American Mission Army, Inc. v. City of Lynwood

MOORE, P. J.

The question for decision is whether special and general demurrers to the complaint were properly sustained.

The pleading alleges that plaintiff is a religious corporation; that it has applied to the city council of respondent for a permit and was refused; that a controversy has existed between the parties as to appellant’s right “to solicit funds in the City of Lynwood for religious purposes, with or without a permit and as to whether the city has authority under the constitution and statutes of this state to forbid any person, lay or ministerial, from soliciting funds for religious purposes and for the purpose of spreading the gospel of Jesus Christ and the Christian religion.” 'Other matters are declared as arguments and authority but they add no substance to the above quoted allegations. The demurrer alleges (1) the facts set forth in the complaint are insufficient to state a cause of action; (2) it is uncertain in that it cannot be ascertained therefrom how or in what manner a present legal controversy exists between the parties and whether or not plaintiff claims that it made application for a' permit to solicit funds under some statute or ordinance requiring such an application for a permit or whether the city council of its own volition required such application to be filed or whether plaintiff voluntarily filed said application for a permit; that it cannot be ascertained whether the authority to issue such a permit vests in the chief of police or in the city council; nor can it be ascertained from the complaint in what manner the defendant is interfering with plaintiff in the solicitation of funds in the City of Lynwood; that it cannot be ascertained wherein the city council has no power to require a permit to be obtained to solicit funds for religious purposes.

Both the general and the special demurrers were sustained with leave to amend. But appellant refused to do so, declaring “we did not amend because there was nothing to amend.”

By the title of appellant’s complaint and by certain declarations thereof, and by its argument, appellant urges' that its pleading is one for declaratory relief and demands a settlement of the controversy, that an injunction issue to

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prevent interference with its statutory and constitutional rights and “mandatorily” to require the city to permit solicitation. The purpose of the declaratory judgment is to serve some practical end in quieting a disputed jural relation.