Pease v. Gibson

PULLEN, P. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment rendered against the administrator of the estate of Rachel C. Gibson, deceased.

The action was one to quiet title, and the court found plaintiff to be the owner of the property in question, and made the further finding that defendant had no interest therein.

Appellant, who is the son of Rachel C. Gibson, deceased, takes the position that the property in question, to the extent of the interest of Rachel as tenant in common, is subject to administration even though respondent may have gained title thereto by adverse possession. No administration was had or sought of the estate of Rachel Gibson until 1935, at which time appellant was appointed administrator.

[354]

Rachel C. Gibson, the deceased, took an interest in this property as a tenant in common with her husband by way of a deed which was executed and recorded in 1892. Rachel died in 1916, and her husband, William Gibson, married Arvilla. In 1925 William Gibson conveyed the whole of this property by gift deed to Arvilla Gibson, his wife. This deed was recorded in July, 1925. Arvilla Gibson conveyed this property to Emily HufEmaster, the mother of respondent, by deed in 1928. This deed was recorded in May, 1929. Emily HufEmaster died in 1930, and this property was distributed to respondent and her brother, Earl HufEmaster in 1931. By deed dated and recorded September 5, 1931, Earl HufEmaster conveyed his interest in the property to respondent. Since the time of the grant by William Gibson to Arvilla, the latter and her grantee, Emily HufEmaster, and respondent herein, have

been

in possession of the property, have fenced and made improvements to it and paid all taxes thereon up to the year 1935.

We are of the opinion that the judgment in favor of respondent is proper and that appellant has no interest in the property in question, either as administrator of the estate of Rachel 0. Gibson or as heir thereto. The findings are adequately supported by the evidence of good title by adverse possession in the respondent. Even though it were to be presumed that privity of estate, for the purpose of title by adverse possession did not exist as between Arvilla Gibson and the mother of respondent, nevertheless, the evidence shows that respondent’s mother went into possession of the property under deed and color of title in May, 1929. This deed was recorded the same day.