Melancon v. Walt Disney Productions

[214]

McCOMB, J.

This proceeding is a motion for a summary reversal of the order of the superior court denying defendants’ motion that plaintiff be required to furnish security pursuant to the provisions of sections 830 and 834 of the Corporations Code.

Defendants’ motion was denied by the trial court by an order reading, in part, as follows: “That the defendant, Walt Disney Incorporated, a corporation, is not a defendant entitled to indemnity from the defendant Walt Disney Productions, a corporation, within the meaning of California Corporations Code, section 830, but is a third party defendant, and the Court has no constitutional authority to grant the motion of said defendant Walt Disney Incorporated, a corporation, to require plaintiff to furnish security pursuant to the provisions of California Corporations Code, section 834, and for that reason only the motion of said defendant, Walt Disney Incorporated, a corporation, for security is denied.”

Defendants appealed from the foregoing order on October 30, 1953. On April 16, 1954, the Supreme Court of California in

Melancon

v.

Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

42 Cal.2d 698, at 703, footnote 4 [268 P.2d 1050], held that the trial court was in error in denying the motion of defendant Disney, Inc., for security, saying: “. . . the motion of defendant Disney, Inc., which the court held was ‘a third party defendant’ as to which the court ‘has no constitutional authority to grant the motion’ to require plaintiff to furnish security. For that reason only, the motion of such defendant was denied. In this view the court erred under our holding in

Beyerbach

v.

Juno Oil Co.

(42 Cal.2d 11, 24 [265 P.2d 1]), filed January 5,1954, subsequent to the trial court’s ruling herein.”

*

It thus appears from an examination of the record in the instant case, and

Melancon