Doyle v. McPherson
Before: Nourse
NOURSE, P. J.
Plaintiffs, partners doing business under the name of Doyle-Feeney Co., brought the present action against defendant, stating two causes of action—the first upon an open and current book account and the second upon an account stated—to recover the balance due upon a brokerage account. Defendant pleaded the statute of limitations and counterclaimed for damages allegedly suffered by reason of plaintiffs’ negligence in the sale of collateral security, and
[83]
pleaded a misjoinder of parties plaintiff. The cause was tried with a jury and the verdict was in favor of plaintiffs for $1500. Thereupon plaintiffs moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Said motion was granted, and judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs for the amount prayed for, $2,319.20. Defendant appeals from the judgment in favor of plaintiffs and from the order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Defendant opened the account with Warded, Taylor, Dunn & Co. in November, 1927. This partnership was succeeded by Bacon, Warded & Co., Warded, Doyle & Co., and DoyleFeeney Co. Bach firm was a general partnership engaged in the brokerage business, and each succeeded to the assets and liabilities of its predecessor by purchase and assignment. Defendant terminated his stock transactions in October, 1930, when Bacon, Warded & Co. sold four bonds which had been held by them as collateral security. These securities, which were sold at a loss, are the basis of the counterclaim that they were held too long after defendant ordered a sale. After this sale no transactions occurred other than the payment of $500 by defendant in 1931 and two other payments of $100 each. Interest was regularly charged to the account upon the balance due. The action was not commenced until June 8,1937. The last item in the account was a credit of 70 cents resulting from the sale of a fractional share.
The appedant states seven questions which he urges as grounds for reversal. The first is whether the respondents were not required to both plead and prove an assignment of the claim from their predecessors. The pleading is in the form of the common count—upon an open current book account, and upon an account stated. The sufficiency of the pleading is not open to question.
(Pike
More from California Court of Appeal
- People v. Hill (1998)
- In Re Autumn H. (1994)
- Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
- In Re Casey D. (1999)
- Santisas v. Goodin (1998)
- Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
- People v. Rivera (2015)
- People v. Barnett (1998)
- People v. Serrano (2012)
- Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)