38 Cal.App.5th at p. 612 [Section 8 housing assistance is a fundamental vested right].)
The independent judgment standard is less deferential to the agency’s factfinding
process than the substantial evidence standard. Under the latter, the trial court must draw
all reasonable inferences to support the agency’s factual findings and may reverse only if
the findings are so lacking in evidentiary support as to render them arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable. (Auburn Woods I Homeowners Assn. v. Fair Employment & Housing
Com. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1583.) By contrast, the independent judgment
standard gives the trial court “the power to draw its own reasonable inferences from the
evidence and to make its own determinations as to the credibility of the witnesses.”
(Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Bd. of Comrs. (2003) 107
Cal.App.4th 860, 868.)
The purpose of the independent judgment standard is to provide an extra layer of
protection to petitioners in cases where an important right is at stake by affording less
deference to the agency’s decision-making process. (Strumsky, supra, 11 Cal.3d at
p. 34.) As our Supreme Court explained: “When an administrative decision affects a
14
right which has been legitimately acquired or is otherwise ‘vested,’ and when that right is
of a fundamental nature from the standpoint of its economic aspect or its ‘effect . . . in
human terms and the importance . . . to the individual in the life situation,’ then a full and
independent judicial review of that decision is indicated because ‘[t]he abrogation of the
right is too important to the individual to relegate it to exclusive administrative
extinction.’ ” (Strumsky, at p. 34.)
B. The Trial Court Misunderstood the Scope of Review under Section 1094.5
Under section 1094.5, subdivision (b), the task before the trial court was to
determine whether the HA’s decision to terminate was supported by the hearing officer’s
factual findings and whether those factual findings were supported by the record.
(§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) The trial court did not undertake that review. If it had, it would
have necessarily concluded that the hearing officer’s factual findings were not supported
by the evidence and, as a result, Harrington had established an abuse of discretion under
section 1094.5, subdivision (b). The record compels such a conclusion because it is
undisputed that the unlawful detainer judgment—which was ultimately reversed for
insufficient evidence—was still under appeal at the time of the administrative hearing.
Indeed, the trial court drew that very conclusion at the hearing on Harrington’s motion to
temporarily stay the HA’s decision.
Instead of reviewing the hearing officer’s factual findings, the court concluded that
the independent judgment standard authorized it to determine whether the record
supported the HA’s decision on any of the other grounds alleged in the notice of intent to
terminate. By concluding that the weight of the evidence showed that Harrington had
15
violated three family obligations, the court effectively made its own factual findings to
support the HA’s termination decision. That was error because section 1094.5 requires a
court to determine whether the agency’s “decision” is “supported by the findings” and
also whether those “findings” are “supported by the evidence.” (§ 1094.5, subd. (b).)
“Section 1094.5 clearly contemplates that at minimum, the reviewing court must
determine both whether substantial evidence supports the administrative agency’s
findings and whether the findings support the agency’s decision.” (Topanga Assn. for a
Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514-515 (Topanga),
emphasis added.)
As our Supreme Court has explained, when conducting the latter inquiry, the trial
court’s focus must be on the factual findings made in support of the agency’s decision:
“[I]mplicit in section 1094.5 is a requirement that the agency which renders the
challenged decision must set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw
evidence and ultimate decision or order. . . . By focusing, instead, upon the relationships
between evidence and findings and between findings and ultimate action, the Legislature
sought to direct the reviewing court’s attention to the analytic route the administrative
agency traveled from evidence to action. In so doing, we believe that the Legislature
must have contemplated that the agency would reveal this route. Reference, in section
1094.5, to the reviewing court’s duty to compare the evidence and ultimate decision to
‘the findings’ (italics added) we believe leaves no room for the conclusion that the
Legislature would have been content to have a reviewing court speculate as to the
administrative agency’s basis for decision.” (Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 515.)
16
The trial court’s failure to review the hearing officer’s factual findings for
evidentiary support appears to have been based on a misunderstanding of the independent
judgment standard. The trial court agreed with the HA’s characterization, which was that
the standard authorizes an independent review of the evidence to find support for the
agency’s decision. However, by concluding that the record supported three alternative
grounds for termination that were not found true by the hearing officer, the trial court
circumvented section 1094.5’s requirement that an agency’s factual findings be supported
by the record. The independent judgment standard is intended to add an extra layer of
judicial scrutiny to agency fact-finding, not to add more protection to the agency’s legal
conclusions by allowing the trial court to make its own factual findings in support of
those conclusions.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its
review under section 1094.5 and failed to undertake the required independent review of
the hearing officer’s factual findings.
C. Reversal Is Necessary
In its supplemental brief, the HA concedes the legal error but contends that we
may nevertheless affirm the judgment. As we explain, we find each of the HA’s
arguments unpersuasive.
First, the HA asserts that Harrington forfeited the issue on appeal by failing to
raise it in her opening brief. But the rule requiring an appellant to raise every issue in
their opening brief is designed to “ensure that opposing parties are fairly apprised of
contentions so as to afford a full and fair opportunity to respond.” (Golden Door
17
Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 555.) But when the
court directs the parties to brief a particular issue, as we did here, then the briefing order
necessarily ensures that the respondent is fairly apprised of the issue and has a full
opportunity to respond.
We also reject the HA’s argument that Harrington “invited” the error because she
failed to object to the HA’s characterization of the independent judgment standard in her
briefing on her petition. The doctrine of invited error applies when “a party by its own
conduct induces the commission of error.” (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54
Cal.3d 202, 212.) If any party induced the trial court’s error, it was the HA, who argued
for an incorrect characterization of the independent judgment standard, not Harrington.
Rather, Harrington placed the issue of the hearing officer’s factual findings lacking
evidentiary support squarely before the trial court, both in her petition and in her briefs
submitted before the hearing.
Second, the HA argues that the appellate division’s decision was “inadmissible,”
because Harrington failed to satisfy “her burden of laying a foundation for augmenting
the record with evidence of the appellate division’s decision.” But the foundation
requirement does not apply to the introduction of state court decisions. Instead, Evidence
Code section 451, subdivision (a), requires courts to take judicial notice of the
“decisional . . . law of this state.” By the time of the hearing on Harrington’s petition, the
trial court had already taken judicial notice of the appellate division’s decision (at the
hearing on Harrington’s request for a stay) and had already concluded that the decision
18
rendered the hearing officer’s finding that the eviction had been upheld on appeal
“impossible.”
Third, the HA contends that we can affirm the judgment because, even if there is
no evidence to support the hearing officer’s finding that the unlawful detainer judgment
was upheld on appeal, the record contains “substantial evidence . . . sufficient for the
hearing officer to reasonably conclude that [Harrington] had been evicted, mandating
eviction under 24 [Code of Federal Regulations part] 982.552(b)(2).” We are not
persuaded. Mandatory termination under 24 C.F.R. part 982.552(b) (2026) applies when
a participant has been evicted for a “serious” lease violation. The only document in the
administrative record that discusses the reason for Harrington’s eviction is the landlord’s
notice to quit. That document bases the eviction upon a failed November 2022 inspection
that purportedly revealed “excessive damages” and “unsanitary conditions,” but the
document does not say what the damages or conditions were. Furthermore, the appellate
division held that the landlord failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding of
excessive damages or unsanitary conditions. Because the record contains no evidence to
support a finding that Harrington was evicted for a serious lease violation, we cannot
affirm the judgment on a finding of eviction only.
Fourth, the HA argues that the court’s failure to review the hearing officer’s
findings for evidentiary support was harmless because the record contains substantial
evidence that Harrington violated the three family obligations identified by the court,
each of which, on their own, justifies termination. But as we explained above, section
1094.5 does not allow a trial court to make its own factual findings to provide alternative
19
support for an agency decision, and for good reason. “To terminate section 8 housing
assistance, due process requires, among other things, timely and adequate notice of the
reasons for the proposed termination and a written decision following a pretermination
hearing that states the reasons for the determination and the evidence on which the
decision maker relied.” (Johnson, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 607.) “At the hearing, the
hearing officer must determine whether the termination of benefits is in accordance with
the law, federal regulations, and departmental policies and issue a written decision.”
(Ibid.) The purpose of the written decision is “to demonstrate that ‘the decisionmaker’s
conclusion as to a recipient’s eligibility . . . rest[s] solely on the legal rules and evidence
adduced at the hearing.’ ” (Ibid., emphasis added.)
Here, the sole focus of the administrative hearing was whether the mandatory
termination provision applied to Harrington because she had been evicted for a serious
lease violation. During argument, the HA’s representative cited the mandatory
termination regulation (24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b) (2026)) as the sole legal basis for
termination and stated that, “[b]ecause of the eviction, my supervisors all agreed that it is
proper to terminate rental assistance.” It would violate Harrington’s due process rights to
uphold the HA’s termination decision based on violations that were alleged in the
termination notice but not placed at issue at the administrative hearing. After all, it is the
hearing officer who must make the factual determinations in the first instance.
In addition to the due process violation, we also note that, based on our review of
the record, we have doubts about whether the evidence would even be sufficient to
support the three alleged violations of the family obligations. In her opening and reply
20
briefs, Harrington raises potentially valid arguments as to why she did not violate those
obligations. At the very least, her arguments are relevant to the discretionary termination
factors set out in 24 C.F.R. part 982.552(c) (2026). Because the discretionary termination
was not at issue during the administrative hearing, the hearing officer did not consider
those factors.
Finally, the HA argues that if we determine that the error is reversible, then the
proper remedy is either to (1) “remand to the trial court to confine its independent
examination to the issue of eviction” or (2) remand to the trial court “with instructions to
enter an order directing the agency to clarify or make further findings.” On this record, it
is unnecessary to remand to the trial court to limit its analysis to “the issue of eviction”
because the relevant facts are undisputed and thus there is only one conclusion the trial
court could properly draw on remand. We also decline to direct the trial court to remand
to the HA to clarify or make further factual findings, because that remedy is only
appropriate when “[t]he absence of specific findings prevents us from fulfilling our duty
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 to conduct a meaningful judicial review of
the challenged administrative decisions.” (Glendale Mem’l Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. State
Dep’t (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 129, 139.) In this case, there is no absence of findings or
confusion about what the findings are. The hearing officer made clear factual findings
that permit judicial review.
Because it is undisputed that the hearing officer’s factual findings are not
supported by the record, the proper remedy is reversal with directions to grant the petition
for administrative mandamus on the ground that Harrington established an abuse of
21
discretion under section 1094.5, subdivision (b). (§ 1094.5, subd. (b); see generally
Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 522; City v. Bd. of Permit Appeals (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 1099, 1111.)
DISPOSITION
We reverse the order denying Harrington’s petition for writ of administrative
mandamus. We remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to enter a new order
granting the petition and issuing a writ of mandamus requiring the HA to vacate its order
terminating Harrington’s financial assistance. Harrington shall recover her costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
FIELDS Acting P. J. We concur:
MENETREZ J.
LEE J.
22
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court erred by failing to review the hearing officer's factual findings under the independent judgment standard, instead improperly making its own factual findings to support the agency's termination decision. Because the agency's decision was based on a mandatory termination ground that was not supported by the record, the court's reliance on alternative, unadjudicated grounds to affirm the decision was improper.
Issues
Whether the trial court misunderstood the scope of judicial review under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 by failing to review the hearing officer's factual findings.
Whether a trial court may affirm an administrative agency's decision by making its own factual findings on grounds not addressed by the agency's hearing officer.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude that the court misunderstood the scope of judicial review because section 1094.5 requires a determination of whether the agency’s factual findings, not its ultimate decision, are supported by the record.”
“The trial court’s failure to review the hearing officer’s factual findings for evidentiary support appears to have been based on a misunderstanding of the independent judgment standard.”