People v. White

GRIFFIN, J.

Defendant was charged with, and entered a plea of guilty to, violating section 332 of the Vehicle Code in that he drove an automobile upon a public highway during a time when his privilege to do so was suspended by the Department of Motor Vehicles.

The recommendation of the probation officer was that probation be denied and that defendant be fined $300 or serve 90 days in jail. The judge denied his application for probation and sentenced him to 90 days in the Industrial Road Camp. Notice of appeal was filed on August 2, 1951.

[297]

On this appeal defendant endeavors to present two contentions -. (1) that it appears from the probation officer’s report that defendant was in an automobile accident in 1950 ; that he carried no liability or property damage insurance and was required under sections 410 et sequitur of the Vehicle Code (Financial Responsibility Law) to deposit security in the amount of $470 because of this accident; that he did not do so; that as a result of this fact his license to operate a motor vehicle was suspended or that it was surrendered to the department in January, 1951; and that accordingly, the imprisonment of defendant for driving an automobile while his license was suspended for the grounds stated, was in violation of article I, section 15, of the Constitution of California, in that it constituted imprisonment for nonpayment of a civil debt; (2) that the court abused its discretion in not granting probation under the circumstances related in the report of the probation officer.

As to the first proposition, counsel for defendant cites no cases in support of his argument. In many respects the constitutionality and validity of section 420 and other kindred sections of the Vehicle Code have been upheld in

Escobedo

v.

State of California,

35 Cal.2d 870 [222 P.2d 1]. The authorities there cited help to fortify the defense of the attack here made. It was there held that the state, in the exercise of its police power, could constitutionally have required a deposit of security by owners of all vehicles as a condition to licensing them. The defendant’s imprisonment here was not for debt nor for his failure to deposit security following the accident which caused him to be imprisoned, but rather, it was for his affirmative act in driving his automobile at a time when he was forbidden to do so. The situation is analogous to those cases in which persons, in order to carry on certain businesses and professions, have been required to pay license taxes, and have failed to do so. When such persons have been convicted of carrying on such businesses and professions without having paid the license tax, the courts have upheld the legality of imprisonment therefor against the contention that it would be unlawful imprisonment for debt.