California Court of Appeal Feb 6, 2026 No. E086244Unpublished
Filed 2/6/26 In re J.N. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re J.N. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E086244
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J303748 & J303749 & J303750) v. OPINION J.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,
Judge. Affirmed.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Kristina M. Robb, Deputy County Counsel for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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J.R. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating dependency
proceedings involving three of her children and issuing exit orders to family court that
vested custody of the children with their father, J.N. (Father), and denied Mother
visitation pending filing of the matter in family court. The children, J.T. (born in June
2008), Ja.N. (born in July 2012) and Jv.N. (born in Dec. 2011; hereinafter Minors) are
now ages 17, 13, and 12. Mother challenges only the court’s denial of visitation. As we
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in failing to require visitation for her in
its exit orders. To recite the evidence above is to show there is no merit whatsoever to
Mother’s argument.
Mother relies on the principle that visitation is ordinarily an essential component
of reunification services. She invokes Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.1,
subdivision (a)(1)(A), which provides that when the juvenile court issues a dispositional
order “placing a child in foster care, and ordering reunification services,” the court
generally must provide for parental visitation “as frequent[ly] as possible, consistent with
the well-being of the child” (ibid.), without “jeopardiz[ing] the safety of the child” (id.,
subd. (a)(1)(B)).2 That is not the posture of this case, however. Foster care and
reunification supervised by the juvenile court were not at issue.
Rather, as CFS points out, section 361.2 governs when there is a previously
noncustodial parent able and willing to assume custody. Instead of sending a dependent
child to foster care, the court “shall” place him or her with the parent willing to assume
custody, unless it would be detrimental to the child. (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) In making these
decisions in the child’s best interests, the juvenile court may adjust legal and physical
custody, terminate its dependency jurisdiction, and “may also provide reasonable
visitation by the noncustodial parent.” (Id., subd. (b)(1), italics added; see, e.g. In re
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1131.) Mother cites no authority that visitation is
required in these circumstances.
To the contrary, as CFS also correctly explains, section 362.4 sets forth the
governing framework when the juvenile court terminates jurisdiction and issues exit
orders for custody and other matters to be monitored and adjudicated in the family court.
(See In re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112-113.) Thus, as J.M. highlighted:
“Section 362.4 governs the termination of juvenile court jurisdiction and related orders.
The statute authorizes a juvenile court to make ‘exit orders’ regarding custody and
visitation upon terminating dependency jurisdiction over a child. (See § 362.4, subd. (a);
In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 203 . . .; In re Kenneth S., Jr. (2008) 169
Cal.App.4th 1353, 1358[.]) These exit orders remain in effect until modified or
terminated by a subsequent order of the superior court. (§ 362.4, subd. (b); see also Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.700.)” (J.M., at p. 112.)
J.M. continued: “ ‘[I]n making exit orders, the juvenile court must look at the best
interests of the child.’ [Citations.] The court must be guided by the totality of the
circumstances and issue orders that are in the child’s best interests. [Citations.] Because
juvenile dependency proceedings arise when children are subject to or at risk of abuse or
neglect, ‘[t]he presumption of parental fitness that underlies custody law in the family
court just does not apply. . . . Rather the juvenile court, which has been intimately
involved in the protection of the child, is best situated to make custody determinations
based on the best interests of the child without any preferences or presumptions.’ ” (J.M.,
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 112.)
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We review the juvenile court’s exit orders under the deferential abuse of discretion
standard. (J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 113.) Under that standard, we will not
disturb the juvenile court’s decision “ ‘ “unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of
legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ”
(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) As the high court “warned” practitioners
long ago: “ ‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court
exceeded the bounds of reason.’ ” (Id. at pp. 318-319.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. Mother’s arguments shade the
record in her favor, contrary to the standard of review. We review the record in the light
most favorable to the juvenile court’s determinations. (See, e.g., In re. I.J. (2013)
56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Mother’s statements also approach misstatement of the record, as when counsel on
her behalf asserts: “The children wished to have visits with Mother, even expressing the
desire to return to her care as her behavior improved.” (Italics added.) Mother’s
behavior never improved, and it misstates the record to imply it did. Counsel on
Mother’s behalf also argues: “There is no evidence that the children feared Mother or felt
unsafe in her presence during monitored or supervised visits.” (Italics added.) The
record is devoid of evidence that Mother visited with Minors, monitored or unmonitored,
except when she approached Jv.N. on her field trip outside of court-sanctioned visitation,
and the child feared she would be kidnapped. Mother also routinely flouted court
supervision by contacting Minors on their cell phones, until the numbers were changed.
Minors were terrified of Mother. The juvenile court was not required to order an
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experiment in finally having Mother abide by monitored visitation in the interlude
between juvenile court and family court jurisdiction.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s challenged exit orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in issuing exit orders that denied visitation to the mother upon terminating dependency jurisdiction, as the court's decision was based on the children's best interests and the mother's failure to address her erratic behavior and safety risks.
Issues
Whether the juvenile court erred by denying parental visitation in its exit orders upon terminating dependency jurisdiction.
Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining that visitation would be detrimental to the children.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The court must be guided by the totality of the circumstances and issue orders that are in the child’s best interests.”
“The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.”