California Court of Appeal Oct 10, 2013 No. D063109Unpublished
Filed 10/10/13 P. v. Bonaparte CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D063109
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD234696)
RONNIE LEROY BONAPARTE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Jeffrey F.
Fraser, Judge. Affirmed.
Anthony J. Dain, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Warren
Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Ronnie Leroy Bonaparte appeals the judgment sentencing him to prison after a
jury found him guilty of murder. Bonaparte complains the trial court erred by admitting
evidence that bolstered the credibility of one prosecution witness and excluding evidence
that would have impeached the credibility of another. We affirm.
Jonathan Gonzalez was shot and killed in the street outside a taco shop. The fatal
wound was inflicted by a .38 caliber bullet fired at close range.
The day before the murder, Tajanae Runnells, Bonaparte's girlfriend, overheard a
telephone conversation in which Bonaparte arranged to meet Gonzalez on the day of the
murder to buy drugs. At the time, Runnells and Bonaparte were unemployed and living
together in a motel room, and she allowed him to drive her great-grandmother's burgundy
Cadillac to sell crack cocaine as a source of income. On the day Gonzalez was murdered,
Bonaparte and another man left the motel in the Cadillac to meet Gonzalez.
Reyes Rodriguez was inside the taco shop talking to Gonzalez shortly before he
was killed. As they were talking, Gonzalez received a telephone call during which
Rodriguez heard Gonzalez say: "Is that you on the red Cadillac? I see where you're at.
I'll be right there right now."1 Gonzalez finished the call, exited the taco shop, and
1 A detective subsequently obtained records for Gonzalez's mobile telephone, which showed several calls on the day of the murder to and from a telephone number belonging to Bonaparte. The last of those calls was placed from Bonaparte's number just minutes before Gonzalez was shot. 2
walked down the street. A few minutes later, Rodriguez heard a gunshot, saw a red car
speed away, and saw Gonzalez had been shot.
Alan Wilburn and Warren Mitchell were also inside the taco shop when they heard
a gunshot. Wilburn turned in the direction of the gunshot and saw a Black man shove
something into his pocket and enter the passenger side of a red Cadillac, which then sped
away. When the police showed Wilburn a photographic lineup, he identified the man as
Bonaparte. Mitchell also saw a red Cadillac with a Black man in the passenger seat, but
he was unable to identify the man.
The day after Gonzalez was killed, Runnells heard about the murder on the news
and asked Bonaparte if he killed Gonzalez. Bonaparte told Runnells he was supposed to
pay Gonzalez $4,500 for the drugs, but when Gonzalez put the drugs on the trunk of the
car, Bonaparte shot him, put the drugs in his pocket, and fled the scene. Bonaparte told
Runnells to wash the Cadillac, clean it out, and return it to her great-grandparents. She
did so.
The following day, the police seized the Cadillac at the home of Runnells's great-
grandparents. A .38 caliber bullet casing was found in the trunk. The police then went to
the motel and arrested Bonaparte.
II.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People charged Bonaparte with murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a);
subsequent undesignated section references are to this code.) They alleged that in the
commission of the murder, Bonaparte intentionally and personally discharged a firearm,
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proximately causing death or great bodily injury. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) The People
also alleged Bonaparte had a prior robbery conviction (§ 211), which qualified as a
serious felony (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(19)) and as a strike for purposes of
sentencing under the "Three Strikes" law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
A jury found Bonaparte guilty of first degree murder and also found true the
firearm enhancement allegation. Bonaparte then waived his right to a trial on the prior
conviction allegations and admitted them. The court sentenced Bonaparte to prison for a
determinate term of five years for the prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)), plus consecutive indeterminate terms of 50 years to life for the murder
conviction (§§ 190, subd. (a), 667, subd. (e)(1)) and 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
III.
DISCUSSION
Bonaparte contends the judgment must be reversed because the trial court made
two erroneous evidentiary rulings under Evidence Code section 352,2 one in admitting
testimony that supported Wilburn's credibility and the other in excluding evidence that
would have undermined Runnells's credibility. As we shall explain, neither claim of
error has merit.
2 Evidence Code section 352 provides: "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." 4
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Admitting Wilburn's Testimony About His Security Clearance
Bonaparte argues the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code
section 352 by not excluding Wilburn's testimony that he had a security clearance that
allowed him to provide communications to the President and other high-ranking
governmental officials.3 We reject this argument on both procedural and substantive
grounds.
Bonaparte forfeited this claim of error. A judgment may not be reversed based on
erroneous admission of evidence unless "[t]here appears of record an objection to or a
motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make
clear the specific ground of the objection or motion . . . ." (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)
Thus, "[t]o preserve a claim that a trial court abused its discretion in not excluding
evidence under Evidence Code section 352, 'a party must make a timely and specific
objection when the evidence is offered.' " (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208,
230; see also People v. Holford (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155, 169 [Evid. Code, § 353
requirement of specific objection applies to claim evidence should have been excluded
under Evid. Code, § 352].) Here, Bonaparte objected to the admission of Wilburn's
testimony about his security clearance solely on the ground of relevance. He therefore
did not preserve his claim the testimony should have been excluded under Evidence Code
3 Wilburn testified he worked as a telecommunications specialist before he retired. He further testified: "I used to do White House communications. Any time the President, Vice President, or head of state came to my home state, I was on 24-hour call to provide them with any communications they needed." 5
section 352. (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 138-139; People v. Alexander
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 905.)
Nevertheless, because Bonaparte asserts his trial counsel's failure to object
specifically on the basis of Evidence Code section 352 constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel, we exercise our discretion to consider the substance of his claim of error.
(See, e.g., People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 621; People v. Felix (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 849, 858.) As we shall explain, the claim fails.
Bonaparte argues Wilburn's testimony about his security clearance should have
been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because its probative value was
substantially outweighed by the probability its admission would create a substantial
danger of undue prejudice. Specifically, Bonaparte contends the challenged testimony
"was irrelevant to any issue before the jury," but "had the prejudicial effect of
impermissibly and significantly bolstering the credibility of Wilburn before the eyes of
the jury." We disagree.
Wilburn's testimony about his security clearance had significant probative value.
Evidence concerning a witness's character for honesty and veracity is relevant when the
witness's credibility is at issue. (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 780, subd. (e); People v. Abel
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 924-925.) Here, Wilburn was an eyewitness to the events that
occurred immediately after the murder, and his trial testimony strongly suggested
Bonaparte was the killer. There were some discrepancies between Wilburn's trial
testimony and what he had reported to a 911 operator and a police officer on the day of
the murder (e.g., whether the Cadillac was an El Dorado or a Seville, whether its
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windows were up or down, whether Bonaparte was 6 feet or 5'9" tall), which Bonaparte's
trial counsel pointed out at trial. Hence, Wilburn's "credibility was a significant issue in
this case," and evidence of his security clearance, which indicated he was honest and
trustworthy, was relevant. (Abel, at p. 925; see also People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th
1056, 1085 [prosecutor may introduce evidence supporting witness's credibility on direct
examination when prosecutor reasonably anticipates defendant will attack witness's
credibility].)
Wilburn's testimony about his security clearance created minimal, if any, danger
of undue prejudice. The prejudice that Evidence Code section 352 is designed to prevent
is not the harm to a defendant that results from introduction of relevant evidence against
him; rather, it is the harm to the defendant that results from introduction of relevant
evidence that is likely to induce the jury to reward the People or to punish the defendant
based on an emotional reaction to the evidence rather than a logical evaluation of the
issue to which the evidence is relevant. (People v. Howard (2010) 51 Cal.4th 15, 32.)
Wilburn's brief and bland testimony that he had a security clearance that allowed him to
provide communications to the President and other high-ranking government officials
was not likely to make the jurors sympathetic to the People or hostile to Bonaparte.
Rather, the jury was likely to use that testimony (if at all) for the permissible purpose of
assessing Wilburn's credibility. Although using the evidence for that purpose might have
bolstered the People's case against Bonaparte, it presented no danger of undue prejudice
within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352. (Ibid.; see also People v. Paniagua
7
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 499, 517 [undue prejudice "is not synonymous with evidence
that is merely damaging to the defendant"].)
In sum, Wilburn's testimony about his security clearance had significant probative
value but presented no substantial danger of causing Bonaparte undue prejudice. We
therefore reject his claim the testimony should have been excluded under Evidence Code
section 352.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Excluding Evidence About Runnells's Prostitution
Bonaparte also argues the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code
section 352 by refusing to permit him to impeach Runnells with her prior act of
prostitution. According to Bonaparte, he was entitled to impeach her with evidence of
that conduct under People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284 (Wheeler), because the
conduct involved a crime of moral turpitude. After setting forth additional background,
we shall explain why the trial court did not prejudicially err by excluding that
impeachment evidence.
1. Additional Background
In a motion in limine, the People summarized the criminal history of some of the
witnesses they planned to call at trial. The summary stated Runnells had a misdemeanor
prostitution citation (§ 647, subd. (b)), with the disposition noted as "unknown." At the
hearing on motions in limine, the prosecutor represented that Runnells had been
convicted, but the prosecutor did not know what the "ultimate disposition" was. The
court ruled Runnells could be impeached with the prostitution conviction.
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During trial, the prosecutor informed the court that Runnells actually had been
convicted not of prostitution but of using offensive words in a public place. (§ 415,
subd. (3).) The prosecutor requested the court preclude Bonaparte from using that
conviction to impeach Runnells. Bonaparte's trial counsel responded that he was entitled,
under Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th 284, to ask Runnells about the underlying conduct
because she had admitted prostitution, a crime involving moral turpitude. The court
disagreed that Wheeler applied and also perceived "a problem with having a trial within a
trial on whether or not she did the act of prostitution." The court cited Evidence Code
section 352 and excluded evidence of the conduct underlying Runnells's conviction
because its admission would necessitate an undue consumption of time and introduce
collateral issues into the pending murder trial.
2. Legal Analysis
Bonaparte bears a heavy burden to show reversible error in the trial court's
exclusion of evidence concerning Runnells's prior act of prostitution. A "trial court has
discretion to exclude impeachment evidence . . . if it is collateral, cumulative, confusing,
or misleading." (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 412.) On appeal, a ruling
excluding impeachment evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is reviewed under the
deferential abuse of discretion standard, under which the ruling will not be disturbed
unless the record shows the trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
manner that caused a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th
334, 374; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.) "Because the court's discretion
to admit or exclude impeachment evidence 'is as broad as necessary to deal with the great
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variety of factual situations in which the issue arises' [citation], a reviewing court
ordinarily will uphold the trial court's exercise of discretion [citations]." (People v. Clark
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 932 (Clark).) Bonaparte has presented no persuasive reason for
us to reverse the trial court's ruling in this case.
Bonaparte correctly points out that prostitution is a crime of moral turpitude
(People v. Chandler (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 703, 709), and that a witness may be
impeached with evidence of prior conduct involving moral turpitude even though the
conduct did not result in a felony conviction (Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 295-296;
accord Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 931). But admission of such evidence is subject to a
trial court's discretion under Evidence Code section 352, which "empowers courts to
prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral
credibility issues." (Wheeler, at p. 296; accord, People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668,
714.) Here, evidence of Runnells's misdemeanor conduct in agreeing to perform a sex
act for money would "not strongly demonstrate moral turpitude, i.e., a ' "general readiness
to do evil" ' [citation], and thus would not have provided the jury much assistance in
assessing [her] credibility." (Lightsey, at p. 714; see also Wheeler, at p. 296
[misdemeanor "is a less forceful indicator of immoral character or dishonesty than is a
felony"].) Moreover, introduction of such evidence might have required "a trial within a
trial" and diverted the jury's attention away from the main issue of Bonaparte's guilt, as
the trial court noted in deciding to exclude the evidence. If Runnells denied that
prostitution underlay her misdemeanor conviction, it might have been necessary to obtain
testimony from the undercover officer that Runnells had agreed to have sex for money
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and testimony from the prosecutor in Runnells's misdemeanor case about the disposition
of the charge against her, testimony having no direct relevance to the murder for which
Bonaparte was being tried. In sum, "[t]his was a routine matter of weighing the
evidence's probative value against the probability its admission would 'necessitate undue
consumption of time' (Evid. Code, § 352), and the trial court's ruling was both reasoned
and reasonable." (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 195-196; accord, Lightsey, at
p. 714.)
In any event, any error in excluding evidence of Runnells's prostitution was
harmless. The exclusion of cumulative evidence concerning a witness's credibility is not
prejudicial. (People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1105; People v. Hendrix (1923)
192 Cal. 441, 450.) Here, the jury heard other evidence that reflected badly on Runnells's
character and undermined her credibility. Runnells testified she lived in a motel room
with Bonaparte, let him use her great-grandmother's Cadillac so he could deal in illicit
drugs, and attempted to obscure his involvement in Gonzalez's murder by washing the
Cadillac and returning it to her great-grandparents after the murder. On cross-
examination, Runnells admitted she initially lied to the police about Bonaparte's
involvement in the murder of Gonzalez, smoked marijuana "pretty much every day," and
falsely told Bonaparte she was pregnant with his child. Bonaparte has not shown that
cross-examining Runnells about her prostitution " 'would have produced "a significantly
different impression of [her] credibility." ' " (Farley, at p. 1105.) Thus, any error in
excluding evidence of Runnells's prostitution did not cause "a miscarriage of justice"
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requiring reversal of the judgment. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Evid. Code, § 354; see
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
MCINTYRE, J.
12
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's murder conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting testimony regarding a witness's security clearance or by excluding evidence of another witness's prior misdemeanor conduct.
Issues
Did the trial court abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting testimony regarding a witness's security clearance?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by excluding evidence of a witness's prior misdemeanor prostitution conduct for impeachment purposes?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Wilburn's testimony about his security clearance had significant probative value but presented no substantial danger of causing Bonaparte undue prejudice.”
“The trial court's ruling was both reasoned and reasonable.”
“any error in excluding evidence of Runnells's prostitution was harmless.”