counseling, and academic deficits. Minor‟s mother was “too complacent” about minor‟s
behavior to supervise him adequately under one of the programs considered.
Several features of minor‟s case were concerning. He brutally attacked a younger
child over a petty matter: accidentally being sprayed with Silly String. When a petition
was filed, describing the theft of a classmate‟s cell phone, minor purposely sought out the
victim‟s address, went to his home, threatened the victim and his mother, and physically
struck the victim in retaliation for reporting the crime. Minor‟s general anger issues had
led to several fights, which resulted in disciplinary actions at school. Minor was not
remorseful, and refused to apologize to the victims. He had other difficulties, including
substance abuse, poor school attendance, and poor grades. He denied membership in a
gang, but he was affiliated with a number of gang members. His older brother had been a
gang member and had died when minor was 12 years old.
Minor‟s mother was the one stable element in minor‟s life, but she appeared
unaware of or in denial about minor‟s poor academic progress, his use of drugs and
alcohol, his frequent fights, and his disciplinary issues at school. She had also failed to
get any help for minor with respect to his grief over his brother‟s death and the
5
abandonment of the family by minor‟s father. The mother was unable to maintain control
of minor‟s behavior.
Because of minor‟s “anger issues and impulsive and volatile actions,” he was “at
severe risk of harming others. Until he receives appropriate treatment, it is only a matter
of time until he strikes out again and injures someone else.” The probation department
therefore recommended an out-of-home placement. Specifically, the probation
department recommended that minor be “placed in a suitable foster/group home, relative
home, county or private facility with no preference for such period as deemed necessary
by staff/probation officer, further, that the minor not be placed at YOP Indio without
further order of the court, . . .”
The treatment plan for minor indicated that the type of placement appropriate for
minor would take into consideration, “the minor‟s need for the least restrictive, most
family-like environment; the minor‟s age, sex, and cultural background; the planned
parent/guardian contacts during the separation and the specific actions to be taken b[y]
the parent/guardian/minor which will facilitate reunification; the appropriateness of
attempting to maintain the special needs of the minor, including transportation, diet,
clothing, recreation, and education, and the capability of [t]he care provider to meet the
needs of the minor. The placement selection will be a safe setting that is the closest
proximity to the parent/guardian‟s home, consistent with the minor‟s needs and best
interests.” Any placement would have to be able to dispense medications, treat
6
substance abuse, provide family counseling and individual and group therapy, contain an
on-grounds school, isolate the minor from the community, provide a structured setting,
instruct in independent living skills, and provide anger and grief counseling.
At the dispositional hearing, the court made findings in accordance with the
probation report and case plan. The court declared minor a ward of the juvenile court and
placed him in the custody of the probation officer. The court agreed that “the minor
needs to be placed,” but noted that the report “doesn‟t recommend the Youthful Offender
Program in Indio. It just recommends some unspecified placement.” Minor‟s counsel
related to the court that, “the parties stipulated as part of the agreement that it would be
YOP Indio. . . . It is unfortunate he does get referred out, because my information he has
also been screened and accepted by Twin Pines Ranch. Which was not part of the deal,
but now has the minor encouraged he is going to Twin Pines Ranch and going tomorrow
rather than sitting on a waiting list to go to YOP.”
The court opined that the parties might not be able to determine the disposition,
because it “is the unique role of a judge to rehabilitate a minor to make sure he has
appropriate orders for rehabilitation.” The prosecutor objected that the People had
dropped a number of outstanding charges, including at least one strike offense, on the
understanding that the defense agreed minor would be placed at YOP. “And I would ask
the Court to follow the district attorney and defense‟s agreed upon negotiation.”
The court probation officer interjected that the screening committee was reluctant
“to send the minor to YOP right out of the gate, because that is our most restrictive
placement. And with probation we attempt to use escalating consequences. In this
7
matter the minor was screened for Twin Pines Ranch and accepted. There is a mental
health component there. There is gang component. There is drug component. It is felt
that he should get an opportunity to work on some of these problems at the ranch
rather than at YOP.” The probation department preferred to reserve YOP as a
consideration for escalated placement, if minor failed to benefit from placement at Twin
Pines Ranch. The court thereupon ordered that minor be placed in a “suitable
foster/group home, relative home, county or private facility with preference for TWIN
PINES RANCH . . . further, that the minor not be placed at YOP Indio without further
order of the court, . . .”
The prosecutor asked the case to be recalled later the same day. The prosecutor
argued that, because “the Court is not going to follow through with the negotiated
disposition between the parties . . . I would ask the plea essentially be withdrawn, the
Petition be reinstituted, and we would proceed on the Petition.” The prosecutor indicated
that a number of serious charges had been dismissed, specifically in contemplation of
minor‟s agreement that he would be placed at YOP. The matter was referred to the
probation department because “we can‟t place the minor without any social history. And
that was the reason for it. Certainly the People would not have dismissed those charges
unless the YOP was honored. That is my request at this point. I‟m asking to proceed on
the Petition in whole.”
Defense counsel explained that one of the dismissed charges was a strike, and “we
were interested in getting rid of the strike as part of the disposition. That is the reason we
agreed to the disposition.”
8
The court took the view that, even if the parties agreed to some disposition to
accomplish their own purposes, the court was charged with a different and overriding
duty. The court did not believe that it was bound by the parties‟ goals: “Especially in
juvenile court the duty of the Court is to make appropriate rehabilitative orders with
respect to the minor. In this case there is no basis in front of me to commit the minor to
YOP. [¶] Secondly, I‟ve already made my orders. Those are final orders. They were
final two hours ago, or three hours ago. So I don‟t think there is a basis for unwinding
them at this point.” The court noted, “thirdly,” that it had “never agreed to sentence the
minor to dispose of the minor‟s case by sending him to YOP. I could never do that,
because I never had information providing a basis to make that kind of commitment.
[¶] Fourthly, if the parties wanted to know what recommendations probation might
make, . . . they might have requested . . . some kind of pre-plea report. That didn‟t
happen in this case.” Minor had already made his admissions at the prosecutor‟s request,
and the court had already dismissed other counts in the interest of minor, well before the
current dispositional hearing. The court therefore denied the People‟s request to
withdraw the plea agreement and reinstate the petitions.
The People have now appealed.
ANALYSIS
I. Contentions
The People contend that the juvenile court‟s dispositional order was unlawful,
because it contravened the agreed-upon terms of a negotiated disposition. Minor
responds that the matter is not cognizable on appeal, because the prosecution is
9
prohibited from appealing an order granting probation to a minor. Minor urges that the
People‟s remedy is to seek review by a writ of mandate or prohibition. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 800, subd. (c); see also In re Jeffrey H. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1058
(Jeffrey H.).)1 The People reply, also relying on Jeffrey H., that the appeal is not an
1 Welfare and Institutions Code section 800 provides in pertinent part as follows: “(a) A judgment in a proceeding under Section 601 or 602 may be appealed from, by the minor, in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed from, by the minor, as from an order after judgment. Pending appeal of the order or judgment, the granting or refusal to order release shall rest in the discretion of the juvenile court. The appeal shall have precedence over all other cases in the court to which the appeal is taken.
“A ruling on a motion to suppress pursuant to Section 700.1 shall be reviewed on appeal even if the judgment is predicated upon an admission of the allegations of the petition.
“A judgment or subsequent order entered by a referee shall become appealable whenever proceedings pursuant to Section 252, 253, or 254 have become completed or, if proceedings pursuant to Section 252, 253, or 254 are not initiated, when the time for initiating the proceedings has expired.
“(b) An appeal may be taken by the people from any of the following:
“(1) A ruling on a motion to suppress pursuant to Section 700.1 even if the judgment is a dismissal of the petition or any count or counts of the petition. However, no appeal by the people shall lie as to any count which, if the people are successful, will be the basis for further proceedings subjecting any person to double jeopardy.
“(2) An order made after judgment entered pursuant to Section 777 or 785.
“(3) An order modifying the jurisdictional finding by reducing the degree of the offense or modifying the offense to a lesser offense.
“(4) An order or judgment dismissing or otherwise terminating the action before the minor has been placed in jeopardy, or where the minor has waived jeopardy. If, pursuant to this paragraph, the people prosecute an appeal of the decision or any review of that decision, it shall be binding upon the people and they shall be prohibited from [footnote continued on next page]
10
appeal from the grant of probation, but rather an appeal from an illegal order: the order
denying the People‟s request to withdraw the plea bargain and reinstate the charges,
because the trial court unlawfully refused to honor the terms of the plea bargain.
II. Standard of Review
The initial point in the appeal is whether or not Welfare and Institutions Code
section 800, subdivision (b)(5), authorizes the appeal and, at the same time, whether
Welfare and Institutions Code section 800, subdivision (c), nevertheless prohibits
proceeding by way of an appeal in this case. In other words, is the appeal from an
“unlawful order” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 800, subd. (b)(5)), or is it an appeal that either
directly, or “in substance,” challenges an order granting probation (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 800, subd. (c))? This is an issue of statutory construction, which we review de novo.
(People v. Wills (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 728, 736.)
The next issue to be considered, if the procedural hurdle can be passed, is whether
the People may enforce the terms of the plea bargain, i.e., commitment of minor to YOP
(or alternatively, to rescind the plea bargain and reinstate the charges). A plea bargain
[footnote continued from previous page] refiling the case which was appealed.
“(5) The imposition of an unlawful order at a dispositional hearing, whether or not the court suspends the execution of the disposition.
“(c) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to authorize an appeal from an order granting probation. Instead, the people may seek appellate review of any grant of probation, whether or not the court imposes disposition, by means of a petition for a writ of mandate or prohibition which is filed within 60 days after probation is granted. The review of any grant of probation shall include review of any order underlying the grant of probation.”
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agreement is in the nature of a contract, and subject to the same rules of construction as
other contracts. (People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360 [“Plea bargains are
generally governed by a specialized form of the law of contracts.”].)
The appellate court applies the standards of review applicable to contracts
The same reasoning applies here. Even though a reversal of the order in question
would necessarily result in the plea (and the probation order) being vacated, that does not
mean the order is non-appealable. The People appeal from the order dismissing certain
allegations and accepting the minor‟s plea as to other allegations, without accepting other
13
portions of the plea agreement as negotiated by the parties. The People did not object to
the grant of probation or any of the conditions of probation, except for the placement
determination; the People had negotiated for a specific placement, which the juvenile
court then failed to impose. The People argue that the court‟s failure to accept the
bargain as negotiated was an unlawful plea bargain. As in Jeffrey H., the People “simply
seek reinstatement of the original charges; they are not attacking, in either form or
substance, the probationary grant itself.” (Jeffrey H., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th 1052,
1058.)
Granted, the authorizing provision is different here from the one applicable in
Jeffrey H. There, the appeal was authorized as from an order dismissing all or part of a
case before jeopardy attached. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 800, subd. (b)(4).) Here, the
People point to Welfare and Institutions Code section 800, subdivision (b)(5), an appeal
from an unlawful order entered at the disposition. Nevertheless, it remains true that the
People do not challenge the grant of probation as such. The crux of the matter is that the
court exceeded its authority in purporting to “accept” a plea bargain without honoring the
terms of the plea bargain as agreed by the parties.
We now turn to the substance of the People‟s claim.
IV. The Juvenile Court Was Not Empowered to Alter the Terms of the Plea Bargain
Negotiated Between the Parties
Plea bargains are “an accepted and „integral component of the criminal justice
system and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of our courts.‟ ” (People
v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 929 (Segura).) Plea bargaining is a common feature in
14
juvenile delinquency proceedings, just as it is in criminal proceedings in adult court.
Similar principles apply in both settings. (See, e.g., In re Kenneth H. (2000) 80
Cal.App.4th 143, 148 [“ „It is well settled that a plea bargain is a tripartite agreement
which requires the consent of the defendant, the People and the court.‟ ”]; In re Jermaine
B. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 634, 639 [“ „Plea bargaining is an accepted practice in our
criminal justice system.‟ ”].)
A plea bargain is a contract between the accused and the prosecutor. (People v.
Vargas (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 506, 533.) Both these parties are bound to the terms of
the agreement; when the court approves the bargain, it also agrees to be bound by its
terms. (People v. Armendariz (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 906, 911.) Both the accused and
the People are entitled to the benefit of the plea bargain. (See People v. Panizzon
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [“ „When a guilty . . . plea is entered in exchange for specified
benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both
parties . . . must abide by the terms of the agreement.‟ ”].) “When either the prosecution
or the defendant is deprived of benefits for which it has bargained, corresponding relief
will lie from concessions made.” (People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 214.)
“Although a plea agreement does not divest the court of its inherent sentencing
discretion, „a judge who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a sentence within
the limits of that bargain. [Citation.] “A plea agreement is, in essence, a contract
between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound.”
[Citation.] Should the court consider the plea bargain to be unacceptable, its remedy is to
reject it, not to violate it, directly or indirectly. [Citation.]‟ ” (Segura, supra,
15
44 Cal.4th 921, 931; People v. Ames (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1217.)
Here, the juvenile court properly adverted to its own inherent discretion and duty
to select a disposition that was in the best interest of minor. The court was correct that
the parties could not themselves create a bargain that would usurp the juvenile court‟s
discretion, or bind the court to a disposition the court viewed as inconsistent with its duty.
The juvenile court had duly advised minor that, although it initially approved the plea
bargain, it might withdraw that approval, depending upon the results of the probation
report and the court‟s evaluation of an appropriate disposition. “[T]he court, upon
sentencing, has broad discretion to withdraw its prior approval of a negotiated plea.”
(People v. Johnson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 868, 873.) “Such withdrawal is permitted, for
example, in those instances where the court becomes more fully informed about the case
[citation], or where, after further consideration, the court concludes that the bargain is not
in the best interests of society.” (People v. Superior Court (Gifford) (1997)
53 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1338.) In deciding whether or not to withdraw approval of a plea
bargain, the court may of course “be expected to consult the probation report . . . .”
(People v. Stringham (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 184, 194.) That is evidently what occurred
here. The juvenile court considered the probation report, including the probation
department‟s reasons for recommending a placement other than the agreed-upon
assignment to YOP. The court exercised its independent discretion to select a placement
at Twin Pines Ranch, rather than the agreed-upon placement at YOP. Once it determined
to do so, however, the juvenile court had effectively withdrawn its approval of the plea
bargain. Under such circumstances, the court could not proceed to apply and enforce
16
certain parts of the plea bargain, while ignoring the provision that had been material to
the People‟s agreement to the bargain. The court was therefore constrained to reject the
plea bargain, and to restore the parties to their former positions. In other words, the court
should have set aside the plea and reinstated all the allegations of the petitions filed
against minor.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court failed to honor the terms of the plea bargain as agreed between
minor and the People, i.e., it refused to place minor in the YOP program. This refusal
was an unlawful order from which the People were entitled to appeal; the People‟s appeal
was not an appeal from an order granting probation. Because the juvenile court failed to
honor the terms of the plea bargain, its remedy was to reject the plea bargain, to withdraw
minor‟s admissions, to reinstate the dismissed allegations, and to proceed on the petitions
as originally filed. The judgment is therefore reversed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
McKINSTER J. We concur:
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
17
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. A juvenile court that rejects a material term of a negotiated plea agreement after initially accepting it must reject the entire plea bargain and restore the parties to their original positions rather than imposing a different, unauthorized disposition.
Issues
Whether the People may appeal a juvenile court's dispositional order that deviates from a negotiated plea agreement.
Whether a juvenile court may unilaterally modify the terms of a negotiated plea agreement while still enforcing the remainder of the bargain.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Should the court consider the plea bargain to be unacceptable, its remedy is to reject it, not to violate it, directly or indirectly.”
“The court should have set aside the plea and reinstated all the allegations of the petitions”