California Court of Appeal Feb 2, 2026 No. E085152Unpublished
Filed 2/2/26 P. v. Endicott CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E085152
v. (Super.Ct.No. CR21880)
LEON ENDICOTT, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Steven G. Counelis,
Judge. Affirmed.
Jonathan M. Lynn for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Arlene Sevidal, Robin Urbanski and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Leon Endicot appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment
order denying his Penal Code1 section 1172.6 petition for resentencing of his first degree
felony murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) conviction following an evidentiary hearing. Defendant
argues there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that defendant was
a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life during the course
of a burglary. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s order.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background2
Early in the morning on December 2, 1983, a police officer stopped defendant and
his brother codefendant Anthony Endicott3 as they were driving very slowly through a
neighborhood in Sun City. The day previously a residence in Sun City had been
burglarized and various items were taken, including brass candlesticks, silverware, a
1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The factual background is taken from the reporter’s transcript from his direct appeal, case No. E001931, which is contained in Exhibit No. 1, and will be denoted as “RT” “1RT” and “1CT” will refer to the reporter’s transcript and clerk’s transcript, respectively, from this case. Exhibit No. 1 includes a copy of this court’s opinion from case No. E001931, a copy of the reporter’s transcript from case No. E001931, and a copy of the clerk’s transcript from case No. E001931. On February 21, 2025, we ordered the superior court clerk to transmit Exhibit No. 1 to this court and to send a copy to counsel.
3 For clarity, Anthony will be referred to by his first name. No disrespect is intended.
2
Tiffany picture frame, a television set, credit cards, and a vacuum cleaner. The brothers
claimed they were looking for work.
Sometime prior to December 13, 1983, defendant had trimmed some trees at 83-
year-old Beatrice Hatfield’s home. Defendant knew that Hatfield had money, that she
was always there, and that she never left her residence. Defendant and Anthony planned
to burglarize Hatfield’s home.
On the night of December 13, 1983, defendant and Anthony went into the house
through the back door. As they were going through cabinets in the home, defendant
heard Hatfield in a back bedroom. The brothers went back to the bedroom where
Hatfield was located, and defendant stood by the bedroom door while Anthony attacked
Hatfield. Anthony hit Hatfield multiple times before taking out his knife and slitting her
throat. Defendant and Anthony then took some mints and a banana from the house before
leaving. As they were leaving, Anthony remarked that “the banana wasn’t even a
Chiquita.”
On the afternoon of December 13, 1983, Anthony visited a friend’s home, during
which time he sharpened the knife that he always carried in a sheath on his belt. Anthony
left but returned later that same night and sharpened his knife again. Defendant arrived a
short while later, and he and Anthony left the house together.
Around 8:00 p.m. on December 13, 1983, defendant and Anthony went to pick up
their friend Troy White from his work. They then dropped him off at his home in Perris.
Around 1:00 to 2:00 a.m., defendant and Anthony returned to Troy White’s apartment.
3
Other people at the apartment overheard defendant and Anthony mumbling to one
another. They heard Anthony tell defendant to shut up, forget it, and it was over. Not
long thereafter, Anthony started washing his knife in the kitchen sink, claiming that he
was washing “catsup” off the knife. Defendant stated to Anthony that he “didn’t have to
cut the lady’s throat from ear to ear,” and Anthony again told defendant to be quiet.
During the course of the conversation between defendant and Anthony, their
friends also overheard them discussing their night’s activities, including that they went to
“rob a house” in Sun City. As defendant and Anthony were talking, Anthony continued
to clean his knife, after which he sharpened it again. Defendant instructed Anthony to
“get rid” of the knife. Anthony and Troy White then smashed the knife with a hammer,
put the pieces into an empty beer can, and threw it into the trash.
The next morning, on December 14, 1983, Troy White and his brother told their
employer what defendant and Anthony had said the night before about murdering an
elderly woman while they were burglarizing her house. They all decided to wait until
they could determine if the story was true, and to check the newspaper to see if there was
any mention of an elderly woman being murdered. Later that same day, defendant and
Anthony tried to sell a women’s small gold watch and a vacuum cleaner to an
acquaintance. Meanwhile, Hatfield’s neighbors grew concerned because Hatfield’s
newspaper was still in her driveway, which was unusual. Upon checking Hatfield’s
home, neighbors discovered the door unlocked, the house ransacked, and Hatfield dead in
her bed. The neighbors contacted the police.
4
Police officers located a jewelry box which had contained a woman’s watch.
Defendant’s fingerprints were found on the inside of the kitchen door, and Anthony’s
fingerprints were found on the patio window. A subsequent autopsy showed numerous
head and neck injuries to Hatfield, including a broken jaw, a cut on her lip, and a three-
inch knife cut that severed her carotid artery.
The day after Hatfield’s body was discovered, the employer of the White brothers
read an article in the newspaper about Hatfield’s murder, which was consistent with what
the White brothers had told him about defendant and Anthony. The employer thereafter
notified the police. The police interviewed the White brothers, after which they agreed to
retrieve the broken knife from the trash. Defendant and Anthony were located shortly
thereafter and placed under arrest.
B. Procedural Background
In 1984, after a joint trial, a jury convicted defendant and his brother codefendant
Anthony of first degree felony murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and first degree burglary
(§§ 459, 460). The jury also convicted Anthony of first degree burglary of another
stolen property (§ 496). The jury also found true the special circumstance allegation that
Anthony committed the murder while engaged in the commission of burglary (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)( 17)( vii)). The jury further found true Anthony personally used a knife
(§ 12022, subd. (b)) in the commission of the murder and the burglary of the Hatfield
5
residence. In 1985, the trial court sentenced defendant to a total indeterminate term of
25 years to life in state prison.
Defendant subsequently appealed. In 1988, this court affirmed defendant’s
judgment in its entirety in an unpublished opinion, case No. E001931.
On August 30, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). Defendant claimed, among other things, that there
had “been a prior determination by a court or jury” that he was “not a major participant
and/or did not act with reckless indifference to human life . . . .”
On December 17, 2021, the trial court issued an order to show cause and set the
matter for an evidentiary hearing.
On February 28, 2022, defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief in support of his
petition for resentencing.
On March 27, 2024, defendant’s retained counsel filed a supplemental brief in
support of his petition for resentencing and response to the People’s brief.
On November 8, 2024, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing during
which defendant and his counsel were present. At that time, the parties relied upon the
unpublished opinion from this court in case No. E001931, the reporter’s transcript, and
the clerk’s transcript from defendant’s underlying direct appeal in case No. E001931, all
of which were reviewed by the trial court. Following argument by counsel, the court took
the matter under submission, provided the parties an opportunity to submit further
supplemental briefing, and set the matter for a final hearing date.
6
On December 6, 2024, the trial court conducted a further hearing. Defendant was
present with his counsel. The court announced that it was denying the petition for
resentencing and filed a nine-page written ruling order setting forth the basis for its
ruling. The trial court found that defendant was a major participant in the underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life, and concluded the People had
met the burden of proving defendant could still be convicted of murder after the changes
to the law. The court noted that defendant had a role in planning the burglary; defendant
knew Anthony had a knife and was aware of the risk and danger posed; defendant was
present at the scene and did nothing to stop Anthony from killing Hatfield; and defendant
did not seek to aid or help for Hatfield after Anthony slit her throat. The court also found
that defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court pointed out that
defendant knew Anthony was armed with a knife; defendant was physically present at the
scene and knew Hatfield was always there; defendant planned to burglarize Hatfield in
the middle of the night; and defendant did nothing to stop his brother’s violence or seek
aid for Hatfield after her throat was slit, despite both defendant and Anthony’s youth
(defendant was 18 years old at the time of the murder, and Anthony was 18 years old).
Defendant timely appealed.
7
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s
finding that he was a major participant in the burglary who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
A. Section 1172.6 Generally
Under the ameliorative changes in the law effected by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-
2018, Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), malice must be proved to convict a principal of
murder, except under the narrowed felony-murder rule set forth in section 189,
subdivision (e), and may not be imputed based solely on an individual’s participation in a
crime (§ 188, subd. (a)(3)), thereby eliminating the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for convicting a defendant of murder. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 842-843, 847 (Gentile).) The amended felony-murder law requires the
People to prove specific facts relating to the defendant’s individual culpability: The
defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although not the actual killer, the
defendant assisted in the commission of the murder with the intent to kill (§ 189,
subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major participant in an underlying felony listed in
section 189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference to human life, “as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3); People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).)
8
Section 1172.6 permits an individual convicted of felony murder or murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the sentencing court to vacate
the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could not now be
convicted of murder because of Senate Bill No. 1437’s changes to the definitions of the
crime. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis); Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.)
If the petitioner makes the requisite prima facie showing he or she falls within the
provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, the trial court must issue an order to
show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder
conviction and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c)
& (d); see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.)
At the evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted
murder under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The trial court may consider
evidence “previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under
current law.” (Ibid.) If the trial court applied the proper standard and burden of proof,
the denial of a petition after an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for substantial evidence.
(People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 970, 985 (Ramirez).) Under this standard, “ ‘ “we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
9
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
[Citation.] We determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court “presumes
in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce
from the evidence.” ’ [Citations.]” (Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951.)
The overlapping factors for assessing whether a defendant was a major participant
in an underlying serious felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life for
purposes of section 190.2, subdivision (d), and thus for section 189, subdivision (e)(3),
were identified in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), and reiterated more recently in In re Scoggins (2020) 9
Cal.5th 667 (Scoggins).
To determine whether a defendant was a major participant in one of the specified
felonies, the Banks court listed the following factors: “What role did the defendant have
in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the
defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant
have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene
of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her
10
own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did the defendant do
after lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
As to whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life, the
Supreme Court enumerated the following nonexclusive factors: “Did the defendant use
or know that a gun would be used during the felony? How many weapons were
ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at the crime? Did he or she have
the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of the
interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What was the
defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of
using lethal force? What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence
during the felony?” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; accord, Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 808.) “ ‘ “[N]o one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of
them necessarily sufficient.” ’ ” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) Courts must view
“the totality of the circumstances to determine whether [the defendant] acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (Ibid.) The major participant factors “significantly
overlap” with the reckless indifference factors. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615.)
Appellate courts have recognized youth as another factor bearing on whether a defendant
acted with reckless indifference to human life. (E.g., People v. Keel (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 546, 558-559; Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 990-991; In re Moore
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454-455.)
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B. Analysis
It is uncontested that defendant was not the actual killer. As discussed, however,
he remains guilty of murder under current law if he “was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).) Defendant argues the trial
court’s finding that he acted with reckless indifference to human life is not supported by
substantial evidence.
Defendant does not challenge the court’s determination that he was a major
participant in the burglary and murder of Hatfield. But there is significant overlap
between being a major participant and having reckless indifference to human life and in
general, “ ‘the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely
that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 615.) Accordingly, we will also review the court’s determination that defendant was a
major participant in the felony murder of Hatfield.
Substantial evidence shows that defendant was a major participant in the burglary.
He was the one who planned and proposed it. He and his brother were seen casing the
neighborhood weeks before the burglary. Defendant suggested Hatfield’s home because
he believed she had money in the home and was the instigator of the burglary. Defendant
was aware Anthony had a knife and believed Hatfield was “always there.” Thus, he
would have been aware of the risk Hatfield would confront them and that his brother
would use a knife against her to prevent their discovery. Defendant was at the scene of
12
the murder, standing right outside the door, and could hear Anthony striking Hatfield
before slitting her throat. He could have prevented the murder by stopping his brother
from killing Hatfield or he could have assisted in aiding Hatfield after her throat was slit.
Instead, defendant and Anthony proceeded to take food from her house before fleeing the
scene.
This active participation and presence during every aspect of the planning and
execution of the crime leaves little doubt that defendant was a major participant in the
underlying offense. These facts, which are supported by the record, together provide
sufficient evidence in support of the court’s conclusion that beyond a reasonable doubt
defendant was a major participant in the underlying burglary and murder.
Substantial evidence also shows defendant acted with reckless indifference to
human life. “Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and an objective
element. [Citation.] As to the subjective element, ‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and
willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’
and he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death his or her actions
create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective element, ‘ “[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the
circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.” ’ ”
(Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; see People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 106.)
13
Although “ ‘[a]wareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in
any [violent felony] is insufficient’ to establish reckless indifference to human life” and “
‘only knowingly creating a “grave risk of death” ’ satisfies the statutory requirement,”
“[r]eckless indifference to human life is ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal
activities known to carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 677,
676.) “Examples include ‘the person who tortures another not caring whether the victim
lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery, utterly
indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the unintended consequence of
killing the victim as well as taking the victim's property.’ ” (Id. at p. 676.) Reckless
indifference “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve
a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome
of his actions.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that beyond a reasonable
doubt defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. That finding relies on
much of the same evidence as the court’s finding he was a major participant. (See Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614-615 [referring to “the interrelationship between the two
elements” and the “ ‘significant[ ] overlap’ ” in the requirements for being a major
participant and having reckless indifference to human life]; People v. Cody, supra, 92
Cal.App.5th at p. 113 [major participant finding is “itself . . . supportive” of reckless
indifference finding].) Here, defendant was aware that Anthony was armed with a knife
and stood outside the door as Anthony struck and slit Hatfield’s throat. Defendant did
14
nothing to minimize the risk of violence. Although it is unclear how long the interaction
lasted, defendant and Anthony’s decision to burglarize Hatfield’s home in the middle of
the night, knowing Hatfield would be present, increased the risk that assaulting or killing
the 83-year-old victim would be necessary to prevent apprehension. That defendant was
present outside the door while Anthony beat and stabbed the vulnerable victim suggests
he had an opportunity to restrain Anthony from hitting and knifing the victim in the throat
and head. Hatfield’s autopsy showed numerous head and neck injuries to Hatfield,
including a broken jaw, a cut on her lip, and a three-inch knife cut that severed her carotid
artery.
Moreover, defendant did nothing to minimize Anthony’s beating of the 83-year-
old vulnerable victim or aid Hatfield after Anthony stabbed her with his knife. Rather, in
the hours that followed Hatfield’s murder, defendant took action to conceal evidence of
the crime, encouraging Anthony to destroy the knife he used during their crime. Shortly
thereafter, defendant and Anthony were attempting to sell a watch they stole from
Hatfield’s home, in addition to property they stole during a prior burglary. Numerous
cases have recognized that such a failure to seek or provide aid is a highly significant
factor indicative of indifference to the life of the victim. For example, in People v.
Gonzalez (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1386, affirmed in People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5
Cal.5th 186, the court found that the defendant exhibited reckless indifference to human
life when he fled with the shooter instead of rendering aid and accompanied the shooter
when he disposed of the murder weapon. (See People v. Smith (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th
15
914, 927-928 [the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life because,
knowing that the victim had been assaulted and seeing his cohort leave the room covered
in blood, he chose to flee with the assailant rather than come to the victim’s aid or
summon help]; People v. Lopez (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117, disapproved in part
by Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 809, fn. 8 [the defendant exhibited “utter indifference to
the victim’s life” when she lured the victim into a secluded alley and after hearing
gunshot failed to help the victim or call 911]; People v. Medina (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th
778, 792-793 [the defendant, who had participated in the robbery but left prior to the
shooting, exhibited a reckless indifference to human life when he returned to the scene to
aid the shooter but made no effort to offer aid or inquire as to the victim].)
Although the beating and stabbing of the victim may have been spontaneous, the
burglary of Hatfield was in no way a spontaneous crime of opportunity. The evidence
established defendant knowingly planned and participated in a residential burglary,
knowing the victim would be home. The totality of the circumstances show defendant
was willing to resort to killing the victim to carry out the burglary. (See Scoggins, supra,
9 Cal.5th at pp. 676-677 [“Reckless indifference ‘encompasses a willingness to kill (or to
assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions’ ”].)
Defendant’s attempts to reinterpret the facts do not undermine the court’s findings.
For example, defendant suggests that there was no evidence he knew Anthony would use
a knife that he regularly carried to kill Hatfield or that he was aware of Anthony’s
16
propensity for violence or that he had the ability to restrain Anthony or minimize the risk.
He also claims a knife is not an inherently dangerous weapon.4 Further, defendant asserts
“[t]here was no evidence the brothers planned for this to be a lengthy operation,” instead
“the stabbing was more of an impulsive response to the victim’s unexpected resistance.”
But defendant’s various arguments about the facts, and his additional contentions
that go to witness credibility, conflate the role of the trial court with our role as an
appellate court applying the substantial evidence standard of review. The trial court was
charged with considering the totality of the circumstances germane to determining
whether defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (See Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 706; Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
“Under our substantial evidence standard of review, we defer to the trial court’s implicit
credibility findings and accept all reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (People v.
Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 482.) Our role is not to reweigh the evidence, judge
the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. (See In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 640.) Rather, determinations are “ ‘upheld if . . . supported by substantial
evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court
might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.’ ” (Ibid.)
4 While defendant is correct that a knife is not considered an inherently dangerous weapon (see People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 6 [“Because a knife can be, and usually is, used for innocent purposes, it is not among the few objects that are inherently deadly weapons.”]), this claim does not aid defendant as it is not a factor in the determination of whether defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.
17
Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the trial court did not conflate the major
participant factors with the reckless indifference factors. Rather, the court considered the
two questions separately, and appropriately enumerated and analyzed the factors
applicable to each question. Further, the trial court’s consideration of whether defendant
acted with reckless indifference to human life accurately considered the precise factors
set forth by our high court in Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at page 677 and Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at page 618 to 622.
The record shows the trial court conducted the required “ ‘fact- intensive,
individualized inquiry’ into where [defendant’s] conduct falls on the spectrum of
culpability” for nonkiller felony murderers. (People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867,
883.) The court considered the evidence introduced at defendant’s trial and at the
evidentiary hearing on his section 1172.6 petition in light of the factors identified in
Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788, and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, and, based on the totality
of the circumstances, found he was guilty of murder as a “major participant” who “acted
with reckless indifference to human life” in the felony during which Hatfield was killed
(§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence is
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that beyond a reasonable doubt defendant
was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
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IV.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MILLER J.
19
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the denial of the defendant's petition for resentencing, holding that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that the defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Issues
Whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the defendant was a major participant in the burglary and murder.
Whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court found that defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life, and concluded the People had met the burden of proving defendant could still be convicted of murder”
“Substantial evidence shows that defendant was a major participant in the burglary. He was the one who planned and proposed it.”
“Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that beyond a reasonable doubt defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.”