Spanach v. Superior Court

WASTE, C. J.

We are in agreement with the following portions of the opinion heretofore prepared in this proceeding by Mr. Presiding Justice Stephens when the same was pending before the District'Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, and we adopt the same, with some additional comment, as and for the decision of this court:

“This is a petition for a writ of review of a proceeding in the superior court which may be briefly stated as follows: Heretofore petitioners brought suit for damages alleged to have resulted from medical malpractice against certain physicians individually and as members of a copartnership of physicians designated as ‘Ross-Loos Medical Group’, hereinafter referred to as ‘Medical Group’.

“Although the complaint alleges that petitioners are members of the Medical Group a reading of the pleadings and exhibits reveals that instead of being members, petitioner Steven N. Spanaeh was, at the times herein concerned, a member of a voluntary association known as ‘Los Angeles Police Relief Association’. Such ‘Relief Association’ as it will here

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after be designated and ‘Medical Group’ entered into a long and detailed ‘Memorandum of Agreement’ by the terms of which the Medical Group became obligated to furnish certain medical and allied services to ‘subscribers’ or members and their families of the ‘Relief Association’. Elna Marie Spanach, the other petitioner, was the wife of Steven N. Spanach, and the alleged malpractice relates to treatment accorded her by a physician attached to the Medical Group.

“The Superior Court action reached the point of taking testimony when defendants requested leave to amend their answers by alleging that said agreement provided that the alleged cause of afetion was subject to compulsory arbitration. The amendments were finally allowed and plaintiffs (petitioners here) by their counsel orally acceded to arbitration. Before such accession, however, there was much discussion turning on the effect of the arbitration provision of the agreement and the court suggested that it was probably without jurisdiction to proceed with the case and that its jurisdiction could be tested by a writ of mandate. Thereafter the court made an order that all proceedings should be stayed ‘until arbitration might be had in accordance with the arbitration agreement’.