Michelle S. v. Superior Court CA4/2 (2026) · DecisionDepot
Michelle S. v. Superior Court CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Mar 30, 2026 No. E087604Unpublished
Filed 3/30/26 Michelle S. v. Superior Court CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MICHELLE S.,
Petitioner, E087604
v. (Super.Ct.No. DPIN2400217)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OPINION RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
Respondent;
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Elizabeth Tucker,
Judge. Petition denied.
Shannon Goldstein for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County Counsel,
and Julie Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest. 1
Michelle S. (Mother) petitions for extraordinary writ review of an order setting a
hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (unlabeled statutory citations
refer to this code). (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) She challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the court’s findings that the Riverside County Department of
Public Social Services (DPSS) provided reasonable services, there was no substantial
probability that the children would be returned if the matter was continued to the 18-
month review hearing, and return of the children to her created a substantial risk of
detriment. We conclude that Mother’s arguments lack merit, and we accordingly deny
the petition.
BACKGROUND
In October 2024, DPSS received a referral alleging general neglect of Levi D.
(then two years old) and P.B. (then one year old) and caretaker absence or incapacity.
The children lived with Mother and her boyfriend, who was on parole. They lived in a
recreational vehicle, which was in poor condition, had trash everywhere, and was
connected to a makeshift septic line. The children were in a playpen that did not have a
bottom, so they were lying on the floor. The children “appeared dirty[,] and they ha[d]
not bathed in a while.”
When the social worker arrived at the property, she spoke with the maternal uncle,
who was watching the children while Mother was away. “There were dozens of flies in
the playpen surrounding the children.” The home smelled of garbage that “[had not] been
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taken out in several weeks.” The social worker asked the uncle to change the children’s
diapers, and he said that “he doesn’t change diapers.”
The social worker spoke to a family friend who lived in the main house on the
property, and the friend said that “[M]other often [left] all day” and could not be reached
when she was gone. The family tried to contact Mother, and eventually someone was
able to reach her. Mother arrived one hour and 30 minutes after the social worker.
Mother declined to drug test.
In October 2024, DPSS filed a petition under subdivisions (b)(1) and (g) of section
300. DPSS alleged Mother had an unresolved history of substance abuse, neglected the
children’s medical needs, failed to provide them with appropriate supervision, and
neglected their health, safety, and well-being.
At the detention hearing, the court detained the children and ordered that Mother
have supervised visits at least once per week for two hours.
In November 2024, DPSS filed its jurisdiction and disposition report. Mother
reported that previously she was engaged to the children’s father, David B. (Father), but
she was currently engaged to someone else. Mother and Father had a history of domestic
violence with the children present. Mother said that they used methamphetamine “at the
same time,” and she said that she started using methamphetamine in 2018 after she met
Father. She entered treatment in 2019, and she completed parenting classes.
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DPSS was unable to interview Father, because he was incarcerated. Phone
interviews were not permitted in the prison, and DPSS tried to contact the prison to
schedule an in-person visit but was unsuccessful.
Mother was dependent on the maternal grandmother for transportation and could
not set up a visitation schedule. DPSS offered Mother bus passes, but she declined them
because “there were no buses in her area.” On the date originally scheduled for the
jurisdiction hearing, the court ordered DPSS to assist Mother with visitation. Mother
subsequently told the social worker that visitation “‘in Indio would be a lot easier.’” The
social worker informed Mother that the travel time for the children would be four hours if
the visits were moved there. Mother stated that “it was fine to keep the visits in
Banning.”
In December 2024, DPSS called Mother and heard a male voice in the
background. Mother said that it was Father. He had been released on parole that month.
The parents were currently in a relationship, and they had been in an “on and off”
relationship for eight years. Father told the social worker that the parents had a history of
domestic violence before the children were born. The last domestic violence incident
occurred before Father went to prison for the first time. The parents “declined to
complete [a] saliva drug test,” “and [they] offered to come back the next day” to test.
In the winter of 2024, Mother was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder,
borderline personality disorder, auditory hallucinations, and severe depression. She was
taking Zoloft, Latuda, and Wellbutrin.
4
DPSS filed an addendum report in March 2025. DPSS reported that Mother tested
positive for methamphetamine on February 24, 2025, but tested negative the next day.
The children’s caregiver reported that during one of the parents’ visits, someone
“smelled like marijuana.” The caregiver said that the children run to her when Father
says “‘go to mom.’” On one occasion, Levi hid under the stroller to get away from the
parents. DPSS and the caregiver agreed that she would no longer supervise the parents’
visits.
In March 2025, the court found all of the petition’s allegations true, removed the
children from parental custody, and ordered reunification services for the parents.
According to the six-month review report, Mother and Father were living together
in a one-bedroom, one-bathroom recreational vehicle on the maternal grandmother’s
property. In June 2025, Mother graduated from a substance abuse program. She reported
that she had been sober since Christmas of 2024. She was on step 10 of her 12-step
program. She tested negative for all substances in a hair follicle test. She took 66
urinalysis drug tests since entering her program, tested negative for all substances, and
did not miss any tests. Mother attended therapy once per week, and she reported that
therapy helped her heal from trauma. Mother also completed a parenting program in
March 2025, and she was also enrolled in another parenting program to “gain more
parenting skills.”
In April 2025, Father tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. In
May 2025, Father tested positive for buprenorphine, but Father denied using any
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substances. He was assessed for individual therapy and deemed not to need services. He
completed a parenting program in June 2025. That month, he stopped visiting the
children in person because of “work commitments,” and he became inconsistent with
video visits.
Mother had video visits with the children during the week, and she had two-hour
supervised visits in Banning once per week. Mother consistently attended visits and
“miss[ed] only one due to illness.” She “always provide[d] the children with two big
bags of toys and snacks.” She engaged the children through play. DPSS had some
concerns that Mother did not correct some of the children’s behavior, so DPSS changed
the visit location to better assess visits. The in-person visits alternated between DPSS’s
office and a McDonald’s play area. The social workers “consistently observed [Mother]
interacting appropriately with the children.”
At the six-month review hearing in September 2025, the court ordered that family
reunification services continue for the parents. The court ordered Father to participate in
a hair follicle test and a new substance abuse assessment.
According to the 12-month review report, DPSS approved Mother for
unsupervised visits in September 2025. She had weekly unsupervised visits at a
McDonald’s in Banning, and the maternal grandmother drove Mother there.
In October 2025, Mother’s counselor left her treatment program. Mother reported
that “she has been assigned a new counselor named ‘Stephanie,’ but at this time has not
been scheduled for her first session with her.” Mother said “that she would be happy
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when she could start counseling again,” and she continued to progress through the family
preservation court treatment program. Mother tested negative for all substances, and she
was on track to graduate from the program in December 2025 or January 2026.
In October 2025, the social worker tried to contact Father and asked that he
respond to set up a meeting. The social worker asked him to contact her so that they
could discuss the case, but Father did not respond. Father had not visited the children in
person for several months.
Also in October 2025, Father tested positive for methamphetamine. He recently
started a substance abuse program. He “reported that he did not think he had a problem,
and he had already been through a substance use treatment program while in prison.”
Father had not been participating in hair follicle testing.
In November 2025, the caregiver contacted the social worker and explained that
her husband had taken the children to visit Mother the previous day. When he dropped
them off, they cried and did not want to stay. When he left, only Mother and the maternal
grandmother were at the visit. When he returned, Father was there too. The caregivers
were concerned because they thought that Father was allowed only supervised visits. The
husband thought that Father looked like he was “‘high and strung out on something.’”
When the social worker asked Mother if Father was present at a visit, she
confirmed that he was there. The social worker told her that Father had not been in
contact with DPSS for a while and had not asked for visits. The social worker explained
to Mother that Father was not permitted to have unsupervised visits. Less than two
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weeks later, Mother’s visits reverted to supervised for three hours per week, and the
maternal grandmother was approved to supervise the visits.
On November 17, 2025, Mother reported that she was no longer in a relationship
with Father and that he had moved out. Four days later, Mother informed the social
worker that Father was no longer allowed on the property. She had applied for a
restraining order against him. In the restraining order request, Mother indicated that on
November 21, 2025, Father “‘showed up with a random chick,’” and Mother asked him
to leave. “[H]e became verbally and physically abusive with her, and [he] threatened
her.”
On December 3, 2025, Mother also informed the social worker that she had been
assigned a new counselor, “Stephanie Guzman, ASW,” and her first session was that day.
She was progressing in the family preservation court program and testing negative. On
December 15, 2025, Mother reported that she had graduated from the program and that
her restraining order request was granted.
The social worker learned that Father had been discharged from his outpatient
substance abuse program because of excessive absences. While in the program, he had
six scheduled drug tests. He tested positive once and missed the other five tests.
At the contested 12-month review hearing, the court found that DPSS had
provided reasonable services. The court found that returning the children to the parents
would create a substantial risk of detriment to the children’s safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that
8
the parents had failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in their
court-ordered treatment plans, and there was no substantial probability that the children
would be returned if the parents were given another six months of services. The court
then terminated reunification services and set a hearing under section 366.26.
DISCUSSION
I. Reasonable services
Mother argues that the court erred by finding that DPSS provided her with
reasonable services. Her arguments lack merit.
At the 12-month review hearing, the court may continue reunification services to
the 18-month review under limited circumstances: The court must find a substantial
probability that the child will be returned to the parent’s custody within the extended time
period, or it must find that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent.
(§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A); 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) Thus, the parent bears the burden of
showing that the services provided were not reasonable. “In almost all cases it will be
true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services
provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best
that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under
the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
When the juvenile court determines that the parent failed to carry their burden of
proof, we ask “‘whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a
matter of law,’ that is, whether the evidence supporting [the parent’s] position ‘was (1)
9
“uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no
room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.”’” (In re
Raul V. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 290, 301 (Raul V.).)
First, Mother argues that she did not receive reasonable reunification services
because her initial counselor’s departure in October 2025 created a “standstill” in her
counseling for “almost two months before [she] was assigned a new counselor.” Mother
frames the issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s
finding that she received reasonable services. But “‘it is misleading to characterize the
failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.’ [Citation.]
Rather, ‘the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a
finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.’” (Raul V., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 300-301)
Mother’s argument fails because it is not supported by the record. In October
2025, at the same time that Mother informed DPSS of her counselor’s departure, she also
informed DPSS that she was assigned a new counselor, “‘Stephanie,’” but had not yet
scheduled an appointment. When contacted on December 3, 2025, Mother repeated the
information that she was assigned a new counselor, “Stephanie Guzman, ASW,” and
reported that she had her first session that day. The record contains no evidence that after
Mother’s original counselor left the program in October and a new counselor named
Stephanie was assigned to Mother at that time, the new counselor too left the program
and a third counselor, coincidentally also named Stephanie, was assigned to Mother in
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December. Rather, the reasonable inference from the record is that when Mother’s
original counselor left the program in October, Mother was immediately assigned a new
counselor but did not schedule an appointment until December 3. The record contains no
evidence that DPSS could have done anything about the scheduling delay or had reason
to believe that there was a problem (if there was one). Moreover, Mother had been in her
counseling program for approximately 10 months when her counselor left in October
2025. Any delay in scheduling Mother’s next counseling appointment apparently did not
affect her progress in the program, from which she graduated in mid-December. For all
of these reasons, Mother’s argument fails to show that the record compels a finding that
services were not reasonable.
Mother also argues that DPSS did not provide her with reasonable services
because her case plan should have included services for domestic violence. She argues
that because Mother and Father “wanted to sta[y] together as a family,” “it was
incumbent on [DPSS] to structure a case plan” that included a “domestic violence
component” after the parents reported a history of domestic violence. Mother did not
raise the issue in the trial court, so the argument is forfeited. (In re Aaron B. (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 843, 846.) Even if she had not forfeited the argument, we would reject it.
The basis for the trial court’s removal of the children was not domestic violence. The
parents reunited after Father was released from prison, and they were together throughout
most of the case: The petition was filed in October 2024, and Father was paroled in
December 2024 and resumed living with Mother at that time. There was no evidence of a
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current domestic violence issue until November 2025, when Father showed up to
Mother’s home and “became verbally and physically abusive with her.” And then Mother
addressed the issue by kicking Father out and obtaining a restraining order against him.
DPSS’s failure to provide services to address a seemingly nonexistent problem does not
compel a finding that services were not reasonable.
Moreover, Mother’s complaints about the case plan are misguided. The case plan
is ordered by the court at disposition (§ 361.5, subd. (a)), and it is reviewed by the court
at the six-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(2)). If Mother thought that her case
plan should have included services to address domestic violence, she could have asked
the court for the services at the disposition hearing or the six-month review hearing, and
she could have appealed if her request was rejected. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 41, 47.)
Because Mother did not ask the court to add domestic violence services to her case
plan, the most that she can argue now concerning the case plan is that it was unreasonable
for DPSS not to recommend at disposition and/or at the six-month review that domestic
violence services be included in the case plan. But that argument fails for the reasons
already given: It was reasonable for DPSS not to recommend that services for domestic
violence be included in the case plan, because there was no evidence of a current
domestic violence issue. Indeed, had DPSS recommended that domestic violence
services be included in the case plan at either disposition or the six-month review, Mother
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likely would have opposed the recommendation as unsupported by the evidence, and her
point would have been well taken.
Mother also argues that services were unreasonable because “visitation is an
essential component of any reunification plan.” Because Mother did not raise the issue in
the trial court (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222) and has failed to
develop the argument on appeal (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 939, 956), the issue is forfeited. Moreover, at the hearing at which Mother’s
reunification services were terminated, Mother argued that she “has had regular visits,”
which “have always gone very, very well.” The record does not compel the conclusion
that DPSS failed to facilitate adequate visitation and thereby failed to provide reasonable
services.
II. Termination of reunification services
Mother argues that the court erred by terminating her reunification services
because (1) the finding that she failed to make substantive progress in her case plan is not
supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) there was a substantial probability that the
children would be returned if her services were continued to the 18-month review. The
arguments lack merit.
The first argument fails because, as DPSS points out, the juvenile court’s finding
concerning Mother’s progress in her case plan was superfluous. A finding that the parent
has failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in their case plan is
required in order to terminate reunification services at the six-month review. (§ 366.21,
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subd. (e)(3).) But Mother’s services were terminated at the 12-month review, and at that
hearing the court is required to terminate services unless “it finds that there is a
substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of the child’s
parent . . . within the extended time period, or that reasonable services have not been
provided to the parent.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A); see § 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) No
finding that Mother failed to participate or make progress in her case plan was required,
so any error in making such a finding was harmless.
The second argument fails because the evidence does not compel a finding of a
substantial probability that the children would be returned to Mother by the 18-month
review if services were continued. (See Raul V., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 301.) The
court detained the children in October 2024, which was 15 months before the contested
12-month review hearing. Thus, there would have been approximately three months
available to Mother to show that the children would be safely returned to her care if
services were continued.
The parents had been in an on-and-off relationship for eight years. Mother told the
social worker that she started to use methamphetamine after she met Father. Father had a
long-standing and completely unaddressed substance abuse issue, and he tested positive
for methamphetamine in October 2025. He failed to participate in a hair follicle test, and
Mother allowed him to attend one of her unsupervised visits the following month. He
appeared to be “‘high and strung out on something’” at the visit. Mother subsequently
kicked Father out and obtained a restraining order against him, following an altercation
14
when he “‘showed up with a random chick.’” But given the parents’ history of breaking
up and reconciling, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to infer that pattern would
continue.
For all of the foregoing reasons, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to infer
that Mother was likely to reunite with the Father again, which would make it unlikely that
the children could be returned to her, because they would be at risk of harm from Father’s
substance abuse and because Father’s presence would greatly increase Mother’s risk of
relapse. Consequently, the evidence did not compel a finding that there was a substantial
probability that the children would be returned to Mother in the remaining three months
before the 18-month review.
III. Substantial risk of detriment
Mother argues that the court’s finding that there was a substantial risk of detriment
to the children if they were returned to her care was not supported by substantial
evidence. We disagree.
At the 12-month review hearing, “the court shall order the return of the child to the
physical custody of their parent . . . unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the return of the child to their parent . . . would create a substantial risk of
detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The
social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment.” (§ 366.21, subd.
(f)(1).) We review the juvenile court’s detriment finding for substantial evidence. (In re
A.J. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 154, 160.)
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For reasons already described, the evidence supports the court’s finding. Father
had a long-standing and completely unaddressed substance abuse issue, and there was
evidence that he was the original source of Mother’s substance abuse. Moreover, the
parents had an eight-year history of separating and reuniting, and they were together
during almost the entire reunification period. It was reasonable for the court to infer that
Mother was likely to reunite with Father again, which would put the children at risk of
harm from Father’s substance abuse, and his presence would greatly increase Mother’s
likelihood of relapse, further placing them at risk of harm. The record thus contains
substantial evidence that return of the children to Mother’s custody would create a
substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-
being.
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
FIELDS J.
16
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court denied the mother's petition for extraordinary writ, affirming the juvenile court's order to terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. The court held that the Department provided reasonable services and that the evidence supported the finding that returning the children to the mother would create a substantial risk of detriment.
Issues
Did the Department provide reasonable reunification services to the mother?
Did the court err in finding that returning the children to the mother would create a substantial risk of detriment?
Was there a substantial probability that the children would be returned to the mother if services were continued to the 18-month review?
Disposition. denied
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.”
“DPSS’s failure to provide services to address a seemingly nonexistent problem does not compel a finding that services were not reasonable.”