California Court of Appeal Feb 11, 2026 No. E083583Unpublished
Filed 2/11/26 P. v. Padilla CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083583
v. (Super.Ct.No. INF2200689)
JUAN ARELLANO PADILLA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John M. Davis, Judge.
Affirmed.
Shay Dinata-Hanson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Colette C. Cavalier and Emily
Reeves, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
In 2020 a jury convicted Juan Arellano Padilla of burglary, robbery, and assault
with a deadly weapon. Padilla appeals, arguing the trial court erred by admitting the
victim’s out-of-court statements under a hearsay exception. We affirm.
Padilla and his victim, Maricela A., knew each other because Padilla visited her
neighbor “a lot.” In July 2020, Maricela A. was at home alone when she heard banging
on her door. She looked out a window and saw Padilla, his girlfriend Joanne, and two
other women—Jeanette T. and Jessica T.—trying to get into her home. The four yelled at
Maricela A. to open the door, and Maricela A. hid in the bathroom. She heard a window
breaking and then heard the four assailants trying to break down the bathroom door.
Padilla eventually kicked the bathroom door down, and he and the others began to
beat Maricela A., with Padilla and at least one other assailant using baseball bats they
found in the home. Padilla then went through her home, destroying various items. While
Padilla traversed the house, Joanne T. and one other woman continued hitting Maricela
A., with Joanne T. using one of the two baseball bats. When the beating finally stopped,
Padilla threatened Maricela A. with a machete he found in the home, and told her “that’s
what happens because you got in with the wrong person.” Maricela A. did not know to
what Padilla was referring. Maricela A. saw no one take anything from her home, but
she noticed things missing after the fact, including the machete.
After the assailants left, Maricela A. tried to get help. First, she went to a nearby
parked car, but the car left. Another person said they could not take her to the hospital
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because their car was broken, and a third said he could not because he just got back from
the hospital. A fourth person refused to help because they did not want any contact with
the police. Maricela A. eventually had to walk about 30 minutes to a store, arriving an
hour or two after the attack. Store security helped her and called the police.
The responding officer recorded his interaction with Maricela A. on his body-worn
camera. Maricela A. identified Padilla as her assailant. Police went to Padilla’s
residence. As soon as they arrived, Jeanette T. and Joanne T. ran away, while Jessica T.
stayed in a white Hyundai, later identified as Jeanette T.’s car. Police eventually
executed a search warrant on Jeanette T.’s car and found a metal baseball bat, a machete,
and an extra-large sized tank top shirt with a red substance on it.
In March 2023, the Riverside County District Attorney charged Padilla with
burglary (Pen. Code § 459),1 robbery (§ 211) and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)). The information also alleged someone other than Padilla was present
during the commission of the burglary (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)), that he personally
inflicted great bodily injury during the robbery and the assault (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a)),
and that he used a deadly weapon in connection with the robbery (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
Before trial, the prosecution moved in limine to have the police body camera
footage containing Maricela A.’s statements admitted under the excited utterance
exception to the rule against hearsay. Padilla opposed this request. After viewing the
footage, the court granted the prosecution’s motion and admitted the evidence. The court
1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.
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reasoned that “[s]he was under extreme emotion. She looked like she was terrified,
horrified and . . . in a considerable amount of pain.” In the court’s view, this meant it was
unlikely that she was making anything up or lying and was still “acting under her
injuries.”
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges and found true all enhancement
allegations. Padilla appealed the judgment.
ANALYSIS
Padilla argues the trial court erred by admitting Maricela A.’s statements in the
body-worn camera footage of her talking to the responding officers. Specifically, he
argues her statements do not fall under the excited utterance hearsay exception because
they occurred well after the incident. We conclude that the statements were admissible
under the hearsay exception for prior identifications, and, in any event, erroneous
admission of them would be harmless here.2
“Whether an out-of-court statement meets the statutory requirements for
admission as a spontaneous statement is generally a question of fact for the trial court, the
determination of which involves an exercise of the court’s discretion. [Citation.] We
will uphold the trial court’s determination of facts when they are supported by substantial
2 Padilla briefly argued below that the admission of the footage was more prejudicial than probative and should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352. However, on appeal Padilla argues only that the statements in the footage are not excited utterances and therefore should have been excluded on that ground and does not raise Evidence Code section 352.
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evidence and review for abuse of discretion its decision to admit evidence under the
“ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the excited utterance exception] it is
required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous
excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must
have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous
excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in
abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence
preceding it.’ ” (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318.) Padilla argues only that the
second element was not met here because the statements happened more than an hour
after the incident. However, “[b]ecause the second requirement relates to the peculiar
facts of the individual case more than the first or third does . . . the discretion of the trial
court is at its broadest when it determines whether this requirement is met.” (Id. at
pp. 318-319.) We review the court’s determination of any preliminary facts for
substantial evidence, and its ultimate decision to admit the evidence for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 540-542 (Brown); see People v.
Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 236.)
Finally, even if the decision to admit a hearsay statement was erroneous, we will
not disturb the court’s decision unless “it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.”
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see People v. Gutierrez (2000) 78
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Cal.App.4th 170, 177 [noting that “[i]t remains to be decided, however, whether the
[evidence] was properly admitted as a spontaneous declaration, and, if not, whether that
error was harmless,” under People v. Watson.].)
Here, there were arguments on both sides as to whether the statements were
admissible as excited utterances, but the trial court ruled after reviewing the evidence,
including the body camera footage with the statements, and in our view it was not an
abuse of discretion to conclude they were admissible. Padilla’s primary argument against
such a conclusion is that at least two hours passed between when Maricela A. was
assaulted and when she spoke to police.3 However “[t]he amount of time that passes
between a startling event and subsequent declaration is not dispositive, but will be
scrutinized, along with other factors, to determine if the speaker’s mental state remains
excited.” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 810.) “The crucial element in
determining whether an out-of-court statement is admissible as a spontaneous declaration
is the mental state of the speaker. [Citation.] ‘The nature of the utterance—how long it
3 We note that Padilla did not make this argument below, and the amount of time walking to the store was not yet in evidence before the court at the time of its ruling on the statements At the hearing on the prosecution’s motion in limine to admit the body- worn camera footage, the prosecution argued it was admissible because it happened “directly after she walks down the street from the crime scene.” Padilla’s counsel responded “that she’s already walked down the street a long ways . . . it’s not a spontaneous statement by the time the officers arrive.” Accordingly, neither party expressly raised the time between the assault and Maricela A.’s statements to police, but only the distance between where these things happened. The time period came into evidence at trial, and the objection was not renewed on that basis. Given the trial court’s review of the camera footage, we lack sufficient reason to conclude that the court would have reached a different conclusion had the evidence of the time been introduced and argued.
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was made after the startling incident and whether the speaker blurted it out, for
example—may be important, but solely as an indicator of the mental state of the
declarant.’ ” (Id. at p. 811.) Indeed, our supreme court has previously held statements
made two and a half hours after an exciting event can be admitted as excited utterances
under some circumstances. (Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 540-542.)
Here, the trial court found that despite the passage of time, Maricela A. was under
the effect of the excitement when she made her statements to police. After watching the
footage, the court found Maricela A. was still “under extreme emotion. She looked like
she was terrified, horrified, and . . . in a considerable amount of pain.” Because of this,
the court concluded “it would be unlikely . . . that it would be a thing that was made up,
and that she would be lying about it.” This factual finding—that Maricela A. was still
operating under the excitement of the preceding events—is supported by substantial
evidence. In the footage, Maricela A. is clearly distressed, crying, and having difficulty
answering officers’ questions. That was enough for the court to conclude that Maricela
A. was still under excitement and that her “reflective powers” remained in abeyance.
However, even if these statements were not admissible as excited utterances, they
were admissible under Evidence Code section 1238, which states that “evidence of a
prior identification is admissible if the witness admits the prior identification and vouches
for its accuracy.” (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 758, quoting Cal. Law
Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 4 West’s Ann. Evid.Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 1238, p. 249.)
This exception overrides the prohibition on admission of prior consistent statements, as
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“[u]nlike other testimony that cannot be corroborated by proof of prior consistent
statements unless it is first impeached [citations], evidence of an extrajudicial
identification is admitted regardless of whether the testimonial identification is
impeached, because the earlier identification has greater probative value.” (People v.
Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 626, overruled on other grounds in People v. Cuevas (1995)
12 Cal.4th 252, 263.) Maricela A.’s statements to police were almost exclusively
attempts to identify Padilla, and Maricela A. testified to the accuracy of this identification
before the jury saw the body-worn camera footage. The statements thus meet both
requirements for admission under Evidence Code section 1238, and were admissible even
if they were not admissible as excited utterances. (See T.A.W. Performance, LLC v.
Brembo, S.p.A. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 632, 643 [“a trial court’s ruling must be affirmed
even if ‘ “given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the
case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the
trial court to its conclusion.” ’ ”].)
This exception allowed the court to admit all or nearly all of Maricela A.’s
statements to police because those statements were merely identifying Padilla. Maricela
A.’s first statement to police was telling them that Padilla was responsible for her
injuries. She also showed police a picture of Padilla on her phone and gave them what
information she knew about him (such as age, appearance, and where Maricela A.
believed he lived). Though Maricela A. did explain to police exactly what Padilla did—
breaking into her home and hitting her with a bat—this was a needed part of the
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identification, as explaining what crime she believed Padilla participated in is essential to
identify him “as a person who participated in a crime.” (Evid. Code § 1238, subd. (a).)
The only portions of her statements inadmissible under this rule were Maricela A.’s
statements about her own personal identifying information, but these statements were not
evidence offered to prove the truth of any disputed matter and also essential to simply
make the identification.
In any event, even if Maricela A.’s earlier statements should not have come in
under any hearsay exception, we would conclude their admission was harmless. Other
evidence sufficiently corroborated Maricela A.’s testimony such that it is not reasonably
probable that excluding her statements to police would have resulted in a more favorable
outcome for Padilla. For instance, Maricela A. testified she also told a neighbor that
Padilla attacked her, and Padilla’s counsel did not object to the admission of this hearsay
statement.4 Specifically, she testified that after the attack she approached a man named
George and “told him that Mr. Padilla and his niece [sic], Joanne, had beat me up.” We
also have reason to believe Maricela A.’s statements specifically identified Padilla,
because George knew him: both Padilla and another witness testified that George and
Padilla were talking to each other at the witness’s house while the incident occurred.
This is a contemporaneous statement about Padilla’s identity, to someone who knew
Padilla and would recognize it as such, consistent with the statements she later made to
police, which served a nearly identical purpose as her statements to police, and which
4 An objection to this statement likely would have been properly overruled due to the identification exception to hearsay codified in Evidence Code section 1238.
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was admitted without controversy. To conclude that admitting her statements to police
prejudiced Padilla, we would have to conclude that this earlier statement to her neighbor
did not, or that only the cumulative effect of both statements created a reasonable
probability of a different result. We do not find that argument convincing.
In addition, physical and circumstantial evidence uncovered by police
corroborated the story she told on the stand. Maricela A. testified that Padilla attacked
her with a bat and threatened her with a machete. She also told the jury that Joanne T.,
Jeanette T., and Jessica T. all assaulted her alongside Padilla. When police went to
Padilla’s residence, all three of the women were present and attempted to run. More
damningly, Jeanette T.’s car was there, and when police searched it they found a baseball
bat, machete, and an extra-large tank top stained with a blood-like red substance. This
evidence matches Maricela A.’s testimony about what happened, connects all the alleged
assailants to Padilla and to each other near the time of the attack, and places the women
with two of the weapons they allegedly used in the attack. Given this corroborating
evidence, excluding Maricela A.’s more contemporaneous statements to police was
unlikely to have made the difference in the jury’s assessment of her credibility in
identifying Padilla, and therefore would not have been reasonably probable to lead to a
more favorable outcome for Padilla.
Because Maricela A.’s statements to officers in body-worn camera footage were
admissible, or at most harmless error, we affirm the court’s judgment.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAPHAEL J. We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
LEE J.
11
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim's out-of-court statements as excited utterances, and alternatively, that the statements were admissible as prior identifications under Evidence Code section 1238. Any potential error in admitting the statements was deemed harmless due to corroborating evidence.
Issues
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting the victim's out-of-court statements under the excited utterance exception?
Were the victim's statements admissible as prior identifications under Evidence Code section 1238?
Was the admission of the victim's statements harmless error?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“evidence of a prior identification is admissible if the witness admits the prior identification and vouches for its accuracy.”
“even if Maricela A.’s earlier statements should not have come in under any hearsay exception, we would conclude their admission was harmless.”