California Court of Appeal Mar 20, 2026 No. E084050Unpublished
Filed 3/20/26 P. v. Pusok CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084050
v. (Super. Ct. No. FVI23003014)
FRANCIS JARED PUSOK, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Debra Harris,
Judge. Reversed in part, affirmed in part with directions.
Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Daniel Rogers, and Vincent P. LaPietra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
1
I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Francis Pusok violently assaulted a gas station clerk after
the clerk told him to stop harassing two women. Defendant then led a responding
sheriff’s deputy on a high-speed car chase. During that chase, defendant drove in the
wrong lane and nearly crashed headfirst into another responding deputy’s car driving in
the opposite direction. The chase ended with Pusok crashing. When being transported
by an ambulance, Pusok kicked one of the responding deputies in the knee. 1 A jury convicted defendant of (1) battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d); count 1),
(2) assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (c); count 2), (3)
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3), (4) evading an officer
against traffic (Veh. Code § 2800.4; count 4), and (5) assault by means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury (GBI) (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 5). As to count 5, the jury
also found true the allegation that defendant personally inflicted GBI (§ 12022.7, subd.
(a)). The trial court found that defendant had two prior serious-felony strike convictions
and sentenced him to five years, four months, plus 60 years to life.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Defendant contends (1) the trial court gave the jury an erroneous definition of GBI
and the prosecutor erroneously defined GBI in closing argument, (2) the trial court
improperly precluded defendant from cross-examining two sheriff’s deputies about a
2015 incident involving defendant and sheriff’s deputies and, in turn, improperly denied
his motion for a new trial based on that ruling, (3) the trial court erroneously declined to
strike one or more of his prior convictions, (4) his sentence is cruel and unusual, and (5)
the abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment.
Defendant also asks that we independently review police personnel records (see Pitchess
v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess)).
As we explain below, we conclude the trial court and the prosecutor both used a
correct definition of GBI. We conclude, however, that the trial court prejudicially
violated the Confrontation Clause (U.S. const., amend. VI) by overly restricting
defendant’s cross-examination of two sheriff’s deputies, whose testimony was the only
prosecution evidence presented on counts 2 and 4. We therefore reverse defendant’s
convictions on those counts and remand for further proceedings, which moots defendant’s
claims of sentencing errors. And although our reversal on counts 2 and 4 likewise moots
defendant’s Pitchess request, we exercise our discretion to address the issue and find that
the trial court should have ordered the production of two civilian complaints. Given this
disposition, we need not address defendant’s claim that the abstract of judgment is
incorrect, since the trial court must enter a new judgment on remand.
3
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Around 1:00 a.m., defendant approached two women sitting in a car at a gas pump
and asked them if they wanted to buy a phone, AirPods, or alcohol. After the women said
no, defendant threw the AirPods on the hood of the car, shoved the phone through a crack
in the car’s window, and then climbed on the hood of the car.
The gas station clerk came outside and asked the women if they knew defendant or
if he was bothering them. The women said they did not know him, so the clerk asked
him to leave. Defendant and the clerk began yelling at each other, so the clerk said he
was going to call the police and turned to go back inside.
Defendant then ran at the clerk, jumped on him, and knocked him down.
Defendant then straddled the clerk and punched him in the face about 15 times. The clerk
was eventually able to run inside and close the door behind him, but defendant ran to the
double doors and began pulling on them as the clerk held them shut. Defendant then ran
to his car and drove off, and the clerk called 911.
After a San Bernardino County sheriff’s deputy responded to the scene, defendant
returned. Defendant drove past the deputy, did a U-turn, and sped off. The deputy turned
on his lights and pursued defendant.
Defendant then led the deputy on a high-speed chase during which defendant
exceeded the speed limit, drove through stop signs, drove in the wrong lane, turned off
his headlights, and drove across multiple lanes of traffic.
4
At one point, a second San Bernardino County sheriff’s deputy with lights
activated drove toward defendant from the opposite direction. Defendant was driving
toward the deputy in the wrong lane. As they approached each other, defendant did not
move over to the correct lane, which forced the deputy to move after nearly colliding into
defendant.
Later, defendant briefly stopped at an intersection, so the two deputies stopped and
waited for him. Defendant then accelerated at the deputies. They moved out of the way
and resumed chasing defendant. Defendant eventually lost control of his car, crashed,
and his car rolled over to a stop.
The deputies arrested defendant and found a gun underneath his car. They
summoned medical care for defendant, and one of the deputies rode in the ambulance
with defendant to the hospital. During that ride, defendant became violent and kicked the
deputy in the knee.
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends (1) the trial court gave the jury an erroneous definition of GBI
and the prosecutor erroneously defined GBI in closing argument, (2) the trial court
improperly precluded defendant from cross-examining two sheriff’s deputies about a
2015 incident involving defendant and sheriff’s deputies and, in turn, improperly denied
his motion for a new trial based on that ruling, (3) the trial court erroneously declined to
strike one or more of his prior convictions, (4) his sentence is cruel and unusual, and (5)
5
the abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment.
Defendant also asks that we independently review police personnel records (see Pitches,
supra, 11 Cal.3d 531).
As we explain below, we conclude the trial court and the prosecutor both used a
correct definition of GBI. We conclude, however, that the trial court prejudicially
violated the Confrontation Clause by overly restricting defendant’s cross-examination of
two sheriff’s deputies, whose testimony was the only prosecution evidence presented on
counts 2 and 4. We therefore reverse defendant’s convictions on those counts and remand
for further proceedings, which moots defendant’s claims of sentencing errors. And
although our reversal on counts 2 and 4 likewise moots defendant’s Pitchess request, we
exercise our discretion to address the issue and find no error. Given this disposition, we
need not address defendant’s claim that the abstract of judgment is incorrect, since the
trial court must enter a new judgment on remand.
A. Instructional Error
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 80 and 875, which
explained that GBI “means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is
greater than minor or moderate harm.”
The prosecutor argued during closing argument: “Great bodily injury means that
there is a significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than
minor or moderate harm. [¶] Not to be repetit[ous] here, however, [the clerk] again
testifies that he separated or dislocated his shoulder, which he had to reset. He has
6
memory loss issues. And he’s got significant bruising. All that qualifies. Therefore, the
special allegation for great bodily injury is true. [¶] Therefore, based on [c]ount 5 the
defendant is guilty of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury and the
associated great bodily injury itself.”
“A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo . . . . In reviewing a claim of
instructional error, the court must consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the trial court’s instructions caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the
Constitution. [Citations.] The challenged instruction is viewed ‘in the context of the
instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable
likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’” (People v.
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.)
Defendant contends the instruction improperly allowed the jury to find that GBI is
an injury that is greater than minor but not greater than moderate. Like several other
courts, we reject this argument. (People v. Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874, 881,
902-904; People v. Sandoval (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 357, 360-362; People v. Quinonez
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 461-466.) For the reasons outlined in these opinions, the
definition of GBI the trial court here used was correct and clear. “‘Injury that is greater
than minor or moderate harm’ cannot reasonably be read to mean injury that is more than
minor but less than moderate. Such an interpretation simply does not make sense, legally
or grammatically, particularly when the phrase is preceded by the explanation that great
bodily injury means physical injury that is ‘significant or substantial.’” (People v.
7
Sandoval, supra, at p. 361.) We thus conclude the trial court properly instructed the jury.
And because the prosecutor used the same proper definition of GBI in closing, the
prosecutor did not misstate the law.
B. Evidence of 2015 Incident
1. Background
In 2015, San Bernardino County sheriff’s deputies arrested defendant for
reportedly stealing a horse. The incident was captured by a media helicopter and
captured several deputies apparently punching and kicking defendant while he appeared
to be surrendering. Three of the deputies involved in the arrest were charged with felony
charges for assaulting defendant. After the jury deadlocked on those charges, they were
dismissed as part of a plea deal. The deputies then pled no contest to misdemeanor
charges of disturbing the peace. Defendant received a $650,000 settlement from San
Bernardino County for the incident.
The only two witnesses for count 2 (assault on a police officer) and count 4
(evading an officer against traffic) were San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Deputies G.
Dominguez and J. Kabluyen. Defendant thus sought to introduce evidence of the 2015
incident to show that the deputies were biased against him and thus undermine their
credibility.
During voir dire, however, the trial court precluded the parties from asking
prospective jurors about the 2015 incident. Instead, they could ask only if anyone was
familiar with defendant.
8
At several points during the trial, the trial court precluded defendant from asking
about the deputies’ knowledge of defendant. One of the women from the gas station,
Jeanene Snyder, testified on direct that a deputy brought her to where defendant crashed
his vehicle and provided her statement there. On cross-examination, defense counsel
asked, “And isn’t it true that you asked the deputies if you could take photographs of the
crash?” The prosecutor objected, and the court held a sidebar. Defense counsel
explained the question was relevant to establish the deputies’ bias because an unidentified
deputy told Snyder that she could not take a picture of the crash, but told her who 2 defendant was and that she could “Google him to watch the video.” The trial court then
sustained the prosecutor’s objection, ruling that defense counsel had to first ask the
deputy about his statement.
During Deputy Dominguez’s cross-examination, he stated that he was “familiar
with who [defendant] is generally,” and that he knew of a “prior incident between
[defendant] and the sheriff’s department in 2015.” The prosecutor objected, and the court
held a sidebar. After defense counsel explained the questioning was to probe Deputy
Dominguez’s “bias, motive to lie,” the trial court ruled that defense counsel could ask
“‘Do you have a bias,’” reasoning that “anything else is not relevant because he said, ‘I
know of him.’” Defense counsel said he would ask that question, and the trial court
reiterated: “So just ask him, ‘Based on your knowledge of who [defendant] was, do you
have a bias in your testimony?’” Defense counsel accordingly asked that question, and
2 The record is unclear as to which deputy told this to Snyder.
9
Dominguez replied, “No.” Defense counsel then asked, “[B]ased on your knowledge of
who [defendant] is, do you have a motive to lie?” Dominguez replied, “No.”
The trial court later revisited its ruling on its own. The court explained: “If
defense got permission to bring up that bias when the officers said, no, I’m not bias[ed],
there’s nothing to be gained than opening the door for the People to use that information
for motive. Specifically motive, why would a person drive a car directly into another
oncoming vehicle? Why would an individual want to be armed? Because that’s an
allegation. The firearm was there for him to use it.” The court noted that a jury
instruction explained that motive was not required, but could be used if the jury found
one. But to “keep everything clean,” the court again found that evidence of the 2015
incident was “not relevant.” Defense counsel confirmed whether this ruling applied to
both deputies, and the court confirmed that it did. The court explained that defense
counsel could ask, “[D]id you know of him, or, if you had prior knowledge, that prior
knowledge, did it cause you to have any knowledge into whatever.”
Later, when cross-examining Deputy Kabluyen, defendant asked, “are you
generally familiar with [defendant]?” Deputy Kabluyen responded that he was “familiar
with who he is” and had “heard the name” before “this incident.” Defendant then asked,
“[D]o you have a motive or bias against [defendant] that would cause you to lie about
him?” The deputy said that he did not.
The trial court’s ruling limiting cross-examination of the deputies was one of
several grounds for defendant’s motion for new trial after his conviction. Defendant
10
argued the ruling improperly precluded him from cross-examining the deputies about
their bias against him. Defendant argued the deputies had significantly different versions
of the pursuit and arrest of defendant, and Deputy Kabluyen’s trial testimony differed
from his preliminary hearing testimony. Defendant thus argued that, by excluding
evidence of the 2015 incident, he was prevented from effectively presenting “an essential
part” of his defense, which was that the deputies “were lying about him because of his
past.”
Defendant noted there was evidence showing that the deputies knew who he was.
“First, a deputy rewarded Ms. Snyder for giving a statement by telling her who
[defendant] was. The deputy wanted to ‘give [her] one thing for [her] efforts,’ told her
[defendant’s] name, to [G]oogle him, and to watch the video of [defendant] being beaten
by San Bernardino County [s]heriff’s deputies in 2015. Second, Deputy Kabluyen on his
audio can be heard talking to another individual, presumably law enforcement associated
with the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department, about [defendant] declining
medical treatment but then needing to be taken back. The other person said, ‘so when he
does it again,’ which can reasonably be associated with suing the department, and Deputy
Kabluyen says, ‘I said the same thing.’”
At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel emphasized that evidence of the
2015 incident was relevant to prove that the deputies were biased against defendant and
that it should have been admitted to allow the jury to assess their credibility. The trial
11
court denied the motion, finding that defendant had a sufficient opportunity to attack the
deputies’ credibility by asking them if they knew defendant and were biased against him.
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses. (People v.
Royal (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 121, 149.) But they have a right only to “reasonable cross-
examination.” (Olden v. Kentucky (1988) 488 U.S. 227, 231.) Trial courts therefore have
“wide discretion in determining the appropriate scope of cross-examination.” (People v.
Royal, supra, at p. 149; People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 406.)
Although trial courts may reasonably limit a defendant’s cross-examination of a
witness’s bias, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause restricts the court’s
examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness’”];
People v. Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 623 [“[T]he right of confrontation includes
the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses on matters reflecting on their credibility.”].)
14
The issue here is, again, whether the trial court’s limitation on defendant’s cross-
examination of Dominguez and Kabluyen violated the Confrontation Clause, not whether
defendant had other available means to explore the deputies’ bias beyond cross-
examining them. The People offer no authority that suggests otherwise.
The People next argue no Confrontation Clause violation occurred because
defendant did not “attempt to introduce affirmative evidence of his 2015 arrest” and so
the trial court did not “exclude such evidence.” The People further maintain that the trial
court did not err because “neither of the deputies who testified at this trial appear to have
been at [defendant’s] 2015 arrest,” so “what they heard is inadmissible hearsay.”
To the extent the People argue that the trial court did not err because defendant did
not introduce evidence of the 2015 arrest by other means, we disagree. Again, the issue
is whether the trial court’s limiting defendant’s cross-examination of the deputies violated
the Confrontation Clause.
We likewise disagree with the People’s conclusory, wholly unsupported argument
that the deputies could not have testified about anything to do with defendant’s 2015
arrest since everything would have been inadmissible hearsay. We do not know what
exactly the deputies knew about the incident, how they learned about it, and the extent to
which their testimony about it would be admissible. On this record, it is entirely
speculative that defendant could not establish that the deputies knew of the incident, the
ensuing prosecution of the sheriff’s deputies, and defendant’s settlement without relying
entirely on hearsay.
15
What Deputies Dominguez and Kabluyen knew about these things was not “of
marginal impeachment value.” The 2015 incident was so highly publicized that the trial
court “doubt[ed] anybody in this county would not know” about it. The incident resulted
in three sheriff’s deputies—potentially former or current colleagues of Deputies
Dominguez and Kabluyen—being criminally charged with felonies (but pleading to
misdemeanors) for their conduct when arresting defendant. Defendant also received a
$650,000 settlement from the county—the deputies’ employer—because of the charged
deputies’ conduct.
The People argue the trial court properly precluded defendant from asking any
questions about these events because the deputies’ testified that they knew of defendant
and were not biased against him. The People thus claim that exploring the deputies’
specific knowledge of “an unrelated event . . . would not have established an additional
basis for bias.” We disagree. A reasonable jury, knowing that sheriff’s deputies were
prosecuted for assaulting defendant and that he received a large settlement for the
incident, could reasonably find that Deputies Dominguez and Kabluyen had a negative
opinion about defendant. That, in turn, could lead a reasonable jury to question the
deputies’ credibility. (See Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1280 [“[F]acts
showing bias are considered so highly probative of credibility . . . .”].) We thus agree
with defendant that evidence of the deputies’ knowledge of the 2015 incident, the ensuing
prosecutions, and defendant’s large settlement could have given the jury “a plausible
16
basis” to find that Deputies Dominguez and Kabluyen “harbored animosity or bias
against” him, thereby undermining their credibility.
The testimony of Deputies Dominguez and Kabluyen was effectively the only
evidence presented on the assault on an officer and felony evading charges (counts 2 & 4) 3 since they were the only witnesses to those offenses. Evidence about the deputies’
knowledge of the 2015 incident was thus not of marginal impeachment value, nor was it 4 “not relevant,” as the trial court incorrectly concluded. (See United States v. Abel (1984)
469 U.S. 45, 52 [“Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of
fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which
might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony.”].) This was the only
evidence that showed the deputies might have been biased against defendant, despite
their denials, and could have influenced the jury’s view of their testimony. (Castaneda-
Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1280 [“[B]ias has traditionally been viewed as
especially powerful.”].) Given that defendant’s guilt on counts 2 and 4 hinged on the
deputies’ testimony, their credibility was a critical issue on those counts. (See Abatti v.
Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 39, 52 [“Impeachment of a witness can make the
difference between acquittal and conviction, especially where credibility is the major
3 Defendant conceded he was guilty of misdemeanor evading. 4 We note that the People do not argue that the trial court properly excluded the evidence under Evidence Code section 352.
17
issue in a case and evidence at trial will consist of opposing stories presented by the
defense and the prosecution witnesses.”].)
The trial court’s ruling allowed defendant to ask the deputies only whether they
knew defendant and whether they were biased against him. When both deputies said they
were not biased against him, defendant could not then probe any potential bias stemming
from the 2015 incident, even though the jury might have reasonably found that the
incident gave the deputies a motive for favoring the prosecution. Defendant effectively
had to accept the deputies’ response at face value and move on with the cross-
examination. In our view, the trial court’s ruling made defendant’s cross-examination of
Deputies’ Dominguez and Kabluyen “an exercise in futility.” (Castaneda-Prado, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1282; see also Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at 679 [“blanket” ruling
“prohibit[ing] all inquiry into” a witness’s potential bias violated Confrontation Clause].)
We therefore turn to the second step of the analysis, which asks “whether ‘[a]
reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression’ of the
challenged witness’s credibility if the proposed line of cross-examination had been
permitted.” (Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1282, italics added.) This
requires us to focus “on the witness’s cross-examination rather than the outcome of the
trial as a whole, examining whether the defense had other means of impeachment” of the
witness during cross-examination. (Id. at pp. 1282 & 1282, fn. 9.) We review the issue
de novo. (Ibid.)
18
We conclude that a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different
impression of the deputies’ credibility had defendant been allowed to cross-examine them
about their knowledge of the 2015 incident and its aftermath. In Davis, our Supreme
Court held the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause by precluding the defendant
from asking a prosecution witness any questions probing whether he was testifying for
the prosecution, and thus biased in favor of the prosecution, to protect his probation
status. (Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 317-318.) The Court reasoned: “While
counsel was permitted to ask [the witness] whether he was biased, counsel was unable to
make a record from which to argue why [the witness] might have been biased or
otherwise lacked that degree of impartiality expected of a witness at trial. On the basis of
the limited cross-examination that was permitted, the jury might well have thought that
defense counsel was engaged in a speculative and baseless line of attack on the credibility
of an apparently blameless witness . . . .” (Id. at p. 318, italics added.)
So too here. Defendant was allowed to ask the deputies whether they knew
defendant and whether they were biased against him, but he was not permitted to ask any
further questions as to why they might be biased against him. Defendant thus was not
“permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw
inferences relating to the reliability of the witness[es].” (Davi v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S.
at p. 318.) Without any further context, this two-question line of inquiry could have left
the jury thinking that defendant was baselessly attacking the deputies for being biased
against him. Had defendant cross-examined the deputies about their knowledge of the
19
2015 incident, the resulting prosecution of three sheriff’s deputies, and defendant’s
$650,000 settlement with the county, the jury might have received a significantly
different impression of the deputies’ credibility. By cutting off all questioning about an
event that the jury might reasonably have made the deputies biased in the prosecution’s
favor, the trial court’s ruling violated defendant’s right to cross-examine.
Because we conclude the trial court’s ruling violated defendant’s Confrontation
Clause right to cross-examine the deputies, we must reverse the convictions on counts 2
and 4 unless the People show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Van 5 Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684.) The People have not done so.
The People offer two unpersuasive reasons why the error was harmless. First, they
contend that the deputies’ “[c]andid responses could have added to [their] credibility,”
and note that their previous knowledge of defendant and his involvement with the
sheriff’s department “may have explained a lack of aggressive tactics such as a PIT
maneuver.” But the People cite no evidence in the record showing that the deputies knew
defendant was the driver before or during their pursuit of him. In any event, the fact that
the deputies may have not used “aggressive tactics” during the pursuit because they knew
of defendant does not dispel their potential bias stemming from the 2015 incident, which
may have affected the credibility of their testimony. That is a credibility issue the jury
should have decided.
5 The People incorrectly argue we review the error under the less-stringent state law standard. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
20
Second, the People reiterate their argument that the trial court’s ruling was proper,
and thus harmless, because the deputies’ testimony about the 2015 incident could have
shown defendant “had a motive for assaulting the deputies.” That may be, but it is also
possible that the jury could have found that the evidence hurt the deputies’ credibility.
Again, this is a credibility issue the jury should have decided.
Van Arsdall held that whether a Confrontation Clause violation is harmless
“depends upon a host of factors,” but identified five specific factors that are “readily
accessible to reviewing courts”: (1) “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the
prosecution’s case,” (2) “whether the testimony was cumulative,” (3) “the presence or
absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on
material points,” (4) “the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted,” and (5) “the
overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684.)
Here, the deputies’ testimony was crucial on counts 2 and 4 since it was effectively
the only prosecution evidence for those counts. For that reason, their testimony was not
cumulative. And there was no evidence, such as dashcam footage, “decisively
corroborat[ing] or contradict[ing]” their account. (Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94
Cal.App.5th at p. 1293.) The fourth factor “strongly favors” defendant because the 2015
incident was the only grounds defendant had for showing the deputies’ bias against him,
and the trial court effectively only allowed him to ask the deputies whether they were
biased against him. (See Reiner v. Woods (6th Cir. 2020) 955 F.3d 549, 560.) Finally, as
to the fifth factor, “[i]n a case that rested almost entirely on credibility . . . we cannot say
21
the overall strength of the prosecution’s evidence compelled but one conclusion—
[defendant] was guilty [of counts 2 and 4] as charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Again, the prosecution submitted no evidence beyond the deputies’ testimony to prove
defendant’s guilt on those counts. (Castaneda-Prado, supra, at p. 1293.)
For all of these reasons, we conclude the trial court’s ruling restricting defendant’s
cross-examination of Deputies’ Dominguez and Kabluyen violated the Confrontation
Clause, and that violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore
reverse defendant’s convictions on counts 2 and 4.
C. Pitchess Motion
Before trial, defendant moved for disclosure of the personnel records of Deputies
Dominguez and Kabluyen. Specifically, defendant sought any personnel records about
the officers’ “(1) falsifying police reports or providing false testimony, (2) failure to
records, and (6) dishonesty and improper tactics no matter how catalogued by the
department.” Defendant sought these records to support his argument that the deputies’
testimony was not credible. The trial court reviewed the records in camera and found no
disclosable material.
Although this claim is moot given our reversal of counts 2 and 4, we exercise our
discretion to address it for the sake of judicial economy since it may reoccur if defendant
is retried on those counts. (See People v. Calderon (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 930,
938; Monty v. Leis (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1372.) We have likewise reviewed the
22
records filed under seal in this court, and disagree with the trial court there is no
disclosable material.
A defendant is “entitled to discovery of relevant documents or information in the
confidential personnel records of a peace officer accused of misconduct.” (People v.
Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179.) “If the defendant establishes good cause, the court
must review the requested records in camera to determine what information, if any,
should be disclosed.” (Ibid.) The trial court must then disclose to the defendant “‘such
information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.’”
(People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226.) Information is relevant, and thus should
be disclosed, if it “will ‘facilitate the ascertainment of the facts’ at trial [citation], that is,
‘all information pertinent to the defense.’” (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002)
29 Cal.4th 1, 7 14.) Thus, the trial court’s “duty to disclose encompasses information that
is not itself admissible but which ‘may lead to admissible evidence.’” (People v.
Gaines, supra, at p. 182.) We review the trial court’s ruling on a Pitchess motion for an
abuse of discretion. (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1220-1221.)
In March 2022, a citizen filed a Civilian Complaint (No. P# 2022-0233) against
Deputy Dominguez and other sheriff’s deputies related to his arrest. The complaint
alleged, among other things, that Deputy Dominguez intentionally “failed to document
his [the complainant’s] injuries in a deputy report” following the complainant’s arrest.
The Sheriff’s department’s Internal Affairs Division investigated the complaint and
23
determined it to be “unfounded” because an officer’s “audio belt recording confirmed
[the complainant] indicated he did not want a Deputy Report taken.”
In November 2021, a citizen filed a Civilian Complaint (No. P# 2021-0272)
against Deputy Kabluyen and other sheriff’s deputies related to the complainant’s son’s
arrest. The complaint alleged, among other things, that Deputy Kabluyen (1) unlawfully
arrested the complainant’s son, (2) coerced him to provide incriminating statements, and
(3) falsified a deputy report. The department’s Internal Affairs Division investigated the
complaint and found these allegations to be “unfounded.”
In our view, these complaints are discoverable because they may lead to
admissible evidence to support defendant’s challenge to the deputies’ credibility. (See
(People v. Gaines, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 182; People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88,
101.) As outlined above, the deputies’ credibility was a critical issue given that their
testimony was effectively the only prosecution evidence for counts 2 and 4. The fact that
the complaints were found to be unfounded is immaterial because “unsustained
complaints are discoverable.” (People v. Zamora, supra, at p. 93 fn.1.) This is because
“the burden for preparing a criminal defendant’s case rests with his counsel, not with the
police department. That burden cannot be properly discharged unless counsel has direct
access to potential witnesses, for it is counsel who must decide if they can aid his client,
not the police department's internal affairs division, however sincere and well motivated
the latter may be.” (Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 823, 829.)
24
On remand, if the People elect to retry defendant on counts 2 and 4, the trial court
is directed to order the sheriff’s department to disclose to defendant (1) the name,
address, and phone number of the complainants who filed Civilian Complaints (No. P#
2022-0233) and (No. P# 2021-0272), (2) the name, address, and phone number of any
witnesses to the incident(s) in question, and (3) the dates of the incidents in question.
(People v. Nuno (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1054.) The trial court must then give
defendant a reasonable opportunity to investigate the disclosed material before retrial on
counts 2 and 4, if any. If the People do not retry defendant on counts 2 and 4, then the
trial court is directed to deny defendant’s Pitchess motion as moot.
D. Remaining Issues 6 Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his Romero motion to strike
one or more of his prior serious felony convictions, his sentence is unconstitutional, and
the abstract of judgment is incorrect. Because we reverse his convictions on counts 2 and
4 and remand for further proceedings, these claims of error are moot. (See People v.
Jeter (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1218; People v. Hishmeh (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 46,
55.)
6 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
25
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed in part and affirmed in part. Defendant’s convictions on
counts 2 and 4 are reversed, but his convictions on counts 1, 3, and 5 are affirmed.
Defendant’s sentence is therefore vacated. On remand, if the People do not timely retry
defendant on counts 2 and 4, the trial court shall resentence him on counts 1, 3, and 5
accordingly. If the People timely retry defendant on counts 2 and 4, the trial court is
directed to disclose the Pitchess records consistent with this opinion and afford defendant
a reasonable opportunity to investigate the disclosed material before retrial.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MILLER J.
26
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court prejudicially violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights by overly restricting cross-examination of two sheriff's deputies regarding their potential bias stemming from a prior, highly publicized incident involving the defendant and the sheriff's department. Consequently, the court reversed the convictions on the counts relying solely on those deputies' testimony and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
Did the trial court err in its jury instructions and the prosecutor's closing argument regarding the definition of great bodily injury?
Did the trial court violate the Confrontation Clause by precluding cross-examination of sheriff's deputies regarding their potential bias?
Did the trial court err in its Pitchess ruling regarding the production of civilian complaints?
Disposition. Reversed in part, affirmed in part with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude, however, that the trial court prejudicially violated the Confrontation Clause (U.S. const., amend. VI) by overly restricting defendant’s cross-examination of two sheriff’s deputies”
“The trial court’s ruling made defendant’s cross-examination of Deputies’ Dominguez and Kabluyen “an exercise in futility.””
“We conclude the trial court and the prosecutor both used a correct definition of GBI.”