Ballarini v. Schlage Lock Co.

100 Cal.App.2d Supp. 859 (1950) ANTHONY BALLARINI, Respondent,

v.

SCHLAGE LOCK COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Appellants.

California Court of Appeals.

Nov. 17, 1950. Littler, Coakley & Lauritzen for Appellants.

Elmer P. Delany for Respondent.

KAUFMAN, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the municipal court in favor of plaintiff and respondent upholding the validity and constitutionality of section 5699 of the Elections Code of the State of California. [100 Cal.App.2d Supp. 861]

Said Elections Code section reads as follows: "Every voter shall, on the day of every general, direct primary or presidential primary election at which he is entitled to vote, be entitled to absent himself from any service or employment in which he is then engaged for two consecutive hours between the time of opening and the time of closing the polls. The voter shall not, because of so absenting himself, be liable to any penalty, nor shall any deduction be made on account of such absence from his usual salary or wages."

The record before us shows that plaintiff is a member of Lodge 1327 Association of Machinists, and prosecutes this action as an assignee and on behalf of 48 assignor members of the association who took time off (two hours) on November 8, 1948, a general election day, falling within the provisions of Elections Code, section 5699. This action is to recover their wages for the time taken off pursuant to the provisions of Elections Code, section 5699.

Appellants, who are the employers of the 48 members of the Machinists Association contend that Elections Code, section 5699, is void and unconstitutional insofar as it provides that no deduction shall be made on account of the worker's absence on election day from his salary or wages.

Similar election code provisions contained in the laws of sister states have been passed upon by the courts of those states and such provisions have been upheld in some states and declared void in others.

Our Elections Code, section 5699, was first adopted by the Legislature in 1891, and has been on our statute books ever since. It has never until now been under attack before our courts.

[1] In considering the validity of such a statute it is well to note that the state may exercise its police power whenever the public interests demand it, and in this particular, a large discretion is necessarily vested in the Legislature to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. (See Barrett v. State of New York, 220 N.Y. 423 [116 N.E. 99, Ann.Cas. 1917D 807]; People v. Ford Motor Co., 271 App.Div. 141 [63 N.Y.S.2d 697].)