People v. Nowell

California Court of Appeal Jun 6, 1941Published

Before: Bishop

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Holding. The court held that reckless driving under the Vehicle Code is equivalent to willful misconduct, which includes the intentional operation of a vehicle with a wanton and reckless disregard of possible consequences, even if the driver does not know that injury is probable. Excessive speed maintained over a distance can constitute such reckless driving when it demonstrates a deliberate disregard for the safety of others.

Issues

Whether excessive speed alone can constitute reckless driving under the Vehicle Code.
Whether reckless driving requires proof that a driver knew injury was a probable result of their conduct.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“mere speed may be so excessive as to afford proof of the elements necessary to make out the more serious crime of reckless driving.”

“one may be found guilty of reckless driving if he drives so as to show a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible consequences to persons or property”

“the rate of speed at which a car is driven may of itself be so great that injury to persons and property is a distinct possibility”

45 Cal.App.2d Supp. 811 (1941) THE PEOPLE, Respondent,

SILAS NOWELL, Appellant.

California Court of Appeals.

June 6, 1941. Haight, Trippet & Syvertson for Appellant.

John F. Dockweiler, District Attorney, and Jere J. Sullivan, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent.

BISHOP, J.

One is guilty of reckless driving who drives a motor vehicle "upon a highway in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." Subdivision (a), section 505, Vehicle Code. The trial court's conclusion that the defendant was guilty of reckless driving we find to rest in the main on the fact that the defendant drove at a rate of speed varying from seventy-five to eighty-five miles per hour. Even so, we are of the opinion that the conclusion was warranted. [1a] While we recognize that one may be guilty of the offense of speeding and yet not be guilty of the crime of reckless driving, we are nevertheless of the opinion that mere speed may be so excessive as to afford proof of the elements necessary to make out the more serious crime of reckless driving.

[2] We have heretofore had occasion to determine the meaning of the words "wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property," as employed to define "reckless driving." (People v. McNutt, (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d Supp. 835 [105 PaCal.2d 657].) We concluded, in the light of several cited cases: "On consideration of all these authorities we find no substantial difference between wilful misconduct [as used in section 403, Vehicle Code, our "guest statute"] and reckless driving, and conclude that they are in truth the same thing, so far as they are concerned with the state of mind of the driver whose conduct is in question, so that the decisions construing the term 'wilful misconduct' may be applied to the statutory provision prohibiting 'reckless driving.'"

We still adhere to this conclusion. [3] There are, however, conflicting statements in the cases construing "wilful [45 Cal.App.2d Supp. 813] misconduct," and we are required to choose between them. For one thing, it is declared in Petersen v. Petersen, (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 680, 686 [67 PaCal.2d 759]: "Speed in itself and alone is not sufficient to establish willful misconduct." Then we repeatedly find statements in the cases which support this observation, in 2 Cal.Jur., Ten-Year Supp. 576: "According to the authorities, a recovery is sustainable only where the evidence leads to the conclusion that the driver knew or ought to have known that injury 'probably' would result from his conduct or was 'likely' to be the consequence thereof."

People v. Nowell

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BISHOP, J.

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