California Court of Appeal Feb 24, 2026 No. E086611Unpublished
Filed 2/24/26 In re L.V. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re L.V., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, E086611 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DLRI2200013) v. OPINION L.V.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark Petersen, Judge.
Affirmed.
Costen Ruiz Law; and Jesse Ruiz for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Arlene A. Sevidal, Robin Urbanski and Anastasia Sagorsky, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
This appeal concerns a juvenile court transfer hearing under subdivision (a) of
Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.1 About two weeks before his 17th birthday,
defendant and appellant L.V. (L.V.), robbed a high school friend for his cash and put a
handgun directly to his head and fired. The gun malfunctioned. L.V. cleared the jam and
fired at his friend as he fled, striking him in the shoulder. A juvenile wardship petition
“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion.
[Citation.] ‘The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it
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calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial
court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.’ [Citation.] The juvenile court’s findings with respect to each of
section 707’s five criteria are findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence.
[Citation.] In conducting a substantial evidence review, we draw all reasonable
inferences in support of the court’s findings.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 165.)
“Likewise, we review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s ultimate finding
‘that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.’ [Citation.] Because the juvenile court must make that finding by clear
and convincing evidence, we ‘determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of
high probability demanded by’ the clear and convincing evidence standard.” (Miguel R.,
supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165; see People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 105 [the
substantial evidence standard requires the reviewing court to examine the whole record in
the light most favorable to the challenged order or judgment to determine whether it
discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value].)
“ ‘The standard of proof known as clear and convincing evidence demands a
degree of certainty greater than that involved with the preponderance standard, but less
than what is required by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.]
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‘ “Clear and convincing” evidence requires a finding of high probability.’ [Citations.]
Courts have also described the standard ‘as requiring that the evidence be “ ‘so clear as to
leave no substantial doubt’; ‘sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of
every reasonable mind.’ ” ’ ” (S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286.)
B. Analysis
We are unpersuaded by L.V.’s contention that the juvenile court’s transfer order is
not supported by substantial evidence. As noted, ante, in deciding whether transfer was
proper, the court was required to evaluate the five criteria set forth in subdivision (a) of
section 707. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 167.) Assembly Bill No. 2361’s
amendments to section 707 were intended to “refocus” the juvenile court’s assessment
and require “[t]he analysis of the five criteria set forth in the statute [to] be focused
through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation.” (S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1288.) Applying these factors, the ultimate question was whether the People
demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that L.V. was “not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3);
Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) The weight to be given each of the five
criteria is within the juvenile court’s discretion. (D.C. v. Superior Court (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 441, 445 (D.C.); see E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 417 [the court has the
discretion to conclude that one or more of the five factors predominate so as to determine
the result, even though some or all of the other factors might point to a different result].)
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Indeed, in making the “ultimate finding” regarding amenability, the plain language
of the statute requires the juvenile court to “consider the criteria specified in
subparagraphs (A) to (E), inclusive.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) “Thus, according to the
statute’s plain language, the court is required to consider each of the five listed criteria in
determining whether the prosecution has carried its burden of proof to transfer a juvenile
to criminal court.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) In other words, the
statute unambiguously provides that the evaluation of the five specified criteria is the
means by which the juvenile court reaches the ultimate determination of whether the
minor is not amenable to rehabilitation; amenability is not itself a separate factual finding
that supplants the findings regarding the specified criteria.
Next, we consider whether substantial evidence supports the findings in the
juvenile court’s transfer order, which was issued after the court heard testimony from a
number L.V.’s supervising probation officer, and considered various other materials
submitted by the parties and the probation officer. In making this determination, we
accept all evidence that supports the successful party and draw all reasonable inferences
to uphold the challenged order. (Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 193, 213.) “It is not our role to reweigh the evidence, redetermine the
credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the testimony, and we will not disturb
the judgment if there is evidence to support it.” (Ibid.) In applying the substantial
evidence standard, we do not review the evidence to determine if there is substantial
evidence to support L.V.’s position, but only to see if substantial evidence exists to
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support the challenged order. Thus, we only look at the evidence offered in the People’s
favor and determine if it was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings as to each
of the five statutory criteria. (See Pope v. Babick (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1245.) If
the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the
reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant reversal for insufficient evidence. (People v. Kraft
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1054.) “As with all substantial evidence challenges, an appellant
challenging [a finding of fact] for insufficient evidence must lay out the evidence
favorable to the other side and show why it is lacking. Failure to do so is fatal. A
reviewing court will not independently review the record to make up for appellant’s
failure to carry his burden.” (Defend the Bay v. City of Irvine (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th
1261, 1266 (Defend the Bay).)
Here, the record reflects that the juvenile court evaluated each of the five statutory
criteria and, based on that analysis, determined that transfer of the matter to a court of
criminal jurisdiction was proper because L.V. would not have been (and currently was
not) amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. No
further finding regarding amenability was required. To the extent L.V. suggests
otherwise, we disagree.
As we next explain, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s transfer
order.
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1. Criminal Sophistication
The first statutory criterion is “[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i).) When evaluating this criterion, “the juvenile
court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s
age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time
of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and
consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the
minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the
existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care
system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or
sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)
The juvenile court “consider[s] the whole picture, that is, all the evidence that
might bear on the minor’s criminal sophistication, including any criminal sophistication
manifested in the present crime.” (Jones, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 683-684; Kevin P.,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 192.) Criminal sophistication can be shown with facts
demonstrating an “ ‘ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of [one’s] criminal
behavior’ and [one’s] awareness ‘of the wrongfulness . . . of [one’s] conduct.’ ” (Kevin
P., at p. 193.) Positive factors such as “normal cognitive functioning” or intelligence by
itself “do not affirmatively demonstrate criminal sophistication.” (Ibid.) But they can
support finding this criterion “weighs in favor of transfer to the extent [the positive
factors] fail to mitigate other evidence that does affirmatively demonstrate criminal
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sophistication.” (Ibid.; see In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 214 (J.S.) [“There was
little to no indication [the minor] suffered from any intellectual deficits. While in
custody, [the minor] was able to finish high school and had taken college level courses”].)
Prior to assessing the five factors, the juvenile court noted L.V. was 16 years,
11 months, and 17 days old at the time of the current offenses and that he was “14 days
shy of turning 17 years of age.” The court further pointed out that L.V. was 17 years, and
nine months of age, at the time of the transfer hearing. In assessing the criminal
sophistication criterion, the juvenile court explained as follows: “The probation officer
stated in his report that the minor’s displayed a lack of human compassion and proper
decision-making skills. It was noted that the minor would have killed the victim should
there not have been an issue with the gun when he initially attempted to fire it. The
boldness and severity of the minor’s actions and disrespect for the law are viewed as
criminally sophisticated by the probation officer. [O.E.] testified he was solid in his
opinion that this particular criteria weighed in favor of transfer to adult court. [¶] There
was not much cross-examination as to this criteria. The court does note that when the
gun misfired on the first attempt, the minor did not give up or cease his activity. The
minor took whatever actions were necessary to clear or fix the misfire, and then attempt
to shoot the victim again. The minor was successful in getting two shots off—after the
misfire—striking the victim one time. This shows the court that the minor was intent on
shooting the victim, that this did not represent an accidental shooting, and that the minor
had the clear intent of wanting to physically harm the victim.” The court agreed with
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L.V.’s probation officer O.E. and concluded by stating: “Based on all of the above, the
court finds the evidence does support a finding that the minor knew what he was doing,
participated willingly, had knowledge of the plan and implementation of the plan. The
minor certainly knew the victim and took advantage of a position of trust to unknowingly
rob the victim, steal his cross-body bag, and then attempt to shoot the victim. The minor
made a clear and conscious choice to engage in these actions. The minor’s actions did
not appear to be impulsive or reactive, rather they were intentional and pre-planned.”
L.V. argues there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding
that he showed criminal sophistication. As support for his position, L.V. claims he was
16 years of age, “an age at which adolescents typically acted with impulsivity, emotional
reactivity, and limited appreciation of long-term consequences.” He also claims
“Nothing in the record showed that L.V. engaged in advance planning or deliberate
preparation. The evidence showed a sudden conflict between two teenagers who had
been spending time together in the weeks leading up to the incident. This context
supported an inference of immature, emotionally driven behavior rather than adult-like
strategic thinking.”
We are unpersuaded, as L.V. simply cites certain defense evidence in support of
his position and based thereon, makes arguments more appropriately directed to a trier of
fact than to an appellate court. In a substantial evidence challenge, an appellant cannot
carry his burden on appeal by merely rearguing the “facts” and/or reasserting his position
at trial. Instead, the appellant must lay out the evidence favorable to the other side and
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show why it is lacking. L.V.’s failure to do so here is fatal to his claim. (Defend the Bay,
supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.) It is not our role to independently review the record
to make up for L.V.’s failure to carry his burden. (Ibid.)
In any event, we have reviewed the record and find that it includes substantial
evidence supporting the challenged finding. L.V. insisted on walking M.G. home against
his protests, left the house with two guns in his pockets, at least one of which was loaded,
and immediately robbed M.G. upon realizing he was not armed. Taking M.G.’s money
and putting a gun to his head and firing was not a “sudden conflict” between the two but
a robbery and attempted murder by someone M.G. considered a friend. The gun’s
malfunction did not cause L.V. to reconsider shooting M.G. but instead L.V. coolly
overcame the jam and decided to fire at M.G. as he was fleeing. L.V.’s actions show not
just a commitment to killing M.G., but a recommitment to that intent. (See J.S., supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 214 [minor’s deliberate violent conduct, which had progressed
from robbery to robbery with a knife to murder with a knife, denial of any involvement in
the murder, and attempts to conceal evidence reflected criminal sophistication]; Kevin P.,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 194 [a minor’s attempts to avoid detection, including setting
fire to a body and an apartment, “constitute[d] substantial evidence of a certain degree of
criminal sophistication”].) There is no evidence to suggest L.V.’s actions were the result
of peer pressure, a stressful situation, or reflexive, as he claims.
In addition, among other things, there was evidence showing that L.V. was
attending school, had earned a “B” in Expressive Writing and “C” in English, and there
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were no issues reported while attending school in juvenile hall. While L.V. had an active
Individualized Education Plan dated May 3, 2024, for 290 Specific Learning Disability
and 280 Other Health Impairment, L.V. had no physical or mental health issues and there
was no evidence that L.V. was a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual
battery. L.V. also had no significant maturity issues other than being a typical 16 year-
old, and did not act impulsively in connection with the currently charged offenses.
Further, there was evidence that L.V.’s criminal behaviors (which included a pattern of
gang-related offenses and violence) were deliberate and calculated and of increasing
seriousness (or escalation), and that L.V. understood the consequences of his criminal
behavior and gang involvement. And, as noted above, the record reflects that the juvenile
court considered the relevant factors in determining that the criminal sophistication
criterion weighed in favor of transferring the matter to adult criminal court. To the extent
L.V. requests that we conduct an independent review of the record and make our own
determinations as to the weight of the evidence, he misconstrues and/or misapplies the
substantial evidence standard of review and we decline to do so. (Defend the Bay, supra,
119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.)
2. Rehabilitation Prior to Expiration of Juvenile Court's Jurisdiction
The second statutory criterion is “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i).) In
evaluating this criterion, the court must consider “the minor’s potential to grow and
mature.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).) The focus “is whether there is enough time to
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rehabilitate the minor while the minor is still eligible to remain under juvenile court
jurisdiction.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)
The parties may introduce expert testimony specifically addressing “the
availability of treatment programs in the juvenile court system and the amenability of the
minor to those programs.” (J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 721
(J.N.).) Expert witnesses can provide “guidance” for the juvenile court in making its
determination, and expert opinion testimony “that the minor can be treated by those
facilities is entitled to great weight in the court’s ultimate determination.” (Jimmy H. v.
Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 709, 714-715.) However, the “decision rests in the sound
discretion of the juvenile court,” and an expert opinion that a minor is amenable to
treatment “is not conclusive.” (Id. at p. 715; see J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 212
[juvenile court was not bound by defense expert’s testimony and opinion that minor
“could be timely rehabilitated”]; J.N., at pp. 721-722 [“ ‘In those cases where the juvenile
court might decide treatment as a juvenile would be in the minor’s best interest, the court
could still find the minor “unfit if those experts testified that rehabilitation might require
treatment beyond the date of his mandatory discharge’ ”].)
In assessing the rehabilitation criterion, the juvenile court began its analysis by
noting “At the time of the alleged offense, the minor was 17. Here, the minor will turn
18 on August 31, 2025—approximately six weeks from the date of this ruling.
Jurisdiction of the juvenile court would expire between the age of 23 or 25, based upon
the maximum confinement time set at the time of the dispositional hearing. As a result,
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the court would lose jurisdiction on either August 31, 2030, August 31, 2032. Therefore,
the court would have approximately five to seven years within which to work with the
minor and provide rehabilitative services.” After the juvenile court explained the
probation officer agreed that L.V. had violated the terms of his probation by committing a
burglary in May 2024, just 15 days after he was placed on wardship, and committing the
instant offenses in August 2024, the court reviewed L.V.’s juvenile delinquency history
and noted it had concerns about Probation Officer O.E.’s opinion L.V. could be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction.
The juvenile court explained as follows: “First, it should be noted that the minor
requested termination of formal probation in 2023, as unsuccessful. The minor was not
interested in completing probation successfully, despite having approximately 3 more
months available to him to complete probation. Further, one year later on March 6, 2024,
the minor was charged in another petition. Then, after having been declared ward of the
court on May 1, 2024, engaged in yet more delinquent behavior fifteen (15) days later on
May 16, 2025, with more egregious conduct than the prior two petitions. [¶] It is
apparent from the four petitions that the minor has no regard for living a law-abiding
lifestyle. Further, the minor has no regard for rules imposed by the court, and has shown
a complete disregard for following terms and conditions imposed by the court, and
supervised through probation. [¶] As to this criteria, the court does not believe the minor
can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. The minor
has been given multiple opportunities to comply with court orders on prior occasions, and
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has failed to follow simple terms on each occasion. The minor continues to engage in
criminal conduct, with each offense involving more serious conduct and behavior than
before. Both the first and last offense involves firearms. The last offense involved the
alleged shooting of another human being.” Based on L.V.’s prior conduct while on
probation, the court did not believe “sufficient time exists to provide” L.V. with
“successful rehabilitative services such that [L.V.] would benefit and become law
abiding.” The court noted that from August 1, 2022 to August 19, 2024, L.V. had shown
“no progress at all in becoming law-abiding,” but rather, his behavior had become
“progressively worse as he [had] repeatedly engaged in criminal conduct and defied court
orders and probation attempts to help [L.V.] be successful.”
L.V. argues the juvenile court erred in discounting the probation officer’s
“professional assessment” and substituting its own conclusion without evidentiary
support. He claims that he had “made meaningful progress” and had behaved well in
juvenile hall.
As an initial matter, we note insofar as the probation officer was testifying as an
expert, “the juvenile court was not required to credit the testimony of the [ ] expert [or
otherwise weigh evidence regarding the rehabilitation criterion in the way L.V.
preferred]. As trier of fact, it was free to discredit such testimony.” (J.S., supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 212; see In re Alejandro G. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 472, 480
(Alejandro G.) [the fact that the court’s finding conflicted with two experts’ opinions did
not show a lack of substantial evidence because the court is not obligated to adopt the
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experts’ opinions].) And the court did not abuse its discretion by relying on other
evidence in the record, including L.V.’s prior conduct while receiving probationary
services. Furthermore, the court acted well within its discretion to reject the probation
officer’s positive assessment of this factor, considering the multiple fights L.V. had in
juvenile hall and his ongoing and worsening criminal conduct. We find substantial
evidence supports the challenged finding as to the rehabilitation criterion.
3. Previous Delinquent History
The third statutory criterion directs the juvenile court to consider the “minor’s
previous delinquent history” and, when doing so, to “give weight to any relevant factor,
including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history
and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma
on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)-(ii).) Juvenile
courts enjoy “broad discretion to consider all evidence relevant to this inherently case-by-
case determination,” including all forms of delinquent behavior. (D.C., supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at p. 455; see id. at p. 456 [the juvenile court considered the minor’s
“behavior documented in his school records”]; J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 214-
215 [the juvenile court considered the minor’s “ ‘significant school delinquency’ history
starting in the seventh grade, including poor behavior, suspensions, and multiple attempts
by school officials to rehabilitate [the minor]”].)
In evaluating this criterion, the juvenile court stated: “[T]he court finds that the
minor does have a prior documented, formal delinquent history with the juvenile court.
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As discussed above, the minor has had a total of four separate, distinct petitions filed
involving a variety of alleged offenses and criminal conduct, ranging from firearms
possession, retail theft, residential burglary and attempted murder.” Disagreeing with
Probation Officer O.E.’s assessment of this criteria, the court further explained: “Even
the probation officer states in his written report, that ‘. . .[t]here is a pattern of possessing
firearms that stands out when looking at [L.V.]’s prior delinquent history.’ The probation
officer goes on to state the minor’s high degree of criminal sophistication. Interestingly,
probation opines that the minor should remain under juvenile court jurisdiction. The
court does not agree with the probation officer’s assessment that the minor’s compliance
with probation was good. Clearly, the minor was unsuccessful on formal probation and
allegedly committed delinquent acts while as a ward of the court. This cannot be stated
as ‘good’ compliance. [¶] Based on the prior documented delinquent history, the court
would find, as to this criteria that transfer would be appropriate, despite the probation
officer’s statement to the contrary.”
L.V. points to the probation officer’s testimony concerning the attempted murder
being his first known act of violence and L.V.’s compliant behavior in a structured
setting, and suggests the court improperly relied on the number of L.V.’s petitions rather
than considering the “seriousness of [his] history in context.” Noting he “completed only
six months of 725 probation beginning in 2022 and spent only three months under
wardship before the August 2024 petition was filed” and that “[t]hese nine months
represented the only structured periods in which he received juvenile court intervention,”
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he also asserts that the court did not give “proper consideration to the limited nature of
this supervision when evaluating his delinquent history.” L.V. points to the probation
officer’s testimony concerning L.V.’s behavior in juvenile hall, no evidence suggesting
“prior documented pattern of organized criminal behavior” or criminal sophistication, and
“peer and relational dynamics that shaped these events.” We are unpersuaded by L.V.’s
arguments. As we have explained, in a substantial evidence challenge, an appellant
cannot carry his burden on appeal by merely rearguing the evidence and/or reasserting his
position at trial. Instead, the appellant must lay out the evidence favorable to the other
side and show why it is lacking. L.V.’s failure to do so here is fatal to his claim. (Defend
the Bay, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.)
In any event, there is ample evidence in the record supporting the juvenile court’s
determination that the previous delinquent history criterion weighs in favor of transfer.
L.V. ignores the evidence in the record showing his extensive delinquent history, which
encompasses a person’s criminal or antisocial behavior that occurred before they reached
the age of majority (i.e., 18 years old). (See D.C., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 445-446,
450-451, 453, 455-456 [delinquent history may include conduct that occurred after the
offense related to the transfer hearing, as well as conduct in school records even if that
conduct did not result in a delinquency petition].) In addition to the four wardship
petitions, L.V.’s delinquent history includes possession of a handgun and 260 grams of
marijuana when L.V. was 14 years old. The handgun had been reported stolen exactly
one week earlier. L.V. also stole a gun from his grandfather in November 2022. When
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the grandfather contacted L.V.’s mother, she admitted L.V. had taken the firearm. L.V.
did not report this incident to his probation officer. Furthermore, while on probation, L.V.
had 18 unexcused absences from school, positive drug test results for marijuana, the
arrest for stealing his grandfather’s gun, and continuing to engage in a gang lifestyle. In
March 2023, L.V.’s grant of probation was terminated as “unsuccessful.” Then in
January 2024, L.V., accompanied by three others, grabbed several cell phones from a T-
Mobile store, then fled in a vehicle and was charged with felony organized retail theft. In
May 2024, L.V., along with others, stole watches, jewelry, firearms, and other items
worth over $150,000. L.V. then boasted about getting away with $10,000, and referred to
himself as a “flocker,” meaning a burglar on social media. The current shooting incident
occurred about three months later on August 17, 2024, while L.V. was still on probation.
Moreover, during his detention in juvenile hall, which had begun on August 20, 2024,
L.V. had been involved in four physical fights with other minors. In two of those
incidents, he had been determined to have been the aggressor, while in another he was
determined not the aggressor, and in another, the altercation was deemed mutual combat.
In short, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings as to the previous
delinquent history criterion.
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4. Previous Attempts at Rehabilitation
The fourth criterion requires the juvenile court to consider whether the “[s]uccess
of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” weighed in favor of
transfer. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i).) When evaluating this criterion, the juvenile court
must “give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of
the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(D)(ii).)
In assessing this criterion, after noting the current petition was L.V.’s third matter
before the juvenile court and L.V.’s chronological history, the court stated: “[T]he minor
has shown he cannot be successful on probationary terms. First, he was unsuccessfully
terminated from formal probation after three months. The minor did not ask to remain on
probation in order to achieve a successful closure after the six month term would have
expired. Further, after being declared a ward of the court on May 1, 2024, the minor
allegedly committed a residential burglary on May 16, 2024, just 15 days later. Although
the petition was not filed on that matter until January 8, 2025, the minor’s criminal
conduct occurred within days of being granted wardship. Then, on August 17, 2024,
90 days after the residential burglary, the minor allegedly was involved in the attempted
murder case. [¶] This minor has no regard for the law, court orders, or probation terms.
Clearly, the minor has no regard for any order and has shown a complete disregard for the
law and court orders.” The court found that “[t]he ‘success’ of prior rehabilitative efforts
has been non-existent” and that L.V. had made “minimal to no effort” to prior services
offered. The court thus disagreed with the probation officer’s recommendation to allow
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L.V. to remain under juvenile jurisdiction and found the recommendation to be “without
merit or justification.” The court believed, as to this specific criteria, “transfer is
appropriate.”
On appeal, L.V. does not specifically argue there was any evidence showing that
the previous attempts to rehabilitate him were successful. Instead, he points to Probation
Officer O.E.’s testimony that during his wardship, he had attended school and earned
passing grades, became sober, made progress in completing community service hours,
and attended his court-ordered victim awareness program. He argues there was no
evidence he had received trauma-informed counseling, behavioral therapy, or long-term
substance abuse treatment and “[t]he court’s conclusion that rehabilitation had failed
ignored the statutory requirement to consider whether prior services had been sufficient.”
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that this criterion
weighed in favor of transfer to a court of criminal jurisdiction. The record reflects that
L.V. engaged in a pattern of delinquent behavior between the ages of 14 and 16, some of
which, such as the organized thefts and residential burglary, was gang related. As a
consequence of his behavior, L.V. was placed on informal and formal probation, which he
failed to complete. As part of his probation, L.V. was prohibited from using controlled
substances, possessing firearms, violating the law, and not knowingly having direct or
indirect contact with anyone disapproved by parent or probation officer and ordered to
complete counseling and community service. Although the record does not include
evidence as to the specific services offered to L.V. to address his needs, the record
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supports the juvenile court’s finding that previous attempts at rehabilitation had not been
successful. The record discloses that L.V. violated the terms of his probation multiple
times, including possessing firearms and continuing to violate the law by committing new
offenses.
On this record, the juvenile court could reasonably find that, despite L.V.’s
placement on both informal and formal probation, he had no willingness or ability to
improve his behavior based on his continued poor conduct, including his failure to
disassociate with the Wyld Lyfe street gang and his continued commission of crimes that
were escalating in severity, including the attempted murder of M.G. The juvenile court
was not required to accept the probation officer’s opinion that L.V. was making good
progress while in juvenile hall. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
disagreeing with the probation officer’s opinion and instead relying on the other evidence
before it. (See J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 212 [trial court is not bound by an
expert’s testimony and opinion]; Alejandro G., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 480 [court
not obligated to adopt experts’ opinions].)
5. Circumstances and Gravity of Alleged Offenses
The fifth and final criterion, the circumstances and gravity of the offense (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)), “focuses on the offense ‘ “alleged in the petition” ’ [citation], and like
the other statutory criteria, it is ‘based on the premise that the minor did, in fact, commit
the offense.’ [Citation.] But the allegation that a minor committed a serious offense,
including murder, does not ‘automatically require a finding of unfitness.’ ” (Kevin P.,
34
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 189, italics omitted.) When evaluating this criterion, the
juvenile court must give weight to any relevant factor, including evidence that, while not
justifying or excusing the crime, tends to lessen its magnitude, including, but not limited
to, “the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree
of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the
person’s mental and emotional development.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii); Kevin P.,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.)
In assessing this criterion, the juvenile court stated: “The probation officer
describes the minor’s actions as being serious and callous in nature. It is well
documented that the minor initially attempted to fire the gun while it was placed against
the victims head, but that a malfunction in the firearm prevented the victim from being
shot at close range. The minor then attempted and succeeded in firing the weapon two
more times. The victim was struck once while attempting to flee. [¶] Here, probation
recommends a transfer to adult court is appropriate. The People and the court agree.”
L.V. claims that “nothing in the record established that L.V. set out with an intent
to inflict lethal harm,” and that the court “inferred adult level intent and deliberation from
the mere fact that the offense involved a firearm.” He further asserts that the court was
“obligated to examine whether [his] conduct reflected impulsivity, panic, immaturity, or
susceptibility to outside influence” but failed to address those factors, as well as factors
relating to peer and familial relationships or dynamics and his amenability to
rehabilitation before and after the alleged offenses.
35
We reject L.V.’s suggestion that the evidence he cites prevented the juvenile court
from finding that this criterion weighed in favor of transfer to a court of criminal
jurisdiction. (See Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 189-190 [rejecting similar
claim, explaining that the minor failed to “offer any authority for the proposition that
expert testimony—or any other evidence beyond that bearing on what happened during
the crime—is required to evaluate this criterion”]; Alejandro G., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th
at p. 480 [court not obligated to adopt experts’ opinions].) The record reflects that the
juvenile court considered the relevant factors, and substantial evidence supports the
court’s determination that the circumstances and gravity of the offenses weighed heavily
in favor of transfer to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (See C.S. v. Superior Court (2018)
29 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1033-1034 [substantial evidence supported the juvenile’s court’s
findings as to the circumstances and gravity of the offenses criterion because there was
evidence that the minor personally and actively participated in an unprovoked gang-
related attack, kicked and punched the victim, and stomped on the victim’s head and
killed him after the other attackers fled].)
6. Amenability to Treatment as a Juvenile
As noted, ante, a recent amendment to section 707 requires the juvenile court to
make an “ultimate” finding that the minor “is not amenable to rehabilitation while under
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); see Miguel R., supra, 100
Cal.App.5th at pp. 164, 167.) The court must consider all five enumerated factors and
36
state its reasons for finding the minor to be unamenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)
At the conclusion of its written transfer order, the court explained: “After
reviewing and considering all reports, evidence and criteria pursuant to
WIC 707(a)(3)(A-E), the court has determined that the People have met their burden by
clear and convincing evidence to have this court order a transfer to a court of criminal
jurisdiction. The evidence at the hearing does establish that the minor should be
transferred. The actions of the minor were premeditated and show sophistication by the
minor. The court does believe that this minor is not amenable to rehabilitative efforts or
services. The court has reviewed the minor’s treatment needs—many of them listed on
the probation officer’s report page 25—and determines that insufficient time exists to
provide these services. [¶] Whether the court has until age 23 or 25, there simply is
insufficient time to address the numerous needs of this youth. The minor has engaged in
a horrendous act and has shown no remorse for his actions. The minor has shown an
inability to comply with court orders on numerous occasions, as well as a complete sense
of apathy toward the completion of any probation services.”
In short, because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings as to
each of the five statutory criteria, there is no basis to reverse the court’s “ultimate”
finding that the People satisfied their burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence
that L.V. was not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
courts. Accordingly, we will affirm the transfer order.
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IV.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order transferring this matter to a court of criminal
jurisdiction is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MILLER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that the minor was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, justifying the transfer to adult criminal court.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's order transferring the minor to adult criminal court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings and affirm the order.”
“The court found the People had shown by clear and convincing evidence that L.V. should be transferred to criminal court, based on the totality of the circumstances”
“We are unpersuaded by L.V.’s contention that the juvenile court’s transfer order is not supported by substantial evidence.”