Puccetti v. Girola

TRAYNOR, J.

On April 21, 1931, Alberto Puccetti commenced an action against Giróla Bros., a corporation, Henry Giróla, its president and sole stockholder, and others for fraudulently inducing him to purchase stock in a subsidiary corporation. Before that suit was filed, Giróla Bros, had changed its name to Madalay, Inc., and while the action was pending, it conveyed by quitclaim deeds certain real property to defendant Madeline Giróla, a director of Giróla Bros, and the mother of Henry Giróla. The deeds, recorded by Madeline Giróla, set forth Madalay, Inc., as grantor, but

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failed to set forth the name in which Madalay Inc. derived title to the realty as required by section 1096 of the Civil Code. On November 1, 1933, Pueeetti obtained a judgment, and on July 9, 1937, recorded an abstract thereof and a writ of execution levying upon all the right, title, and interest of the judgment debtors in the property. On August 18, 1937, Madeline Giróla executed a mortgage on the property to defendant State Finance Company which recorded it on October 8, 1937. On November 8, 1937, Puccetti purchased the land at an execution sale and on that day recorded the sheriff’s certificate of sale. On December 9,1938, he recorded the sheriff's deed conveying the property to him. He then brought this action to quiet title to the land, claiming that the conveyance to Madeline Giróla was void because it failed to comply with section 1096 of the Civil Code and because it was in fraud of creditors.

The trial court made findings in favor of defendants and granted the cross-complaint of Madeline Giróla, quieting title in her. Puccetti has appealed from the judgment. Following his death during the pendency of the- appeal, his administratrix, Gemma Puccetti, was substituted as plaintiff and appellant.

It is admitted that the conveyance from Madalay Inc. to Madeline Giróla failed to comply with section 1096 of the Civil Code, providing “Any person in whom the title of real estate is vested, who shall afterwards, from any cause, have his or her name changed, must in any conveyance of said real estate so held, set forth the name in which he or she derived title to said real estate.” Appellant contends that the requirements of this section are mandatory and that a deed in violation thereof does not pass legal title. Respondents argue that the section must be construed to have the same effect as the recording statutes embodied in sections 1213-1218 of the Civil Code, so that a conveyance in disregard thereof can be attacked only by a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer for value without notice of the change of name by the original owner.