“[T]he firearms prohibition under section 29820 . . . is self-executing and independent of
the juvenile court’s authority to impose conditions of probation.” (In re M.A., at p. 148.)
“The prohibition is a mandatory consequence of (1) the true finding as to a predicate
offense and (2) the ensuing wardship disposition. . . . The juvenile court’s duty under
3
section 29820 is merely the ministerial duty to ‘notify the [Department of Justice] of
persons subject to this section.’ ” (Ibid.)
E.J. concedes that a violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1), triggers the
firearm prohibition set forth in section 29820. He argues only that the statute itself is
facially unconstitutional. “ ‘The interpretation of a statute and the determination of its
constitutionality are questions of law. In such cases, appellate courts apply a de novo
standard of review.’ ” (People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, 474 (Alexander);
People v. Roberts (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 187, 193.) “ ‘Typically, a litigant may
challenge the constitutionality of a statute in two ways: on its face or as applied.’ . . . [¶]
‘A facial challenge seeks to void the statute as a whole by showing that “ ‘no set of
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid,’ i.e. that the law is
unconstitutional in all” ’ . . . or at least the ‘ “ ‘great majority of cases. ’ ” ’ ” (Roberts, at
p. 193.) “When reviewing a facial challenge to a statute, we ‘consider . . . only the text of
the measure itself, not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual.’ ”
(Ibid.)
B. The Firearm Restriction Does Not Violate the Second Amendment
The first argument advanced by E.J. is that the firearm prohibition in section
29820 violates the Second Amendment because it is not consistent with our nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation. 2 We disagree.
2 In N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n. Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1 (Bruen), the United States Supreme Court “held that the test for assessing constitutionality under the Second Amendment is as follows: ‘When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an [footnote continued on next page]
4
In Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 1, the United States Supreme Court “established a two-
part test for analyzing Second Amendment challenges.” (People v. McCowan (2026)
‘the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.’ [Citation.] . . . [¶]
If Bruen step one is satisfied, ‘[t]he government must then justify its regulation by
demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation.’ ” (Ibid.) “At the second Bruen step, the challenged law need not ‘precisely
match its historical precursors’ so long as it is ‘ “analogous enough to pass constitutional
muster.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680, 692 (Rahimi).)
As this court has already concluded in Alexander, supra, a statute banning
possession of firearms by convicted felons is not facially unconstitutional in violation of
the Second Amendment because only law-abiding citizens are among the class of people
covered by the text of the Second Amendment. (91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 477-480.)
Multiple other published decisions have reached the same conclusion. (People v.
Richardson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1203, 1212; People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
307, 316-317 [same]; People v. Ceja (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1296, 1301 [same].) While
these decisions addressed the constitutionality of firearm prohibition following adult
convictions in criminal proceedings, the reasoning of these decisions is equally applicable
individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s “unqualified command.” ’ ” (Alexander, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 476.)
5
to section 29820.
“As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the interests at stake in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding parallel those at risk in a criminal prosecution.” (In re
Kevin S. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97, 118.) In such a proceeding, “a minor is accused of
criminal conduct.” (Ibid.) The declaration that a minor is a ward of the juvenile court
within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 constitutes an
adjudication that the minor has violated a criminal law; (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602,
subd. (a); 702) and the minor can be subject “to a loss of liberty for years . . . comparable
in seriousness to a felony prosecution” as a result. (In re Kevin S., at p. 118.) The
firearm prohibition set forth in section 29820 applicable to juvenile adjudications is
merely the companion statute to section 29800 applicable to adult convictions. (In re
M.A., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 148.) Because a juvenile adjudication of wardship
constitutes a determination that the minor has engaged in behavior in violation of a
criminal law, the logic of Alexander concluding that the protections of the Second
Amendment apply only to law abiding citizens forecloses E.J.’s argument in this case. If
an adult may be prohibited from possession of firearms after a determination that the
adult is not law abiding, then a juvenile clearly can be subject to the same prohibition
upon the same determination. 3 As such, E.J. does not meet step one of the Bruen test.
3 If anything, the state is permitted to impose greater restrictions on a minor’s constitutional rights when compared to adults. (See In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118 [Even where constitutional rights are implicated, a condition of probation may be permissible in juvenile adjudications that would not be permitted for an adult criminal defendant.].)
6
In reply, E.J. argues that our conclusion in Alexander should not apply here
because he has successfully rehabilitated such that he is now “law-abiding.” Even if this
argument had been preserved for our consideration, 4 it would not dictate a different
conclusion. Assuming that E.J. is a person afforded the protections of the Second
Amendment in satisfaction of step one of the Bruen test, we would still conclude that
section 29820 is facially valid. As detailed at length in People v. Anderson (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 577 (Anderson), “sources from 17th-century England, colonial America,
and the early federal period demonstrate that California’s felon-in-possession firearm
regulations comport with our national tradition of firearm regulation”; “categories of
persons thought to pose a danger to the community were forbidden to have arms, and
individuals were sometimes disarmed as a consequence of being convicted of criminal
conduct”; and “[w]hen the founding generation framed and debated constitutional text, it
considered such limitations inherent in the right the Second Amendment protects.” (Id. at
pp. 589-590; see People v. Gomez (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 419, 439 [agreeing with
Anderson].) As explained in Anderson, California’s disarmament laws are sufficiently
analogous to these historical analogues to pass constitutional muster under Bruen and
Rahimi. (Anderson, at p. 598.); that is, they are “ ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our
tradition is understood to permit.” (United States v. Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 692.)
4 Because this argument rests upon a set of facts specific to E.J., the argument is clearly an “ ‘as applied’ constitutional challenge and not a facial challenge because the argument would not apply in all circumstances.” (In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144, 167.) And “[a]n as-applied constitutional challenge is forfeited unless previously raised.” (People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946.)
7
Numerous decisions by federal circuit courts have reached a similar conclusion in
the context of evaluating federal statutes imposing firearm prohibitions on convicted
felons. (See United States v. Schnur (5th Cir. 2025) 132 F.4th 863, 870 [For persons
previously convicted for a “ ‘crime of violence,’ ” “the regulation of such person’s ability
to possess a firearm ‘is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
of firearms possession by persons convicted of felonies . . . is based on those persons’
prior conduct, formally admitted or proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that constitutes a
serious violation of the law” and firearm prohibition for such persons “is an appropriate
exercise of [Congress’s] longstanding power to disarm dangerous categories of persons.”]
(Zherka); United States v. Bernard (8th Cir. 2025) 136 F.4th 762, 765-766 [a permanent
or indefinite prohibition on gun possession by person previously convicted of a violent
criminal offense “is not unconstitutional on its face”]; United States v. Canada (4th Cir.
2024) 123 F.4th 159, 161-162 [“[T]he government may constitutionally forbid people
who have been found guilty of [serious crimes] from continuing to possess firearms.”].)
We find the detailed analysis set forth in Anderson persuasive on this point and
agree with its conclusion. Thus, even if we assume that E.J. can now be considered a
person who enjoys the rights afforded by the Second Amendment, a statute that regulates
the possession of firearms as a consequence of a prior determination that the person has
engaged in criminal conduct is not facially unconstitutional. The statute survives scrutiny
under step two of the Bruen test because such regulation is consistent with our nation’s
8
historical tradition of firearm regulation, even at the time the founders adopted the
Second Amendment.
C. Section 29820’s Reference to Age Does Not Render It Facially Unconstitutional
E.J. also briefly suggests that section 29820 is unconstitutional because it limits
firearm possession by a juvenile offender until age 30 and “[t]he Second Amendment
does not permit disabilities that rest on ‘age-as-proxy-for-risk.’ ” We disagree.
Here, E.J. seeks to cast the statute’s reference to “age 30” as an age-based
disability and thereafter relies on a series of cases from federal circuit courts finding that
firearm restriction based solely on age is unconstitutional. However, we find the premise
of E.J.’s argument flawed. On its face, section 29820 restricts firearm possession based
upon an adjudication that the person has committed specific statutory violations resulting
in a declaration of wardship. (§ 29820, subd. (a).) The statute’s reference to “30 years of
age” simply designates the point at which the firearm restriction is lifted. (§ 29820, subd.
(b).)
Thus, on its face, the text of the statute does not impose any restriction on any
person’s Second Amendment rights because of that person’s age. The restriction is
imposed as the result of a prior juvenile adjudication that the person has engaged in
criminal conduct. And, as we have already explained, such regulation does not violate
the Second Amendment. Since imposition of a firearm restriction is constitutional for
criminal offenders, regardless of age, E.J. has not established that section 29820 is invalid
merely because it designates a point in time at which the restriction will be lifted.
9
D. Section 29820 Does Not Violate Due Process
E.J. also argues that section 29820 is unconstitutional because it imposes a
categorical restriction and fails to offer any mechanism to obtain an individual
assessment of dangerousness, depriving him of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Again, we disagree.
By its plain terms, section 29820 applies based solely on the fact that a person was
previously adjudged a ward of the juvenile court for violation of specified criminal
statutes. (§ 29820, subd. (a)(2).) As explained by both the United States Supreme Court
and California Supreme Court, where the application of a statute is based upon the “fact
of previous conviction, not the fact of current dangerousness,” due process does not
require a further opportunity to contest whether an individual is dangerous because “due
process does not entitle him to a hearing to establish a fact that is not material under the
challenged statute.” (Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe (2003) 538 U.S. 1, 4, 7; Doe v.
California Dept. of Justice (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1113.)
Because E.J. asserts only a facial challenge to section 29820 in this appeal, we
look only to the text of the statute at issue. And because the application of section 29820
is based upon the fact of a prior juvenile adjudication and not a determination of E.J.’s
risk of danger, the absence of an individualized hearing or mechanism to establish E.J.’s
risk of danger to society does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
protections. By all accounts, the record suggests that E.J. has been successful thus far in
his efforts at rehabilitation. Such efforts should be recognized and are commendable.
However, the Legislature has not conditioned the firearm prohibition set forth in section
10
29820 on a determination of individual risk to society. 5 And due process does not entitle
E.J. to a hearing to contest facts that ultimately have no bearing on the application of the
statute he seeks to challenge.
E. The Belatedly Asserted As-Applied Challenge Is Forfeited
Finally, we briefly address E.J.’s argument that “the firearm prohibition operates
as a purely punitive sanction at this stage of [E.J.’s] life” because he has “successfully
completed probation, had the offense reduced and the record sealed,” and “[t]here is no
evidence in the record that [E.J.] poses a danger to public safety or that continued
disarmament serves any rehabilitative function.” Because this argument rests upon a set
of facts specific to E.J., the argument is clearly an as-applied challenge and not a facial
5 We do not necessarily disagree with E.J.’s contention that the purpose of the juvenile delinquency system is to promote rehabilitation and protect the public. However, Congress and the Legislature are constitutionally permitted to make categorical restrictions on the possession of firearms based upon prior convictions when enacting statutes with a public safety purpose. (Zherka, supra, 140 F.4th at p. 96 [due process does not require finding of individual dangerousness where federal statute “constitutionally disarms felons as a class”]; United States v. Duarte (2025) 137 F.4th 743, 760-761 [“[O]ur historical tradition reveals that legislatures were permitted to categorically disarm those they deemed dangerous without having to perform ‘an individualized determination of dangerousness as to each person in a class of prohibited persons.’ ”]; United States v. Jackson (2024) 110 F.4th 1120, 1127-1128 [same]; United States v. Ogilvie (2025) 153 F.4th 1098, 1109 [constitution does not require individualized assessment before categorical disarming those charged with serious offenses during pretrial detention].) The decision whether to condition a restriction on a categorical legislative determination as opposed to an individualized assessment rests with the Legislature.
11
challenge. (In re D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)6 We conclude this argument
has been forfeited for two independent reasons.
First, E.J.’s opening brief characterizes his appeal as purely a facial challenge to
the constitutionality of section 28920, expressly for the purpose of avoiding forfeiture.
His as-applied argument was raised for the first time in the reply brief. “ ‘ “ ‘[T]he rule is
that points raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good
reason is shown for failure to present them before.’ ” ’ ” (Cox v. Griffin (2019)
34 Cal.App.5th 440, 453.) Absent good cause, the argument may be deemed forfeited.
(People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1061.) No good cause for the failure to
present the argument earlier has been shown by appellant here.
Second, “constitutional challenges to probation conditions must ordinarily be
brought in the trial court, unless the challenge constitutes a facial challenge.” (People v.
As the People correctly point out, the record does not indicate E.J. raised an as-applied
challenge in the juvenile court. Thus, we also deem the argument forfeited for this
additional reason.
6 Generally, “ ‘[a]n as applied challenge may seek . . . relief from a specific application of a facially valid statute or ordinance to an individual or class of individuals who are under allegedly impermissible present restraint or disability as a result of the manner or circumstances in which the statute or ordinance has been applied.’ ” (In re T.F.-G. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 893, 911.)
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IV. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
FIELDS J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
13
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. Penal Code section 29820, which prohibits individuals adjudicated as juvenile wards for certain offenses from possessing firearms until age 30, is facially constitutional under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
Issues
Does Penal Code section 29820 violate the Second Amendment by failing to conform to the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation?
Does Penal Code section 29820 violate the Second Amendment by using age as a proxy for dangerousness?
Does Penal Code section 29820 violate the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide a mechanism for individualized assessment of dangerousness?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude that section 29820 is facially valid and affirm the order.”
“due process does not entitle him to a hearing to establish a fact that is not material under the challenged statute.”