Laurent v. City & County of San Francisco

GOODELL, J.

Appellant filed in the superior court his petition for a writ of mandate to compel respondents as members of the Public Utilities Commission and J. H. Turner as manager of public utilities and B. M. Doolin as manager and chief engineer of the airport department “to formally accept the bid of petitioner and to execute a lease with petitioner, ...” covering a certain area at the San Francisco

[708]

Airport near South San Francisco. Respondents’ return raised issues of law and fact. The court’s ruling denying the writ amounted to the sustaining of a demurrer to the petition.

The petition alleges that at the direction of the commission a call for bids was issued by the director of property, reciting that sealed bids would be received up to October 21, 1948, at 10 a. m. for leasing for automobile parking and “U” Drive purposes an area approximately 229 feet by 310 feet at the airport, north of the administration building. The call recited that the lease would be for three years, subject to the covenants, terms and conditions set forth in the proposed, lease on file in the office of the director and that it would be “awarded to the highest responsible bidder subject to confirmation by the Public Utilities Commission. ’ ’ It ■concluded with the statement “Right reserved to reject any and all bids” and was signed by Eugene J. Riordan, director of property..

The petitioner alleges that at the time and place mentioned he and others were present and “bids were opened and examined and your petitioner was thereupon publicly declared by the respondent Turner to be the highest bidder and the winner of the lease.”

There are allegations that appellant thereupon made arrangements and purchases preparatory to entering into possession under the prospective lease, and disposed of other business interests.

It is then alleged that about November 22, 1948, the commission adopted a resolution rejecting petitioner’s bid and on the 24th notified him in writing of such resolution and rejection. It appears from the record that the commission rejected not only, appellant’s bid but all bids.

Appellant argues that “The mode provided for the leasing of lands devoted to airport purposes is clearly and intelligibly set forth in section 93 of the charter and no mode other than that provided by the statute mav be followed.”