California Court of Appeal Oct 24, 2013 No. E054551Unpublished
Filed 10/24/13 P. v. Saway CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E054551
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF129653)
CHANTHON SAWAY, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Becky Dugan, Judge.
Affirmed.
Lauren E. Eskenazi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Peter
Quon, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant and appellant Chanthon Saway appeals from the trial court’s denial of
her motion to set aside her felony conviction pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1203.4.
We find no error and affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
On April 28, 2006, defendant pled guilty to felony unlawfully obtaining the
Defendant here sought relief based upon the third situation, i.e., the motion asked
the trial court to find that relief should be granted in the interests of justice based upon a
five-year crime-free period, completion of three years of probation, rehabilitation, and a
“desire to seek future professional employment.”
On appeal, defendant argues that reversal and remand is required because the trial
court “refused to consider these ‘interests of justice’ factors and denied relief solely on
[defendant]’s unsatisfactory performance on probation.” Defendant also claims that the
trial court “misunderstood its discretion because it erroneously believed that
[defendant]’s probation violation, alone, precluded section 1203.4 relief as a matter of
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law and, thus, relinquished its discretionary power to address the issue based on the
‘interests of justice.’” There is no merit to these claims.
“When the question on appeal is whether the trial court has abused its discretion,
the showing is insufficient if it presents facts which merely afford an opportunity for a
difference of opinion. An appellate tribunal is not authorized to substitute its judgment
for that of the trial judge.” (People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 59, 65.)
“[D]iscretion is abused only if the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances being considered.” (Ibid.) This rule requires that the reviewing court
engage in all intendments and presumptions in support of the decision and consider the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. (People v. Condley (1977) 69
Cal.App.3d 999, 1015 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) It also requires that the party claiming
abuse of discretion affirmatively establish the point. (Smith v. Smith (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d
952, 958.)
A grant of probation is “‘a bargain made by the People, through the Legislature
and the courts, with the convicted individual, whereby the latter is in essence told that if
he complies with the requirements of probation, he may become reinstated as a law-
abiding member of society. [Citation.] As an additional inducement, the “removal of the
blemish of a criminal record” is held out through the provisions of Penal Code section
1203.4. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘The expunging of the record of conviction is, in
essence, a form of legislatively authorized certification of complete rehabilitation based
on a prescribed showing of exemplary conduct during the entire period of probation.’”
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(People v. Covington (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1270; see also Johnson, supra, 211
Cal.App.4th at pp. 261-262.)
Here, the trial court did not disregard the evidence of defendant’s rehabilitation as
defendant claims. Defendant clearly presented the factors for the trial court’s
consideration. The trial court simply found that defendant’s nonexemplary conduct
during the entire period of probation outweighed the evidence of defendant’s relatively
short-lived rehabilitation. The record also fails to demonstrate that the trial court
misunderstood the scope of its discretion. Defendant had pointed out in her motion for
relief that the trial court had discretion to grant relief in the interests of justice.
Defendant also pointed out in her motion that the court should grant relief based on the
following factors: (1) completing probation; (2) remaining crime-free since 2006;
(3) pursuing economic opportunities; (4) completing a rehabilitation program;
(5) volunteering and helping others; and (6) attending college for business administration.
Defendant’s arguments do no more than highlight a difference of opinion about
the significance of the factors considered by the trial court in evaluating the interests of
justice rather than demonstrate that the trial court’s opinion was irrational. (See, e.g.,
McLernon, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 577 [“A request for relief under the interests of
justice provision of section 1203.4 necessarily will be based upon the facts as they exist
at the time of the request. Those facts may be very different at different times. For
example, at the time McLernon brought his first motion in 2001, he had been drug free
and crime free for only six years. By the time of the motion at issue in this appeal, he had
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been drug free and crime free for 12 years”].) Defendant, therefore, fails to affirmatively
demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
Defendant’s reliance on McLernon, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 569, to support her
position that the trial court failed to consider her interests of justice factors is unavailing.
Unlike here, the motion filed in the McLernon case was clearly denied without the trial
court considering his interests of justice factors or the merits of his motion but instead
relying upon the denials of his motion in 2001 and his petition in 2007. The record on
appeal included a minute order of the court’s ruling, which stated: “‘The petition for
relief pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.4 is rejected having been submitted and denied
on 3-06-01 and 6-05-07.’” (Id. at p. 574.) The appellate court explained: “First, the
language of the minute order at issue makes clear that the trial court did not consider the
merits of McLernon’s motion. The court ‘rejected’ the motion as ‘having been submitted
and denied on 3-06-01 and 6-05-07.’ Moreover, the minute order denying the previous
motion petition on June 5, 2007 indicates that the reason for that denial was the denial of
the March 6, 2001 motion, which was denied ‘due to unsatisfactory performance on
probation.’ Thus, it appears that the sole basis for denying any of McLernon’s requests
for relief under section 1203.4 was his unsatisfactory performance on probation.” (Id. at
p. 575.)
In the present matter, defendant cannot affirmatively show that the trial court did
not consider the merits of her motion or her interests of justice factors but instead solely
relied on her poor performance on probation. Defendant also cannot affirmatively
demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion. In fact, the
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record shows otherwise. The trial court simply exercised its discretion in finding that the
interests of justice did not require the relief be granted.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
KING J.
CODRINGTON J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for relief under Penal Code section 1203.4, as the record demonstrated the court considered the defendant's rehabilitation evidence but found it outweighed by her prior probation violations.
Issues
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for relief under Penal Code section 1203.4.
Whether the trial court failed to consider the 'interests of justice' factors or misunderstood the scope of its discretionary authority.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court simply found that defendant’s nonexemplary conduct during the entire period of probation outweighed the evidence of defendant’s relatively short-lived rehabilitation.”
“The record also fails to demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion.”
“The trial court simply exercised its discretion in finding that the interests of justice did not require the relief be granted.”