California Court of Appeal Jan 29, 2026 No. E086479Unpublished
Filed 1/29/26 Qi v. Superior Court CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ZEMING QI,
Petitioner, E086479
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVSB 2320216)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN OPINION BERNARDINO COUNTY,
Respondent;
LANG MAO,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Joseph T. Ortiz,
Judge. Petition granted.
Kenneth I. Gross & Associates and Kenneth I. Gross for Petitioner.
No appearance by Respondent.
ArentFox Schiff, Malcolm S. McNeil, Kirsten A. Hart, and Gilbert Mikalian for
Real Party in Interest.
1
In this partition action, respondent superior court ordered petitioner Zeming Qi to
appear in person for a deposition in California under Code of Civil Procedure section
2025.260. (Unlabeled statutory references are to this code.) Qi filed a petition for writ of
mandate challenging that order. He argues that because he does not reside in California,
pp. 1115-1117.) But the later version of the statute at issue in Glass (i.e., former section
2025), like the current version of section 2025.260(b), did not include the
“[n]otwithstanding” language. (Toyota Motor, at p. 1123.) Glass’s characterization of
the two statutes (former section 2019 and former section 2025) as being “virtually
identical” is therefore erroneous.1 (Glass, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1052.) Toyota
Motor accordingly rejected Glass’s conclusion that former section 2025 implicitly
repealed section 1989 to allow courts to compel out-of-state residents to attend
depositions in California. (Toyota Motor, at pp. 1123-1124.) We agree with Toyota
Motor’s analysis.
1 In a footnote, Glass addressed the Legislature’s removal of the “‘[n]otwithstanding section 1989’” language as follows: “Real parties’ remaining substantive argument is that the Legislature’s 1986 deletion of ‘Notwithstanding Section 1989’ from subdivision (b)(2) of section 2019 evidences an intent on its part to restore the limitations of section 1989 as they existed before the Twin Lock decision. However, real parties offer no legislative history or other compelling support for their argument. Furthermore, it is more reasonable to assume the Legislature determined the phrase was superfluous in light of the 30-year-old Twin Lock decision, its revised discovery scheme and its stated goal of eliminating unnecessary cross-references to other discovery statutes.” (Glass, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1053, fn. 3.) We agree with Toyota Motor that the analysis is not persuasive. The legislative history confirms “that the omission of the ‘[n]otwithstanding Section 1989’ language in 1986 was intentional, and must be given effect.” (Toyota Motor, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.) And “Twin Lock found that language to be important to its analysis; removing the language removes one of the underpinnings of Twin Lock and renders its discussion of the 1959 version of [former section 2019] inapplicable.” (Id. at pp. 1123-1124.)
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In sum, section 1989 prohibits a trial court from compelling a witness, including a
party, who is not a California resident to appear in person for a deposition in California.
Other statutory provisions govern taking “depositions of non-California residents in the
state or country of their residence. Section 2026.010[] provides for depositions in other
states, and section 2027.010 provides for depositions in foreign nations.” (Toyota Motor,
supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1113.)
II. The trial court’s findings
Mao argues that regardless of whether section 1989 prohibits compelling an out-
of-state resident to appear in person for a deposition in California, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by granting the motion to compel, because the court found that Qi had
not established where he resided for purposes of determining whether the section 1989
prohibition applied. We are not persuaded.
The trial court did not find that Qi resided in California. Instead, the court found
that Qi had failed to provide a specific residence address and either had “no residence” or
resided in various locations abroad over the past few years. Section 1989 prohibits a
court from compelling a witness who resides outside California to appear in person for a
deposition in California. The trial court therefore could grant the motion to compel only
if the court found that Qi resided in California “at the time of service.” (§ 1989.) The
trial court consequently erred by ordering Qi to appear in person for a deposition in
California without making that finding.
Moreover, the trial court could not have made that finding, because it would not be
supported by any evidence. The record contains no evidence that Qi resided in California
10
at any time during the pendency of this lawsuit. Rather, the evidence shows that Qi did
not reside anywhere in the United States during that period. In his verified response to
interrogatories in November 2024, Qi stated that he had resided in “various locations”
abroad since 2021. In emails to Mao’s attorney about scheduling Qi’s deposition, Qi’s
attorney repeatedly confirmed that Qi “resides abroad” and “outside of the U.S.” And in
opposition to the motion to compel, Qi and his attorney said that Qi resides in Slovakia.
The June 2022 complaint alleges that Qi worked in Rancho Cucamonga “at all
relevant times hereto,” but that is irrelevant for at least two reasons. First, it does not
state that Qi resided in Rancho Cucamonga (or elsewhere in California) at that time.
Second, the relevant period for that action was December 2021 through March 2022, and
the complaint in this action was filed in August 2023. The allegation in the prior
complaint therefore has no tendency to show that Qi resided in California at the time of
service of any document in this action.
For all of these reasons, it does not matter that Qi and his attorney never provided
Mao or the trial court with a specific residence address for Qi. Section 1989 prohibits
compulsion of Qi’s in-person appearance for a deposition in California if Qi is not a
resident of California. Thus, in order to apply the section 1989 prohibition, the court did
not need to know Qi’s exact address. Rather, in order to avoid that prohibition, the court
needed to find that Qi was a resident of California. No such finding was possible on this
record.
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DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate is granted. Let a peremptory writ of mandate
issue directing the trial court (1) to vacate its order granting Mao’s motion to compel Qi
to appear in person for a deposition in California, and (2) to enter a new and different
order denying the motion. The stay of proceedings in the trial court is lifted. Qi shall
recover costs incurred in this writ proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MILLER J.
12
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. Code of Civil Procedure section 1989 prohibits a trial court from compelling a party witness who is not a California resident to appear in person for a deposition within California. Section 2025.260 does not grant the court discretionary authority to override this residency requirement.
Issues
Does Code of Civil Procedure section 1989 prohibit a court from compelling a non-resident party to attend an in-person deposition in California?
Does Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.260 authorize a court to compel an out-of-state resident to appear for a deposition in California despite the restrictions of section 1989?
Disposition. granted
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Section 1989 prohibits a trial court from compelling a witness, including a party, who is not a California resident to appear in person for a deposition in California.”
“The trial court therefore could grant the motion to compel only if the court found that Qi resided in California “at the time of service.””