Colon-Perez v. Security Industry Specialists CA1/1

Filed 2/11/26 Colon-Perez v. Security Industry Specialists CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JENNY-ASHELY COLON-PEREZ, Plaintiff and Respondent, A168297 v. SECURITY INDUSTRY (Alameda County SPECIALISTS, INC., Super. Ct. No. 21CV004546) Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 In our prior opinion in this case, we concluded Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b)2 could not be invoked to excuse failure to comply with arbitration fee payment deadlines set forth in section 1281.98, regardless of the reason why the deadline was missed or how soon after the deadline payment was made. We therefore affirmed the trial court’s order

We resolve this case by memorandum opinion under California 1

Standards of Judicial Administration section 8.1. The parties are fully conversant with the “the facts of the case and its procedural history,” and we therefore proceed directly to our discussion of the matter on remand from our Supreme Court. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.) All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure 2

unless otherwise indicated.

1

allowing plaintiff Jenny-Ashely Colon-Perez to withdraw from arbitration and its order denying defendant Security Industry Specialists, Inc.’s motion under section 473, subdivision (b) to vacate that order. (Colon-Perez v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 403, disapproved by Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, 349 (Hohenshelt).) Our Supreme Court granted review and deferred action pending its decision in Hohenshelt. In that case, the high court concluded relief may be sought from failure to timely pay arbitration fees under section 1281.98, and not only under section 473, subdivision (b), but also under Civil Code section 3275 and Civil Code section 1511. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 333– 335.) In short, the court posited the question before it as “whether there is a clear indication that section 1281.98 was intended to limit the ordinary operation of section 473(b) or Civil Code sections 3275 and 1511.” (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 335.) The court held there was not. (Id. at pp. 335–341.) “We find no indication that the Legislature, in enacting a ‘strict yet reasonable method’ to ensure timely payment of arbitration fees ([Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 707 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 11, 2019,] at p. 9), intended that any instance of nonpayment by the drafting party, regardless of the circumstances, would result in loss of its right to arbitration.” (Id. at p. 340, italics omitted.) The high court went on to hold that since these statutes affording equitable relief from contractual missteps and defaults are available in the arbitral context, section 1281.98 does not impermissibly target and burden arbitration contracts and therefore is not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 341–346.) “[S]ection 1281.98, construed in harmony with background statutes, makes arbitration