Grimes v. Steele

California Court of Appeal Jan 25, 1943 No. Civ. 6697Published

Before: Paulsen

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Holding. The court held that the vendees were not entitled to specific performance due to failure to perform contract conditions, and that the vendors were entitled to quiet title because the vendees' conduct and declarations rendered a formal tender of a deed by the vendors unnecessary.

Issues

Whether the vendees were entitled to specific performance of the real estate purchase agreement.
Whether the vendors were required to tender a deed before quieting title when the vendees' conduct indicated such tender would be unavailing.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“there is no evidence in the record to show that appellants had fully performed, offered to perform, or proved sufficient excuse for not performing all the conditions of the agreement.”

“it is equally well settled that where the conduct or declarations of the vendee are such as to show that such tender would be unavailing, the tender is not necessary.”

“It is obvious that a tender of a deed and demand for performance would have been unavailing and were therefore excused.”

PAULSEN, J. pro tem.

On June 21, 1933, appellants, as vendees, and respondents, as vendors, entered into an agreement for the purchase and sale of certain real estate. Appellants brought this action for specific performance of the agreement, and respondents filed a cross-complaint praying that their title be quieted. The court found that appellants were in default and had forfeited all rights under the contract before the bringing of this action. The judgment deified specific performance and quieted respondents’ title to the property.

The agreement provided for a total purchase price of $643 payable in monthly installments with interest on deferred payments. It was further provided “that the said vendees shall be let into and have immediate possession of said prem

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ises; but that time is of the essence of this contract; and that if the said vendees shall fail to pay the said installments, or any of them when due, the said vendors shall be released from all obligation to convey said property; and, in such event vendees shall forfeit all right to said property and all payments theretofore made by them shall be forfeited to the said vendor; that acceptance of any of said installments after the date when same became due shall not be considered as a waiver of time of payment of future installments thereafter falling due. The said vendors, upon receiving payments at the time and in the manner hereinbefore specified, agree to execute and deliver ... a good and sufficient deed ...”

Upon the execution of the agreement appellants entered into possession and made periodic payments up to and including the 21st day of July, 1936. Ten of these, made subsequent to April 21, 1934, were accepted by respondents long after they became due. The final payment was due January 21,1937, but on October 24, 1937, and November 18, 1937, appellants mailed payments of $18 and $20, respectively, to respondents. These were refused and respondents instructed their attorney to notify appellants that the agreement was terminated. Apparently this notice was not given. Appellants do not claim to have made other direct payments but assert that the purchase price was paid in full by other methods.

It is the contention of respondents that they recovered possession of the premises on October 22, 1937, but appellants insist that they rented the property to one Boering on October 27, 1937, received at least a part of the rent from him and had at all times kept furniture in the house and retained control of one room for their own use. They assert further that in January, 1938, the attorney who then represented them ordered Boering to pay the rent to Mr. Snyder, respondents’ attorney, for application to the balance due on the purchase price and that four payments were received by respondents in that manner.

Grimes v. Steele

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