GIBSON, C. J. Prior to his marriage to defendant in 1929 plaintiff purchased 20 acres of farm land. During the marriage $1,000 of community funds were expended in improving the property. The parties separated in 1942, and Mrs. Krier continued to reside on the land.
On May 18, 1943, Mrs. Krier recorded a declaration of homestead on the property and later on the same day she filed an action for separate maintenance. In her complaint in that action she made no reference to the declaration of homestead she had previously filed on the property. Instead, she alleged that the parties were “possessed of certain community property, consisting of a community interest” in the land above mentioned, and prayed for judgment “awarding her all of the community property hereinbefore described.” During the trial of the separate maintenance action Mrs. Krier likewise made no reference or claim to any homestead interest in the property, basing her right thereto solely on the alleged community interest. Judgment was entered in September, 1943, granting separate maintenance to Mrs. Krier, directing Mr. Krier to pay her $75 a month for the support of herself and a minor child, and awarding her one-half of the community property, i. e., one-half of the value of the improvements made with community funds. The judgment in that action has long since become final. Mr. Krier thereafter procured a decree of divorce in Nevada. No disposition of the property was attempted in the Nevada action.
Later, in June, 1944, Mr. Krier brought this action against Mrs. Krier for partition of the property alleging that he was the owner and entitled to its possession as his sole and separate property subject only to the interest (one-half of the value of the improvements made thereon with community funds) created in Mrs. Krier by the prior decree of separate maintenance. She answered and cross-complained, setting up for the first time a homestead interest in the property based [843]on the declaration filed by her prior to commencement of the separate maintenance action but, as stated, not advanced by her during any stage of that proceeding.
It. was found and concluded herein that the decree in the separate maintenance action is res judicata of Mrs. Krier.’s interest in the property, including the homestead interest. Physical partition being impracticable, the court ordered the property sold and, in accordance with the prior decree of separate maintenance, awarded Mrs. Krier one-half of the value of the improvements made with community funds. She has appealed and contends that the court erred in holding that she is barred by the prior judgment from now claiming a homestead interest in the property.
Section 137 of the Civil Code provides that in granting a wife permanent support and maintenance, the court “shall make the same disposition of the community property and of the homestead, if any, as would have been made if the marriage had been dissolved. . . .” (Italics added.) (See Civ. Code, § 146, with respect to the manner of disposition of a homestead.)
In the prior separate maintenance action Mrs. Krier sought and procured an adjudication with respect to her interest in the property. She here seeks a second adjudication relative to her interest in the same property. It is settled, however, that a judgment in a prior action between the same parties on the identical cause of action is res judicata, and a bar to a second suit thereon, not only as to issues actually determined therein but also as to issues necessarily involved. (Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Cal.2d 636 [134 P.2d 242]; Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807 [122 P.2d 892]; see Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690 [28 P.2d 916]; Rest., Judgments, § 63, comment (a); 2 Freeman on Judgments (5th ed.) § 676, p. 1425.) And even though the causes of action be different, the prior determination of an issue is conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties as to that issue and every matter which might have been urged to sustain or defeat its determination. (Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Cal.2d 195 [99 P.2d 652, 101 P.2d 497]; see Price v. Sixth Dist. Agri. Assn., 201 Cal. 502 [258 P. 387]; 2 Freeman on Judgments, § 677, p. 1429.)
Having claimed the property in the prior action solely as community property and having procured a decree therein based on its character as such, Mrs. Krier is precluded from [844]seeking in this later action another award thereof based on an entirely different interest (homestead or otherwise) existing, but unclaimed, at the time of the earlier adjudication. Under the circumstances, she was required to advance her entire interest, whether community or homestead, or both, in order to permit the court to make an effective and complete adjudication of the respective interests of the parties. (Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 202 Cal. 312, 318 [260 P. 545].) Not having done so, she cannot relitigate the matter, whether it be held that the two suits involved the same cause of action insofar as they concerned her interest in the property, or merely involved a common issue as to her interest in the property.
The separate maintenance suit placed in issue the interests of the parties in particular property, and the court having determined the issue, the judgment on the merits is conclusive.
■ The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.