A.D. v. Superior Court CA4/2 (2026) · DecisionDepot
A.D. v. Superior Court CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Mar 18, 2026 No. E087543Unpublished
Filed 3/18/26 A.D. v. Superior Court CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
A.D.,
Petitioner, E087543
v. (Super.Ct.No. DPSW2200014)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OPINION RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
Respondent;
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Sean P. Crandell,
Judge. Petition denied.
Jaki Andrews for petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy
County Counsels, for Real Party in Interest. 1
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner A.D. (father) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 challenging the juvenile court’s orders terminating
reunification services as to his children, N.D., L.D., and W.D. (the children), and setting a
Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing. He
At a 12-month review hearing, “the court shall order the return of the child to the
physical custody of their parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to their parent or legal
guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical
or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1).)
4 While the presumptive maximum period of services for children over the age of three and under the age of three is 18 months and 12 months, respectively, the actual maximum period is 24 months. (§ 361.5, subds. (a)(3), (a)(4).) 19
At the 12-month review hearing for a dependent child under three years old at time
of removal, a juvenile court that does not return a child to the parent’s custody must
either schedule a hearing under section 366.26 (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(4)), order that the
child remain in foster care (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(5)), or extend services for an additional
six months until an 18-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)-(3)). In order to
extend the case for an additional six months to an 18-month review hearing, where the
parent has received reasonable services the court must find “a substantial probability that
the child will be returned to the physical custody of their parent or legal guardian and
safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time,” which in turn requires
findings that a parent has (1) “consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the
child,” (2) “made significant progress in resolving problems that led to the child’s
removal from the home,” and (3) “demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete
the objectives of their treatment plan and to provide for the child's safety, protection,
physical and emotional well-being, and special needs.” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)-(3).)
B. The Record Does Not Compel a Finding That There Was a Substantial Probability of
Return of the Children to His Custody Within Six Months
At the outset, we note the children were removed from father at the contested
jurisdiction hearing on October 22, 2024. The child was under the age of three at that
time, and the court found them to be a sibling group at the 12-month hearing on
December 16, 2025. Thus, father had already received the presumptive maximum
number of 12 months of reunification services allowed. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B), (C);
B.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1151.)
20
In any event, father argues the court erred in terminating his services since there
was insufficient evidence to support its finding that he failed to make substantive
progress in his case plan. He is essentially claiming the court should have continued his
services for an additional six months, since he made reasonable efforts to address the
problems that led to removal of the children.
The court here actually found that father failed to make substantive progress in his
case plan, as he asserts. However, the court was not required to make this finding in
order to terminate his services and set a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to
section 366.26. To continue the case for an additional six months and thus extend
services rather than setting a selection and implementation hearing, the court was
required to find “a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical
custody of their parent or legal guardian and safely maintained in the home within the
extended period of time.” (§ 366.21, subd. (g).) The court here found there was no
substantial probability that the children would be returned if given an additional six
months of services. Thereafter, the court set a selection and implementation hearing.
To the extent father is arguing the court should have found there was a substantial
probability of return in six months, this argument is unavailing. “[T]he question for a
reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law.” (In re Raul V. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 290, 300-301.) To
prevail on this challenge, father must show that the evidence compelled the finding as a
matter of law, that is, that the evidence “‘was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and
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(2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it
was insufficient to support a finding.”’” (Id. at p. 301.)
Father essentially asserts there was no evidence he maintained contact with mother
in the months leading up to the termination of services, he participated in therapy,
parenting programs, and a psychological evaluation, as required by DPSS, and he
“largely completed his case plan, [and] maintained [] stable housing and employment.”
He claims these facts “lend credence to the notion that six additional months of services
would have resulted in” the return of his children.
We disagree. While father did complete some of his services, the evidence
showed that he failed to benefit from them. He completed three parenting education
programs, participated in individual counseling, and completed a psychological
evaluation. However, he stated therapy was a “waste of time” and insisted he was a
nurturing parent. Further, when the children were in his care, father failed to meet their
basic needs, including medical care, a safe place to sleep, adequate supervision, and a
home free of debris and choking hazards. Remarkably, father could not even see the
need for regular medical check-ups for the child. He still did not understand why DPSS
had to be involved with his family.
Moreover, father’s psychological evaluation indicated that he was in deep denial
and would likely not follow through in keeping mother away from the children. He
continued to blame the system for him losing custody, which the psychologist said was a
sign of his mental health issues. Mother had “extreme mental illness” and was “gravely
disabled with bizarre behavior and thought processes,” yet father did not fully
22
acknowledge that she was severely mentally ill. The psychologist noted that father
continued to have an intimate relationship with her even though it was clear she was
incapable of caring for the children, and this reflected poorly on father’s judgment.
Further, father was unwilling to acknowledge the serious risk mother posed to the
children, and he placed them at risk of harm by allowing her unsupervised access to
them.
In view of the record, we conclude the evidence does not compel a finding that
there was a substantial probability of return to father’s care. The court properly declined
to extend the case for an additional six months and continue his services.
II. The Court Properly Denied Father Reunification Services as to M.D.
Father argues the court erred in denying him services under section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(10), as to M.D. He points out that the 12-month review hearing during
which the court terminated his services as to the children was calendared in conjunction
with the jurisdiction/disposition hearing for M.D. He then contends the consecutive
rulings “did not take into account the efforts he previously made to rectify the problems
that led to [the children’s] removal and did not provide further opportunity, prior to
bypass, for [him] to made additional efforts to demonstrate his protective capacity as to
M.D.” Father also asserts the court did not make any explicit findings that he failed to
make a subsequent reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of the
children.
At the outset, we note that father failed to raise these issues in the juvenile court.
Therefore, the issues are waived. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338
23
[“a parent's failure to object or raise certain issues in the juvenile court prevents the
parent from presenting the issue to the appellate court”].) In any event, we conclude the
court properly denied father services.
A. Relevant Law
Section 361.5, subdivision (b) “sets forth a number of circumstances in which
reunification services may be bypassed altogether. These bypass provisions represent the
Legislature’s recognition that it may be fruitless to provide reunification services under
certain circumstances.” (Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586,
597.) Specifically, “reunification services need not be provided to a parent or
guardian . . . when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the
following: [P] . . . [P] (10) (A) That the court ordered termination of reunification
services for any siblings . . . of the child because the parent or guardian failed to reunify
with the sibling . . . after the sibling . . . had been removed from that parent or
guardian . . . and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent or guardian has
not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the
sibling . . . of that child from that parent or guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10)(A).)
B. The Evidence Was Sufficient
In In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831 (Harmony B.), the juvenile court
held a six-month review hearing with respect to the mother and father’s older children, at
which the court terminated reunification services. The court conducted the
jurisdictional/dispositional hearing for their younger child immediately thereafter. It
sustained the petition, declared her a dependent, and removed her from her parents’
24
custody. The court denied reunification services to her parents based on the order
terminating reunification services as to the older siblings. (Id. at p. 836.)
Similar to the instant case, the father in Harmony B., argued on appeal that the
court abused its discretion in denying him services, based on the fact that it
denied services on the same day it terminated services as to the siblings. (Harmony B.,
supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 839-840.) This court found that “when some time has
elapsed after the termination of reunification services with respect to one child, the court
appropriately must take into account the parent’s reasonable efforts to correct the
underlying problems in the interim before the court denies reunification services with
respect to a second child. When, however, . . . the two proceedings occur in immediate
proximity, the trial court[’s] required finding under the ‘no-reasonable effort’ clause is a
formality because the parent’s circumstances necessarily will not have changed. (Id. at
pp. 842-843.)
In explaining this difference in treatment, this court explained, “[i]n our view, the
statute was amended to provide a parent who has worked toward correcting his or her
problems an opportunity to have that fact taken into consideration in subsequent
proceedings; it was not amended to create further delay so as to allow a parent, who up to
that point has failed to address his or her problems, another opportunity to do so.”
(Harmony B., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 843.)
In other words, in the instant case, it was not error for the court to deny father’s
services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) immediately after terminating his
services in the children’s case. (Harmony B., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 842-843.)
25
Moreover, father is correct that the court made no express finding that he failed to
make reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to removal of the children. We
conclude, however, that such finding can properly be implied on the record before us,
since the implicit finding is supported by substantial evidence. (In re S.G. (2003) 112
Cal.App.4th 1254, 1260 [“we will infer a necessary finding provided the implicit finding
is supported by substantial evidence”]; see In re Corienna G. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 73,
83.) The juvenile court could easily conclude that father had not made a reasonable effort
to treat the problems that led to the children’s removal and that it was not in M.D.’s best
interests to provide him with reunification services. (See § I, ante.)
DISPOSITION
The writ petition is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J. MENETREZ J.
26
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court denied the father's petition for extraordinary writ, upholding the juvenile court's orders to terminate reunification services for his children and deny him services regarding his newborn child.
Issues
Did the juvenile court err in terminating reunification services for the children?
Did the juvenile court err in denying the father reunification services for his newborn child under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)?