California Court of Appeal Feb 18, 2026 No. E078721AUnpublished
Filed 2/18/26 P. v. Scott CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E078721
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1604645)
THOMAS RYAN SCOTT, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Matthew Perantoni,
Judge. Affirmed in part; sentence vacated and remanded with directions.
Stephen M. Lathrop, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Randall D.
Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2022, a jury convicted defendant Thomas Ryan Scott of, among other things,
voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense within the crime of murder, and
being a felon in possession of a firearm, finding true the allegation that defendant
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directions, we vacated our original opinion and
solicited additional briefing from the parties. We now turn to the issue.
DISCUSSION
In his supplemental brief, Defendant argues on appeal that his 2009 prior
conviction qualified as a strike only by virtue of a gang enhancement under section
186.22 for unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), where
the elements of the gang allegation have been statutorily modified. Prior to 2022, an
allegation of a prior conviction carrying a sentence enhancement under section 186.22,
subdivision (b), was deemed a serious felony pursuant to section 1192.7, subdivision
(c)(28), and could result in a sentence under the Three Strikes law. (§§ 667, subd. (d)-(i);
1170.12, subd. (c).)
In 2021, the Legislature amended section 186.22 with the passage of Assembly
Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), enacting the STEP Forward
Act of 2021. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 1; Fletcher, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 583.) Assembly
Bill 333 changed the elements of gang offenses and enhancements by narrowing the
definitions of ‘“criminal street gang,”’ “pattern of criminal activity,” and “what it means
for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13
Cal.5th 1169, 1206 (Tran).) In Tran, the Supreme Court held that Assembly Bill 333 is
ameliorative legislation that applies to nonfinal judgments under the rule of In re Estrada
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada). (Tran, supra, at pp. 1206–1207.)
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In Fletcher, the Supreme Court addressed the question of “whether Assembly
Bill 333 applies to a sentencing court’s determination of whether a defendant’s conviction
under the prior version of section 186.22 qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction for
purposes of prior serious felony enhancements.” (Fletcher, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 583.)
The Supreme Court concluded that where a defendant has suffered a prior conviction
under the earlier version of section 186.22, Assembly Bill 333 applies to the
determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction
under subdivision (c)(28) of section 1192.7 for purposes of the Three Strikes law and
prior serious felony enhancements. (Ibid.) It also held that it applies retroactively to
cases in which the judgment is not yet final. (Ibid.)
In our earlier opinion, we cited two reasons for concluding that defendant was not
entitled to relief due to the enactment of Assembly Bill 333. On ground was whether the
issue had been forfeited by defendant’s admission of the Three Strikes allegation, and the
other ground, which was dispositive, was grounded on the legal principle that the
determination of the serious or violent nature of the prior felony conviction is determined
at the time of the prior conviction. We did not reach the question of whether the issue
was forfeited by defendant’s admission of the Three Strikes allegation in the trial court.
The answer to this question was not answered by the Supreme court in Fletcher.
Nevertheless, the People agree that defendant’s admission cannot be construed as
knowingly and/or intelligently made because it was prior to the decision in Fletcher and
that the true finding on defendant’s strike prior should be reversed, and the matter
remanded to the trial court for any retrial of the strike allegation, applying the elements of
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section 186.22 as amended by Assembly Bill 333. (Fletcher, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 608.)
We agree. Notwithstanding the admission of the prior conviction in the trial court, we
have discretion to reach the merits. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6
[“An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not
been preserved for review by a party”]; see People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393,
400 [an appellate court may reach the merits of a forfeited issue in order to “forestall” a
cognizable ineffective assistance of counsel claim].)
Accordingly, we reverse the true finding on the strike prior and remand the matter
to the trial court for further proceedings on the strike allegation.
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s sentence, as well as the true finding that defendant’s 2009 prior
conviction qualifies as prior serious felony conviction under the Three Strikes law, is
vacated. The matter is remanded to the trial court for any retrial of that allegation,
applying the elements of section 186.22 as amended by Assembly Bill 333 and for
resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
McKINSTER J. CODRINGTON J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court reversed the true finding on the defendant's prior strike conviction and remanded for retrial of that allegation in light of the retroactive application of Assembly Bill 333, as established in People v. Fletcher.
Issues
Does Assembly Bill 333 apply to a sentencing court's determination of whether a prior conviction qualifies as a strike under the Three Strikes law?
Does a defendant's admission of a strike prior in the trial court bar appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in light of subsequent statutory amendments?
Disposition. Affirmed in part; sentence vacated and remanded.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Assembly Bill 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under subdivision (c)(28) of section 1192.7 for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements.”
“The matter is remanded to the trial court for any retrial of that allegation, applying the elements of section 186.22 as amended by Assembly Bill 333 and for resentencing.”