Cordova v. Teasdale CA2/3

Filed 3/25/26 Cordova v. Teasdale CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

DANIEL CORDOVA, B339195

Plaintiff, Defendant and Los Angeles County Respondent, Super. Ct. Nos. 23PSRO01696, v. 23PSRO01631, 18PSRO01772 RENEA TEASDALE,

Defendant, Plaintiff and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michelle Graves Bryant, Judge. Affirmed.

Diamond & Associates and David D. Diamond for Defendant, Plaintiff and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff, Defendant and Respondent. _________________________

Renea Teasdale appeals from a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) issued in favor of Daniel Cordova and the former couple’s two children. She also challenges the denial of her DVRO application. The trial court found Cordova gave credible testimony supporting his DVRO application, while Teasdale did not. The court primarily based this credibility determination on Teasdale’s calculated decision to omit material facts from her DVRO application, which, in the court’s words, showed “she has used the Domestic Violence Prevention Act and the purpose of it and the tools [of it] to manipulate and to harass and to control Mr. Cordova” and “not” out of any genuine “fears for [her] safety.”1 Teasdale similarly omits from her appellate brief material evidence that supports the trial court’s credibility determinations, factual findings, and exercise of discretion. We affirm the order. We review the grant or denial of a DVRO for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226.) To the extent the court’s exercise of discretion rests on factual findings, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (Ibid.) The court’s decision is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate error affirmatively. (Ashby v. Ashby (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 509; In re Marriage of Gray (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 974, 977– 978.) To meet this burden, an appellant like Teasdale “ ‘must set forth, discuss, and analyze all the evidence [relevant to her