Martin v. James-Martin CA4/2 (2026) · DecisionDepot
Martin v. James-Martin CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Mar 30, 2026 No. E085704Unpublished
Filed 3/30/26 Martin v. James-Martin CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
CRYSTAL M. MARTIN,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E085704
v. (Super.Ct.No. FAMSB2405610)
MONIQUE R. JAMES-MARTIN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael J. Gassner,
granting grandparent visitation was reversed because lower court failed to apply the
presumption of parental fitness, discounting the mother’s concern about the
grandparents]; Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (Troxel) [statute that
authorized courts to grant any person visitation upon a finding it served the child’s best
interests held unconstitutional as applied because “the Due Process Clause does not
permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing
decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made”]; but
see Lopez v. Martinez (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 279, 287-288 (Lopez) [Section 3104 is not
unconstitutional because it explicitly limits the situations and circumstances in which
grandparents can petition for visitation rights, and it creates a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the parents’ decision that visitation is not in the child’s best interests].)
A. Standard of Review
“Generally speaking, ‘[t]he standard of appellate review of . . . visitation orders is
the deferential abuse of discretion test. [Citation.] The precise measure is whether the
5
trial court could have reasonably concluded that the order in question advanced the “best
interest” of the child. We are required to uphold the ruling if it is correct on any basis,
regardless of whether such basis was actually invoked. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
[¶] ‘“[E]valuating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing
the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling. . . . Broad deference must be shown to the
trial judge. The reviewing court should interfere only ‘“if [it] find[s] that under all the
evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge could
reasonably have made the order that he did.” . . .’” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘“The
burden is on the party complaining to establish an abuse of discretion, and unless a clear
case of abuse is shown and unless there has been a miscarriage of justice a reviewing
court will not substitute its opinion and thereby divest the trial court of its discretionary
power.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Rich v. Thatcher (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1176,
1182.)
B. Analysis
1. Standing
We begin with mother’s challenge to SGM’s standing to request visitation.
According to mother, SGM’s reliance on section 3104 (grandparents may petition for
visitation of their grandchildren) is misplaced because she is a stepgrandmother. (§ 3104,
subd. (a).2) However, SGM did not seek grandparent visitation solely under section
2 “(a) On petition to the court by a grandparent of a minor child, the court may grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparent if the court does both of the following: [¶] (1) Finds that there is a preexisting relationship between the grandparent [footnote continued on next page]
6
3104; she invoked sections 3100 through 3104, particularly section 3101, subdivision (a),
which authorizes the trial court to grant reasonable visitation to a stepparent, if it is
determined to be in the best interest of the minor child. On appeal, she also references
section 3100, which authorizes the court to grant reasonable visitation rights to “any other
person having an interest in the welfare of the child.” While none of the statutes
referenced by SGM expressly grant visitation rights to stepgrandparents, neither do they
explicitly proscribe such rights.
California’s statutory scheme gives the greatest protection to “the integrity of the
nuclear family unit and the ability of married, cohabiting parents to make decisions free
from state interference” by shielding married, cohabiting parents from the filing of a
grandparent visitation petition except in very limited situations. (Lopez, supra, 85
Cal.App.4th at p. 286.) Thus, a grandparent’s right to visitation is statutory, but evolving.
(In re Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 219-2203; Lopez, at p. 286 [prior to
1993 amendments, grandparents could not bring an independent action to establish
and the grandchild that has engendered a bond such that visitation is in the best interest of the child. [¶] (2) Balances the interest of the child in having visitation with the grandparent against the right of the parents to exercise their parental authority.” (§ 3104, subd. (a).)
3 “Grandparents’ rights to court-ordered visitation with their grandchildren are purely statutory. [Citation.] Three California statutes expressly address grandparent visitation: [S]ection 3102, which permits visitation by a deceased parent’s children, siblings, parents, and grandparents if such visitation would be in the best interests of the child; section 3103, which permits a court in specified proceedings involving the custody of a child to grant grandparent visitation; and section 3104, which permits grandparents to petition for visitation if the grandchild’s parents are not married or if certain other conditions are met.” (In re Marriage of Harris, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 219-220, fns. omitted.)
7
visitation rights with a grandchild because no statutory authority expressly permitted such
an action].) While stepgrandparents are not currently included in our legislative scheme,
our statutes and “legal doctrine evolve[] over time, and appellate courts have the
capability and the responsibility to recognize and explain such changes when they occur.”
(K.R. v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 295, 308-309; but see Ed H. v. Ashley C. (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 899, 908-911[appellate court denied standing to great-grandparents
because section 3104 expressly grants visitation rights to grandparents only].) To that
end, we are mindful of the fact that for many modern households, the traditional nuclear
family no longer exists. It has transitioned into a single parent household or a blended
family, consisting of stepparents, half siblings, stepchildren, and stepgrandparents. Such
is the case before this court.
Mother’s family is a blended family, and SGM has been part of it since 2017, first
as an interested person, then as a stepgrandmother. To deny her standing to petition for
visitation simply because our laws have yet to catch up with our current social
conditions—blended families—is to ignore the reality of our evolving social fabric. “‘“It
is common knowledge that children who have strong, loving adults in their lives thrive.
Grandparents[, even stepgrandparents,] can be that strong, loving adult for a child. These
relationships become even more vital during times when families are dissolving and
changing. . . .”’” (Finberg v. Manset (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 529, 536.) Accordingly, we
interpret our statutes broadly to provide stepgrandparents with standing to seek visitation.
Notwithstanding the above, granting stepgrandparents standing does not
automatically result in granting them visitation. Rather, the trial court must conclude that
8
it is in the best interests of the children. (§§ 3100, subd. (a) [“the court shall grant
reasonable visitation rights . . . when it is shown that the visitation would be in the best
interest of the child”], 3101, subd. (a) [“the court may grant reasonable visitation to a
stepparent, if visitation by the stepparent is determined to be in the best interest of the
minor child”], 3102, subd. (a) [“the children, siblings, parents, and grandparents of the
deceased parent may be granted reasonable visitation with the child during the child’s
minority upon a finding that the visitation would be in the best interest of the minor
child”], 3103, subd. (a) [“the court may grant reasonable visitation to a grandparent of a
minor child of a party to the proceeding if the court determines that visitation by the
grandparent is in the best interest of the child”], 3104, subd. (a) [“the court may grant
reasonable visitation rights to the grandparent if the court . . . [f]inds that there is a
preexisting relationship . . . that has engendered a bond such that visitation is in the best
interest of the child”], 3105, subd. (b) [“court may grant reasonable visitation rights to a
person who previously served as the legal guardian of a child, if visitation is determined
to be in the best interest of the minor child], italics added; Stuard v. Stuard (2016)
244 Cal.App.4th 768, 779 (Stuard) [“‘the primary impetus behind the provision was not
the strengthening of grandparental visitation rights, but the protection of the best interest
of the child’”].) Also, even when grandparents are statutorily given standing to petition
for visitation rights, there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of the parents’ decision that
visitation is not in the best interests of the children. (§§ 3103, subd. (d); 3104, subds. (e),
(f); Lopez, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 287-288 [statutory scheme makes clear the court
9
must accord extreme deference to parental authority while considering the best interest of
the child].)
Since this case involves a blended family, we interpret the statutory scheme
granting grandparents’ visitation broadly and conclude SGM has standing.
2. Deference to parental authority
In her second claim, mother contends the trial court erred in failing to give the
constitutionally required deference to her decision regarding visitation. (Zasueta, supra,
102 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1248, 1254; Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 72-73.) We are not
persuaded.
Since SGM is the boys’ grandmother, albeit a stepgrandmother, we consider the
issue under section 3104, the statute applicable to a grandparent’s request for visitation.
A trial court may grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparents if it (1) “[f]inds
that there is a preexisting relationship between the grandparent and the grandchild that
has engendered a bond such that visitation is in the best interest of the child” and (2)
“[b]alances the interest of the child in having visitation with the grandparent against the
right of the parents to exercise their parental authority.” (§ 3104.) A parent’s objection
does not automatically foreclose visitation. Rather, “‘[t]he decision of [the parents] about
whether and under what conditions grandparents should have visitation with their
grandchildren is entitled to “special weight” under [United States Supreme Court
authority]—assuming both are fit parents—but no more.’” (Stuard, supra, 244
Cal.App.4th at p. 784.) Accordingly, “[t]here is a rebuttable presumption affecting the
burden of proof that the visitation of a grandparent is not in the best interest of a minor
10
child if the parent who has been awarded sole legal and physical custody of the child in
another proceeding, or the parent with whom the child resides if there is currently no
operative custody order objects to visitation by the grandparent.” (§ 3104, subd. (f).)
“To overcome the presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of the
grandchild, a grandparent has the burden of proof and must show, by clear and
convincing evidence, that denial of visitation is not in the best interest of the grandchild,
i.e., denial of visitation would be detrimental to the grandchild.” (Rich v. Thatcher,
supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1180.)
Here, the appellate record consists of SGM’s petition and declarations, along with
mother’s motion to quash, and her opposition. The reporter’s transcript of the evidentiary
hearing has not been provided. According to SGM, the trial court heard the following
evidence of mother’s failings as a fit mother: (1) the boys’ fathers were presently
incarcerated for long periods of time in prison, (2) mother’s husband, James, attacked and
caused the death of GF, (3) the boys witnessed the attack of their GF, (4) mother
continues to live with James despite his attack on GF, and (5) James is awaiting trial for
the murder of GF. Additionally, the court was provided evidence via SGM’s declarations
regarding the boys and mother living with the GP’s, mother’s transient lifestyle, James’s
abusive nature, and GP’s role in the boys’ lives. On appeal, mother does not challenge
SGM’s representation of the facts. Rather, she asserts (1) her husband’s separate pending
criminal case is irrelevant, (2) her “alleged character flaws, and accusations regarding the
[boys]” amount to nothing more than “unsubstantiated allegations” that should be
disregarded, and (3) she “cannot address the specifics of her husband’s pending criminal
11
case . . . as she is a witness . . . and doing so would be improper and prejudicial.” SGM
notes the record fails to provide a full transcript of the hearing, which included relevant
evidence. In response, mother faults the “court reporter’s failure to provide the
designated full proceedings.” However, her notice designating the record on appeal only
identifies the January 27, 2025, proceeding entitled “Motion to Quash (Dismissed)-
Family Code 3100.”
“[I]t is settled that: ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed
correct . . . and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of
appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’”
(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; accord, In re Marriage of
Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) “‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the
record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate
court. “[I]f any matters could have been presented to the court below which would have
authorized the order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were
presented.”’” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) Specifically, unless the
record demonstrates otherwise, “‘a reviewing court must presume that the record contains
evidence to support every finding of fact.’” (In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d
877, 887; accord, Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) “‘“[I]f
the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of
the trial court should be affirmed.”’” (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011)
198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.)
12
Turning to the record before us, the trial court acknowledged mother’s opposition
to SGM’s request for visitation and conducted an evidentiary hearing. SGM offered
substantial evidence of her pre-existing relationship with the boys, along with mother’s
actions to separate her (SGM) from the boys following GF’s death at the hands of her
(mother’s) husband. Based on the evidence presented, the court must have found that
mother is an unfit parent,4 and that SGM provided clear and convincing evidence to rebut
the presumption that mother was acting in the best interest of the boys in denying
visitation to SGM at this time or that denial of visitation with SGM would be detrimental
to the boys. The court observed that “there are different people associated with Mother
that are in Jail or Prison. [SGM] represents stability in the children’s lives.” We cannot
fault this observation or conclude that the court abused its discretion in granting SGM
visitation.
4 The Family Code does not define “fit parent” in a specific legal term. However, case law describes a fit parent as a parent who cares for his or her children. (Guardianship of Ann S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110, 1129-1130 [“‘[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family . . . .”].) Caring for children suggests providing a safe and stable environment void of abuse or neglect, and prioritizing the children’s health, safety, and welfare.
13
III. DISPOSITION
The order granting SGM’s request for stepgrandparent visitation is affirmed.
SGM shall recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)-(2).)
MILLER ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Holding. The court held that stepgrandparents have standing to petition for visitation under the Family Code and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting such visitation after finding the stepgrandmother provided stability for the children.
Issues
Whether a stepgrandmother has standing to petition for visitation under the California Family Code.
Whether the trial court failed to provide constitutionally required deference to the mother's parental authority in granting visitation.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Since this case involves a blended family, we interpret the statutory scheme granting grandparents’ visitation broadly and conclude SGM has standing.”
“The court observed that “there are different people associated with Mother that are in Jail or Prison. [SGM] represents stability in the children’s lives.””
“We cannot fault this observation or conclude that the court abused its discretion in granting SGM visitation.”