greater and causing bodily injury. (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b).) At a restitution
hearing under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b), the trial court declined to apply
comparative fault principles and awarded the victim the entire amount of his medical
expenses, which exceeded $96,000.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's unwillingness to employ civil
comparative fault principles in making its restitution order. Although under
extraordinary circumstances such principles may be useful to a trial court in determining
the amount of restitution (see People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 41-42
(Millard)), there is no requirement in Penal Code section 1202.4 that they be employed in
all cases where a defendant, although guilty of a crime, did not act intentionally. Here,
the record fully supports the trial court's award of the victim's substantial medical
expenses. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's restitution order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Offense
Around 10:30 on the evening of November 2, 2007, Stormey James Trammel,
who was then 15 years old, was riding his quad on the top of a hill in the Imperial County
dunes. According to Trammel, he was driving the quad about 15 miles an hour.
2
Trammel saw what is known as a sand rail or dune buggy, without any headlights on,
coming from behind him at a high rate of speed; Trammel veered to his left but was
unable to avoid being struck by the sand rail and was thrown from his quad.
The sand rail was being driven by defendant and appellant Julie Ann Watson.
According to a statement she gave at the scene, Watson was driving the sand rail at
approximately 60 miles an hour up the hill when her passenger yelled to her to watch out
for the quad in front of them. Watson put on her brakes, and her sand rail hit the back of
Trammel's quad. Watson said she saw Trammel flying off his quad. Watson believed the
sand rail was going about 30 miles an hour by the time she hit Trammel.
At the scene, Watson's breath smelled of alcohol, her eyes were bloodshot, her gait
was unsteady and her speech was slurred. Watson admitted consuming an eight-ounce
cocktail and some vodka. The responding California Highway Patrol officer attempted to
perform a field sobriety test, but Watson was unable to follow the officer's instructions.
Watson was arrested and transported to a facility where she consented to a
breathalyzer test. As we indicated at the outset, the breathlyzer showed a BAC of
0.18/0.17.
Trammel was taken to a local hospital where surgery was performed on his
severely shattered leg. Trammel was initially hospitalized in Yuma, Arizona, where two
surgeries were performed on his leg; Trammel was later admitted to a hospital in
Flagstaff, where two additional surgeries were performed. According to his mother,
Trammel missed several weeks of school and, as a result, received failing grades in many
of his classes.
3
B. Trial Court Proceedings
On June 11, 2008, Watson pled guilty to one count of driving a motor vehicle with
a BAC in excess of 0.08 percent and causing bodily injury. (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd.
(b).) The trial court placed Watson on formal probation and, as a condition of probation,
ordered that Watson pay Trammel restitution.
Trammel initially submitted $102,462.72 in medical bills to the probation
department. Watson objected to that amount as her restitution obligation.
By virtue of requests for continuances and Watson's own repeated failures to
appear, the restitution hearing did not occur until March 22, 2012.
At the hearing, the People presented $96,182.69 in medical billings.
For her part, Watson presented expert testimony from a retired California
Highway Patrol Officer who had investigated approximately 11,000 accidents during his
30-year career. Based on his review of the statements Watson, Trammel and other
witnesses had provided, the expert concluded Trammel was 25 to 30 percent at fault for
the accident. He based his estimate of fault on Trammel's statement that he veered to the
left instead of the right when he saw Watson coming toward him; he also faulted
Trammel for failing to have any formal training on the quad.
On cross-examination, the expert conceded he did not do any accident
reconstruction in the case, had never done any accident reconstruction while working for
the highway patrol and had never assigned a percentage of fault in any of his
investigations. The expert also conceded he had not used any kind of mathematical
computation in arriving at his conclusion that Trammel was 25 to 30 percent at fault.
4
Finally, the expert admitted that in calculating Watson's percentage of fault, he had not
taken into account Watson's inability to complete a field sobriety test at the scene of the
accident. In addition to testimony from her expert, Watson filed a memorandum of
points and authorities that in pertinent part argued that the trial court could reduce any
restitution by whatever percentage of fault the trial court attributed to Trammel.
The trial court ordered that Watson pay all of the Trammel's medical expenses. In
declining to reduce the amount of restitution by any percentage of fault attributable to
Watson, the court stated:
"Well, we have the testimony of the qualified expert who viewed this from the
perspective of reports, analysis, and gave us a figure of 25 to 30 percent. I can
understand where that came from, and it appears to be quite logically derived. However,
I believe that the analysis in a criminal case may be different than one in a civil case.
And in a civil case, you are basically breaking down numbers and assigning percentages
based on the individual's conduct.
"Here we have a plea to Section 25153(b), I believe. And what that means is that
the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol and caused injury. In this case,
she overtook a vehicle that was ahead of her and basically ran it down. It seems to me
that the fact that she has pled guilty to that offense and is therefore guilty of that violation
of law is an overriding consideration.
"The accident would not have occurred had she been sober. She would have been
traveling at a safer speed, been able to slow down sooner, been able to turn in the other
direction, if necessary.
5
"On the other hand, Mr. Trammel was being overtaken, had to look over his
shoulder at a vehicle with no lights on, and was being overtaken very rapidly. She was,
at her slowest, going twice his speed.
"So I think that the analysis has to depend on what she pled to, and to me, that is
such an overriding factor that I do not think that this is a comparative negligence case.
And I am going to -- while I understand where the expert's figures came from, and
respect that, I think in a civil case, that might be appropriate, but it is not appropriate
here." (Italics added.)
As we indicated at the outset, the trial court ordered that Watson pay the
$96,182.69 in medical expenses presented at the hearing, subject to the presentation of
additional bills that were not available at the time of the hearing.
Watson filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
On appeal, Watson contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
reduce the amount of its restitution order by the percentage of fault her expert attributed
to Trammel. We find no abuse of discretion.
A. Victim Compensation
In Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pages 24-27, we summarized the
constitutional and statutory provisions that require the victims of crime be given
restitution: "'In 1982, California voters passed Proposition 8, also known as The Victims'
Bill of Rights . . . . Proposition 8 established the right of crime victims to receive
6
restitution directly "from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer."
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).)' [Citation.] At the time of the judgment in this case
in 2006, article I, section 28, subdivision (b), of the California Constitution provided: 'It
is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California that all persons who
suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from the
persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer. [¶] Restitution shall be ordered
from the convicted persons in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition
imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss, unless compelling and extraordinary
reasons exist to the contrary.'
"In implementing Proposition 8, the Legislature enacted Penal Code section
1202.4, which provides:
"'(a)(1) It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of crime who incurs any
economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly
from any defendant convicted of that crime. [¶] . . . [¶]
"'(3) The court, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the
law, shall order the defendant to pay . . . the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (B) Restitution to the
victim or victims, if any, in accordance with subdivision (f), which shall be enforceable
as if the order were a civil judgment. [¶] . . . [¶]
"'(f) . . . [I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of
the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the
victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss
claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court. If the amount of loss
7
cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing, the restitution order shall include a
provision that the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court. The court
shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not
doing so, and states them on the record. . . .
"'(1) The defendant has the right to a hearing before a judge to dispute the
determination of the amount of restitution. . . .
"'(2) Determination of the amount of restitution ordered pursuant to this
subdivision shall not be affected by the indemnification or subrogation rights of any third
party. . . .
"'(3) To the extent possible, the restitution order shall be prepared by the
sentencing court, shall identify each victim and each loss to which it pertains, and shall
be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every
determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct,
including, but not limited to, all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶]
"'(B) Medical expenses. [¶] . . . [¶]
"'(D) Wages or profits lost due to injury incurred by the victim . . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
"'(H) Actual and reasonable attorney's fees and other costs of collection accrued
by a private entity on behalf of the victim. [¶] . . . [¶]
"'(g) The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and
extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states those reasons on the record.' Penal
Code section 1202.4 provides for full restitution of victims' economic losses, but 'does not
authorize direct restitution for noneconomic losses. [Citation.]' [Citation] '[D]irect
8
victims of crime have a statutory right to restitution on the full amount of their losses
without regard to the full or partial recoupment from other sources (except the state
Restitution Fund). [Citation.]' [Citation.]
"At a victim restitution hearing, a prima facie case for restitution is made by the
People based in part on a victim's testimony on, or other claim or statement of, the
amount of his or her economic loss. [Citations.] 'Once the victim has [i.e., the People
have] made a prima facie showing of his or her loss, the burden shifts to the defendant to
demonstrate that the amount of the loss is other than that claimed by the victim.
[Citations.]' [Citation.]"
"'The standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of discretion. "A victim's
restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed." [Citation.] "'Where there is a
factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse
of discretion will be found by the reviewing court.'" [Citations.]' [Citation.] However, a
restitution order 'resting upon a "'demonstrable error of law'" constitutes an abuse of the
court's discretion. [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
[to support a factual finding], the "'power of the appellate court begins and ends with a
determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted,' to support the trial court's findings." [Citations.] Further, the standard of
proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] "If the circumstances reasonably justify the [trial court's]
findings," the judgment may not be overturned when the circumstances might also
reasonably support a contrary finding. [Citation.] We do not reweigh or reinterpret the
9
evidence; rather, we determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the
inference drawn by the trier of fact. [Citation.]' [Citation.]"
In Millard, the defendant was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of
alcohol and causing bodily injury. (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a).) At trial, evidence
was presented which showed that the victim, a motorcycle rider, was traveling at an
excessive speed at the time of the accident and bore substantial responsibility for his own
injuries. In light of that evidence, the trial court reduced the economic losses established
by the victim by the 25 percent of fault it found attributable to the victim and ordered the
defendant to pay, as restitution, the reduced amount. The trial court stated: "'The court
does this under the concept that it should order full restitution unless it finds compelling
and extraordinary reasons for not doing so.'" (Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 37.)
We found no abuse of discretion or error in the trial court's use of comparative
fault principles in determining the amount of restitution "when the victim's negligence
was also a substantial factor in causing his or her economic losses." (Millard, supra, 175
Cal.App.4th at p. 41.)
B. Amends to Society, Reformation and Rehabilitation
Importantly, in addition to providing compensation to specific victims of crimes
under Penal Code section 1202.4, restitution of victims as a condition of probation is also
separately authorized under Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (a). The restitution
provided by Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (a), may be imposed when a trial
court determines it is "fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends
may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person
10
resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and
rehabilitation of the probationer." (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j), italics added.)
In People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1122 (Carbajal), the Supreme
Court determined that Proposition 8 and a predecessor to Penal Code section 1202.4,
Penal Code former section 1203.04,1 did not limit restitution imposed under Penal Code
section 1203.1 to the losses caused by the specific crime for which a defendant is
convicted. In Carbajal, the defendant struck a parked car and left the scene without
leaving his name or other information required by law. He later pled guilty to violating
the hit and run statute, Vehicle Code section 20002. Because the damage he caused to
the parked car was not necessarily the result of any criminality—the crime he committed
occurred only after he inflicted the damage—the defendant argued he should not be
required to provide the owner of the car with restitution.
The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention. "There is no requirement
the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is
actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of
damages that might be recoverable in a civil action. [Citation.]" (Carbajal, supra, 10
Cal.4th at p. 1121.) More particularly, the court determined: "[N]othing in Proposition 8
or in Penal Code section 1203.04 purports to limit or abrogate the trial court's discretion,
under Penal Code section 1203.1, to order restitution as a condition of probation where
the victim's loss was not the result of the crime underlying the defendant's conviction, but
1 See People v. Slattery (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1091, 1096, fn. 2. 11
where the trial court finds such restitution will serve one of the purposes set out in Penal
Code section 1203.1, subdivision (j). [Citation.]" (Carbajal, at p. 1122.) Rather,
because of the broader goals of restitution provided by Penal Code section 1203.1,
restitution may be imposed under that section whenever it is "reasonably related either to
the crime of which the defendant is convicted or to future criminality." (Carbajal, at p.
1123.)
With respect to the relationship between restitution and the crime of hit and run,
the court noted that the crime of fleeing the scene of an accident imposes costs on all law-
abiding drivers in the form of increased insurance premiums and that "[t]he lack of a
precise fit between the costs of the crime and the amount of restitution ordered does not
render the restitution order invalid . . . ." (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1124, italics
added.)
With respect to the goal of rehabilitation, the court stated: "[A] trial court could
properly determine restitution would serve a salutary rehabilitative purpose by directing
the defendant to accept the social responsibility he attempted to evade when he fled the
scene without identifying himself. Conditioning probation on restitution under these
circumstances would serve the rehabilitative purposes specified in Penal Code section
1203.1." (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1125, fn. omitted.)
C. Analysis
In Millard, the trial court expressly relied on the compelling and extraordinary
exception to the full victim restitution otherwise required by Penal Code section 1202.4,
subdivision (g). Thus, under Millard, a trial court may, in an extraordinary case, find
12
reasons to limit the full restitution otherwise required to an amount commensurate with
the defendant's comparative fault discretion. (See Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp.
36-41.) However, nothing in our opinion in Millard requires a trial court to apply civil
comparative fault principles in any criminal case, even where a conviction is based on a
defendant's criminal negligence or recklessness.
Importantly, Carbajal holds that in addition to providing compensation for a
particular crime victim, restitution may be imposed for the separate purposes of requiring
that a probationer make amends to society in general and to promote the defendant's
rehabilitation. (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1123.) A victim's own fault has little, if
any, bearing on either the need for a defendant to make amends to the public or the goal
of promoting the defendant's rehabilitation. In light of Carbajal, it is plain that, as the
trial court here stated, the comparative fault principles that may be appropriate in a civil
case are in no sense mandatory in a criminal proceeding. Thus, we reject Watson's
contention that the trial court misstated or misapprehended the law in any respect.
Moreover, the record here fully supports the trial court's unwillingness to treat this
as the sort of extraordinary case where the victim's comparative fault might reduce the
amount of restitution otherwise required under Penal Code sections 1202.4 and 1203.1.
Trammel's conduct was in no sense a substantial factor in causing the accident. In
particular, we note that, unlike the victim we considered in Millard, Trammel was not
engaged in any unlawful or dangerous driving at the time of the accident but was only
subject to criticism from Watson's expert because, in reacting to a hazard created solely
by Watson, he veered left instead of right. Trammel's error in reacting, unlike the
13
excessive speed of the victim in Millard, was not a significant factor in causing the
accident and was not blameworthy. As the trial court determined, Watson basically ran
Trammell down with her much bigger and unlighted vehicle, and the accident would not
have occurred if she had been sober.
The trial court's imposition of full restitution of Trammel's economic losses is also
supported by the need for Watson to make amends to the public for the very real costs
law enforcement and emergency personnel expended in responding to the accident and
Trammel's serious injuries. Like the increased insurance rates all members of the public
pay because of hit and run drivers, which the court in Carbajal discussed, the public in
general also pays for the substantial emergency response costs continually imposed by
drunk drivers. By imposing full, rather than partial, restitution, the trial court required
some amends from Watson for her violation of law and the very real costs that violation
imposed on the public.
In addition, full restitution was warranted by Watson's obvious need for
rehabilitation. At the time of the accident, her BAC was more than twice the legal limit
and she could not complete a field sobriety test. The need to impress upon Watson the
seriousness of her conduct and its very real cost is manifest here and by itself supports the
trial court's restitution order.
Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that
Watson pay all of Trammell's economic losses.
II
We also reject Watson's contention the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order
14
restitution because it did not do so at the time of sentencing.
Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f) states: "If the amount of loss cannot be
ascertained at the time of sentencing, the restitution order shall include a provision that
the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court." Thus, "[u]nder a reading of
the plain language of section 1202.4, if the court cannot determine the amount of
restitution at the time of sentencing, there is no limitation upon when the court must next
set a restitution hearing, nor is there a limitation on the permissible reasons that may
prevent fixing the amount of restitution." (People v. Bufford (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th
966, 971; see also People v. Ford (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1357.) Here, the record
shows the prosecution sought repeatedly to fix the amount of restitution, but Watson
objected and then either sought continuances of the hearing or failed to appear, which
required that bench warrants be issued. The court had good reason to delay, at Watson's
instance, the restitution hearing and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing when it did.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
IRION, J.
15
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that trial courts are not required to apply civil comparative fault principles when determining the amount of victim restitution in criminal cases, even where the defendant's conduct involved criminal negligence or recklessness.
Issues
Whether a trial court must apply civil comparative fault principles to reduce a criminal restitution order.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering full restitution for the victim's medical expenses.
Whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to order restitution after the initial sentencing hearing.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“there is no requirement in Penal Code section 1202.4 that they be employed in all cases where a defendant, although guilty of a crime, did not act intentionally.”
“the comparative fault principles that may be appropriate in a civil case are in no sense mandatory in a criminal proceeding.”