People v. McLachlan
Before: Shaw
SHAW, P. J.
The defendant was charged with violating subdivision (a) of section 560 of the Vehicle Code and now appeals from a judgment of conviction entered against him. The code provision just mentioned reads as follows: “The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk or within any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.” The terms “roadway” and “crosswalk” are defined in the Vehicle Code, but no questions arise here as to their meaning, and those definitions need not be copied.
There is very little conflict in the evidence, but resolving such conflicts as there are in favor of the judgment, the following facts appear: The events on which the charge is based occurred at the intersection of Figueroa Street and Bishop Road. Figueroa Street here runs in a northerly and southerly direction and is divided by a white center stripe; each half is further divided into two lanes by another line, the lane nearest the center line being 10 feet wide and the other lane next to the curb, being 27% feet wide. Bishop Road runs in a northwesterly and southeasterly direction, intersecting Figueroa Street diagonally, and a painted crosswalk 15 feet wide extends across Figueroa Street in line with the southerly curb line of Bishop Road. The defendant was driving his automobile northerly on Figueroa Street, after dark, at a speed of about 25 miles per hour, in the east half of the street, and as he approached this crosswalk he turned into the lane nearest the center line. There were other automobiles ahead of him on his right which obscured his view of the easterly 27% feet of the crosswalk. While defendant was approaching the crosswalk, two pedestrians crossing Figueroa Street from west to east passed in front of him in the crosswalk, completely crossed the ten-foot lane in which he was driving, and reached a point several feet east of the easterly line of this lane, where other automobiles cut off defendant’s view of them. As they reached this point, another automobile, in the lane to the right of defendant, came up to the crosswalk, at a high rate of speed, and bore down
*Supp. 757
upon these pedestrians. Thereupon the pedestrians suddenly-leaped backward to the west, directly in front of defendant’s car, which was then 20 feet from them. He at once applied his brakes, turned hard to his left and skidded to a stop, but his car ran into the crosswalk and there struck the pedestrians before stopping. Defendant testified that he did not see these pedestrians when they crossed in front of him going easterly; but his duty to yield them the right of way cannot be any greater by reason of that fact than it would have been if he had seen them. It is our opinion that on these facts defendant was not guilty of the charge laid against him. While it does not appear that his speed violated any of the
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