denying the remedy of mandate to compel the fulfillment of the statutory obligation to pay interest”

“In this respect Howe v. Southrey, supra, is overruled.”

“There is nothing in the record to show that the method of enforcement provided for such cases is inadequate to compel the payment of interest if the respondents are entitled thereto.”

THOMPSON, J.

This case was transferred to this court after decision by the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reversing a judgment that a peremptory writ of mandate should issue to compel the appellants to pay interest on a decree in a condemnation action, tried in the Superior Court in Tuolumne County, fixing the compensation for the' condemned property. The District Court of Appeal was of the opinion that the ease came within the rule that the writ of mandate cannot be used to require the payment of interest upon a principal sum admittedly due. Reliance was placed upon

Howe

Southrey,

144 Cal. 767 [78 Pac. 259, and

Sheehan

Board of Police Commrs.,

188 Cal. 525 [206 Pac. 70].

The appellants cite in support of their contention that the writ of mandate cannot be used to compel the payment of interest upon a judgment which does not by its terms make provision therefor,

Sheehan

Board of Police Commrs., supra; Engebretson

City of San Diego,

185 Cal. 475 [197 Pac. 651],

Howe

Southrey, supra, Barber

Mulford,

117 Cal. 356 [49 Pac. 206],

Bates

Gerber,

82 Cal. 550 [22 Pac. 1115], and

People

Fogg,

11 Cal. 351. All these cases reiterate the rule that the office of the writ of mandate is to compel performance of an act specifically enjoined by law, that it does not lie to enforce the obligations of contract nor to obtain a money judgment. With the exception of

McPherson v. City of Los Angeles

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THOMPSON, J.

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