People v. Stortz CA1/1

Filed 3/4/26 P. v. Stortz CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, A171098 v. (San Francisco City & County MICHAEL STORTZ, Super Ct. No. CRI23016291) Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 Michael Stortz was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment after a jury convicted him of kidnapping. (Pen. Code,2 § 207, subd. (a).) In this appeal, he urges us to reverse that conviction, arguing the trial court erroneously denied Stortz’s request to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). As we explain below, the trial court’s denial of Stortz’s Faretta motion at the preliminary-hearing stage was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and Stortz has forfeited any appellate claim with respect to representing himself at trial. Accordingly, we will affirm.

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.) 2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

Under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 807, “a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.” Although the deprivation of that right at trial “cannot be harmless” (McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 177, fn. 8), such a deprivation at the preliminary hearing “is subject to harmless error analysis” pursuant to Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, which held that no reversal is required for certain errors that are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.3 (People v. Tena, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 615.) Here, any error in the trial court’s denial of Stortz’s Faretta motion at the preliminary-hearing stage was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither party explains how Stortz’s inability to represent himself at the preliminary hearing contributed to the verdict, and we see no way it could have done so. There were only two witnesses at the preliminary hearing: Officer Grande, who authenticated video evidence, and investigating Officer Lopez Martinez who relayed statements from the complaining witness. The record simply belies any suggestion that Stortz could have cross-examined these witnesses better than his professional counsel: When the trial court earlier questioned Stortz about his Faretta motion, Stortz voiced his belief that kidnapping was a misdemeanor, ignored the judge’s request not “to talk about the facts” of the case, and otherwise spoke in a confusing, nonresponsive, and sometimes self-contradictory manner. Defense counsel’s