Caffrey v. Tilton

SHENK, J.

The plaintiff is a resident of the city and county of San Francisco. The plaintiff sued the defendant in San Francisco, for declaratory relief in reference to his rights under a contract which they had entered into in Los Angeles Qounty. The defendant appeals from an order denying his motion for a change of venue to Los Angeles.

At the time this action was commenced the defendant was and for many years prior thereto had been a resident of the county of Los Angeles and engaged in a gear manufacturing business. The contract contemplated the employment of the plaintiff as the defendant’s sales representative for northern California on a commission basis. This agreement is contained in a letter from the defendant to the plaintiff which lists

[373]

certain “companies we have done work for” in northern California. The plaintiff obtained an order from one of these companies but the defendant told him not to negotiate with that company because its financial situation was precarious. The defendant added that if the plaintiff did not wish to continue his work subject to this condition he could consider the agreement as revoked. The plaintiff thereupon filed the complaint in this action alleging that he had performed all terms of the agreement but that the defendant seeks to modify or terminate it, and asking for a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to a commission on present and future business from this particular company, for a declaratory judgment ordering that the plaintiff receive such compensation, and for a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties.

It is undisputed that under the general provisions of section 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure the defendant is entitled to have this action tried in Los Angeles which is both his residence and the place where the contract was entered into. It is contended, however, that there is a “special contract in writing” sufficient to justify the denial of the -requested change of venue in accordance with the following portion of that section; “When a defendant has contracted to perform an obligation in a particular county, either the county where such obligation is to be performed, or in which the contract was in fact entered into, or the county in which the defendant . . . resides at the commencement of the action, shall be a proper county for the trial of an action founded on such obligation, and