In Re McAllister

CURTIS, J.

Upon the filing in this court by the clerk of the Superior Court of the County of Alameda, in pursuance

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oil section 288 of the Code of Civil Procedure, of a certified copy of the record of conviction of H. L. McAllister, the petitioner herein, of the crime of conspiracy to violate section 17 of the General Cemetery Act (Stats. 1931, p. 2434, as amended; Deering’s General Laws, Act No. 1288), this court entered an order removing petitioner from his office as an attorney and counselor at law, it appearing to this court at the time of the entry of said order that the judgment of conviction had become final. Upon his petition, a rehearing of said matter was granted petitioner and the same is now before this court for decision.

The sole question for our consideration is whether the petitioner was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Section 17 of the General Cemetery Act provides that, “Every person . . . who shall sell, offer for sale or advertise any cemetery plot under representation that such plot is under perpetual care before a perpetual care fund has been established for the cemetery in which such property so sold, offered for sale or advertised is situated, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. ’ ’

Undoubtedly the violation of this section of said act would involve dishonesty if not fraud. To sell lots in a cemetery representing that they are under perpetual care when no provision had been established for such perpetual care would be a false representation and make the seller thereof liable in a civil action, and under said statute, render him subject to criminal prosecution. A conviction under said statute would manifestly be a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

(In re Finch,

156 Wash. 609 [287 Pac. 677] ;

In re Comyns,

132 Wash. 391 [232 Pac. 269].)

Moral turpitude is defined as “everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals”.

(Matter of Coffey,