California Court of Appeal Jan 28, 2026 No. E083557Unpublished
Filed 1/28/26 P. v. Torres CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083557
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF2203627)
RAUL TORRES, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Rene Navarro, Judge.
(Retired judge of the Santa Clara Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art.
VI, §6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Rex Adam Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Arlyn
Escalante, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
A jury convicted Raul Torres of assault with force likely to cause great bodily
injury, infliction of corporal injury on a former partner, criminal threats, and false
subd. (a)(4), 273.5, subd. (a), 422.) The court suspended imposition of sentence and
placed Torres on probation for three years. As a condition of probation, the court ordered
Torres to serve 120 days in county jail through the work release program.
DISCUSSION
Torres contends that the trial court excluded evidence that C.M. “began abusing
[Torres] when he was a minor.” (Italics omitted.) He argues that the evidentiary ruling
was an abuse of discretion and a violation of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
The argument lacks merit.
6
I. Additional background
During cross-examination, defense counsel asked C.M. who A.R. was. The
People objected, the court held an unreported sidebar conference, and it sustained the
objection.
The court later memorialized the sidebar conference “pertaining to [the]
relationship between the witness and the defendant’s uncle.” The court asked defense
counsel to put his request on record, and counsel explained the claimed relevance of his
question. According to counsel, A.R. is Torres’s uncle (Uncle), and Uncle was in a
relationship with C.M. for nearly 10 years. C.M. met Torres in 2012 when she was still
in a relationship with Uncle. Torres was 17 years old in 2012. Counsel claimed that
Torres and C.M. started a physical relationship in 2012 when Torres was a minor,
contrary to C.M.’s testimony that their relationship started in 2019. Counsel further
claimed that the relationship caused a family rift when it was discovered, and C.M. “used
that as an opportunity to control and attempt to influence Mr. Torres at various points in
time.” Counsel argued that the evidence went to C.M.’s bias and credibility, because it
contradicted her testimony about the length and nature of her relationship with Torres.
The People argued that the length of C.M.’s relationship with Torres was “fair
game” and a proper subject of cross-examination. But they argued that evidence that
C.M. had a relationship with Uncle was irrelevant, “designed to shame her,” intended to
make her seem promiscuous or unfaithful, and unduly prejudicial.
7
The court ruled that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the
risk of undue prejudice and/or the potential to confuse or mislead the jury. The court
observed that Uncle was not a proffered witness. It reasoned that the evidence was “not
being offered with respect to an issue that will ultimately pro[ve] to be material to the
party’s case.” The court explained that defense counsel could ask C.M. “anything with
respect to their relationship, the length of it, what have you,” but that counsel could not
ask C.M. about Uncle.
After C.M. testified that she met Torres in 2019 and that they began their
relationship that year, defense counsel asked: “Now, in fact, your relationship—your
intimate relationship has gone back further than that, right?” C.M. replied: “No.”
Defense counsel asked if she was “sure” about that, and C.M. replied: “That I remember,
yes.” Counsel then showed her a photo collage of C.M. and Torres dated June 2017. At
least two of the photos depicted them kissing, and they appeared to be hugging in others.
C.M. confirmed that the photos fairly represented her and Torres at that time. She
testified that she was not lying when she said that their relationship began in 2019; she
did not remember them being together in 2017. Counsel also asked C.M. if she met
Torres in 2012, and she said that she did not remember. Counsel then asked if she
remembered that Torres was 17 years old in 2012, and she replied, “No.” She agreed
with counsel that she would have been roughly 35 years old in 2012.
Counsel also asked C.M. if she met Torres through a family member, and the court
sustained the prosecutor’s objection to the question. The court then held another
8
unreported sidebar conference, which was later memorialized. Defense counsel
explained that he had a good-faith basis to believe that C.M. began an intimate
relationship with Torres when he was 17 years old, making it a crime under Penal Code
section 261.5. Counsel argued that C.M. groomed Torres and knew that her conduct was
criminal and inappropriate. He asserted that “this not only is relevant but it goes to
motive to fabricate.”
The People argued that defense counsel was trying to offer both impeachment and
character evidence. Torres had not given notice of the evidence prior to trial, and if he
had, then the evidence would have been “402’d well in advance of trial.” The People
argued that there were no witnesses or documentary evidence substantiating the defense’s
claim that C.M. had committed a crime. In addition, the claimed crime would have
occurred over 10 years ago, so it was remote. The People argued that the probative value
of the evidence was outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.
The court again explained that it was excluding the proffered evidence because
“the probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that [its] submission
would . . . create undue prejudice and confuse the issues or mislead the jury.”
II. Exclusion of evidence regarding Uncle
The primary purpose of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation “‘is to secure
for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.’” (Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415
U.S. 308, 315-316, italics omitted.) “Cross-examination is the principal means by which
the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.” (Id. at p. 316.)
9
“[T]he cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the
witness,” including by “cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases,
prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness.” (Ibid.)
But the right to cross-examine a witness is not absolute. (People v. Pearson
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 454.) “‘A trial court may restrict defense cross-examination of an
adverse witness on the grounds stated in Evidence Code section 352.’ [Citations.]
Evidence Code section 352 gives the trial court discretion to ‘exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’” (People v. Villa (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 1042, 1051.) We review for abuse of discretion the court’s ruling under
Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 521.) We must
uphold the court’s ruling “‘unless it exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd manner.’” (Ibid.)
The court’s routine application of Evidence Code section 352 generally does not
implicate a defendant’s constitutional rights. (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518,
545.) “‘[U]nless the defendant can show that the prohibited cross-examination would
have produced “a significantly different impression of [the witnesses’] credibility”
[citation], the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate the
Sixth Amendment.’” (Id. at pp. 545-546.)
10
The court did not err under either Evidence Code section 352 or the Sixth
Amendment. As a threshold matter, Torres does not accurately characterize the court’s
evidentiary ruling. He claims that the court excluded evidence that C.M. abused him
when he was minor or “began having a sexual relationship with [him] when he was a
minor.” He asserts: “[W]hat if C.M. had begun an intimate relationship with [him] years
before the offenses, when he was 17 years old and she was in her mid-thirties and dating
his uncle? One might question who was jealous, who controlled and abused whom, and
whether C.M.’s inconsistent stories indeed were a symptom of abuse, or instead of
fabrication.”
The court barred cross-examination of C.M. about Uncle. But it did not bar cross-
examination of C.M. regarding when she met Torres, when their relationship began, or
whether they had an intimate relationship as early as 2012, when he was 17 years old.
Indeed, defense counsel was permitted to question C.M. on those topics. She testified
that their intimate relationship started in 2019, and she denied that their relationship
began earlier than that. Defense counsel then impeached her with photos of them in
2017, and C.M. acknowledged that she had been wrong but attributed it to her faulty
memory. Counsel also asked her if she met Torres in 2012 and if she recalled that he was
17 years old then, and she said that she did not remember either of those things.
Torres thus is incorrect that the court excluded all evidence or cross-examination
on those topics. He was permitted to cross-examine C.M., and he did not call any other
witnesses (such as Uncle) to testify that C.M. and Torres began an intimate relationship
11
in 2012. Nor did he offer to produce documentary evidence that the relationship started
then. But the court’s ruling did not prohibit Torres from introducing evidence concerning
the length of his relationship with C.M. or his age when the relationship started.
Rather, the ruling excluded evidence concerning C.M.’s claimed relationship with
Uncle. But on this record, such evidence had little probative value, and the court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding it. Even if C.M. had a relationship with Uncle and met
Torres through Uncle, those circumstances alone do not give rise to a reasonable
inference that C.M. became intimate with Torres when he was a minor. Nor do they give
rise to a reasonable inference that C.M. was a jealous, controlling, or abusive partner
years later. The claimed link between the excluded evidence (C.M.’s relationship with
Uncle) and any motive to lie about the abuse by Torres was tenuous at best. Evidence of
a claimed motive to fabricate “need not be admitted where the theory behind the alleged
motive to fabricate is highly tenuous, speculative, conjectural or based on ‘possibilities.’”
(People v. Johnson (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 163, 168.)
Given the limited probative value of the excluded evidence, the court did not
abuse its discretion by concluding that the probative value was substantially outweighed
by the danger of undue prejudice. For purposes of Evidence Code section 352,
“‘[p]rejudicial’ means evidence ‘“that uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against
a party as an individual, while having only slight probative value with regard to the
issues.”’” (People v. Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 521.) Evidence that C.M. dated
Uncle before Torres had the potential to bias the jury against her by portraying her as
12
promiscuous or inviting speculation that she was a “homewrecker” who would pit family
members against one another. We cannot say that the court’s decision was arbitrary or
capricious, particularly when the claimed relationship with Uncle was irrelevant alone,
and Torres offered no evidence that his relationship with C.M. began when he was a
minor.
Moreover, the court’s ruling did not violate Torres’s right of confrontation,
because he has not shown that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced a
significantly different impression of C.M.’s credibility. Torres asserts that evidence that
C.M. began a sexual relationship with him “when he was a minor and she was in her mid-
thirties may have left the jury with a different impression of C.M.’s credibility.” But
there is no indication that Torres had any such evidence—he did not proffer evidence that
their relationship began before 2017, when Torres was already an adult, and Torres was
not prohibited from introducing such evidence. C.M. denied that the relationship started
earlier than 2019. She said under cross-examination that she could not remember if she
met Torres in 2012. Assuming that cross-examination regarding Uncle would have
revealed that she met Torres as early as 2012, there is no reason to believe that she would
have testified to an intimate relationship with Torres then. And her testimony regarding
when they met and when their relationship began was already impeached by the
photographic evidence of them in 2017, but even that evidence did not show that their
relationship began when Torres was a minor.
13
In addition, Torres already had strong grounds for attacking C.M.’s credibility.
There were numerous occasions during direct examination when C.M. could not testify to
key details about Torres’s attacks, and she then recalled them only after the People used
her statements to officers to refresh her recollection. Indeed, she initially testified that
she could not recall anything at all about the January 2022 incident. Her statements were
also inconsistent as to several details. For instance, she testified at trial that Torres
pointed a gun at her head during the May 2022 incident, but she told officers that he
pointed the gun at her midsection. And her statements about how long he choked her and
the amount of force he used were inconsistent. During closing argument, defense counsel
repeatedly used C.M.’s memory lapses and inconsistent statements to argue that she was
lying about many things, including “when their relationship began, how the assault
happened, when the assault happened, [and] who was present for it.” We cannot say that
the jurors would have had a significantly different impression of her credibility if Torres
had been able to show that she met him through Uncle. The court therefore did not
violate Torres’s constitutional right of confrontation by prohibiting cross-examination
about Uncle.
The case on which Torres primarily relies, People v. Castaneda-Prado (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 1260 (Castaneda-Prado), is inapposite. The defendant in that case was
convicted of sexually abusing two children. (Id. at pp. 1266-1267.) At the preliminary
hearing, one of the victims testified that she filed a declaration accusing the defendant of
sexual abuse to help her mother obtain a “‘U visa,’ a type of visa that can provide legal
14
status for victims of certain crimes who assist in the investigation of those crimes.’” (Id.
at pp. 1267, 1271-1272.) The trial court acknowledged the relevance of the U visa
evidence to the defense “and at no point suggested that it was peripheral to the case” (id.
at p. 1286), but it nevertheless excluded the evidence under Evidence Code section 352.
(Castaneda-Prado, at p. 1267.)
Castaneda-Prado held that the trial court abused its discretion. (Castaneda-
Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1290.) The appellate court concluded that the U visa
evidence was highly probative as “bias evidence,” namely, evidence that a witness has
been offered inducements or expects benefits for their testimony. (Id. at p. 1285.) The
court found that there was an adequate foundation for cross-examining the victim about
any U visa, because “she admitted trying to help her mother obtain a U visa at the
preliminary hearing. Nothing else was necessary to provide a good faith basis to cross-
examine on the issue at trial.” (Id. at p. 1286.) And there was not a substantial risk of
undue prejudice or any of the other circumstances that would outweigh the significant
probative value of the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. (Castaneda-Prado, at
p. 1290.)
We disagree with Torres that this case “closely parallels” Castaneda-Prado. The
probative value of the U visa evidence in Castaneda-Prado was clear and significant.
The evidence tended to show that the victim expected a benefit for her testimony (the U
visa) and therefore suggested a motive to lie in order to obtain that benefit. Torres’s
theory appears to be that if his relationship with C.M. began when he was a minor, then
15
C.M. was controlling and continued to control him years later, and falsely accusing him
of abuse was a way of controlling and exerting power over him. But Torres was not
prohibited from introducing evidence that his relationship with C.M. began when he was
a minor, and the record contains no proffered evidence to that effect. The only evidence
that was excluded concerned Uncle, and that evidence does not “tend[] reasonably to
establish that [C.M.] has a motive to fabricate” the charged conduct in this case.
(Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1285.) The further inferential steps from
her alleged relationship with Uncle to her alleged control and power over Torres amount
to pure speculation. “Evidence of a witness’ conduct must unequivocally point to a
possible motive to fabricate testimony before it is admissible.” (People v. Johnson,
supra, 159 Cal.App.3d at p. 168.) Otherwise, it is not relevant.
For all of these reasons, Torres fails to show that the trial court erred by restricting
his cross-examination of C.M.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J. We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
FIELDS J.
16
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 or violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by excluding evidence of the victim's prior relationship with the defendant's uncle. The court properly determined that the evidence was of limited probative value and created a risk of undue prejudice and confusion of issues.
Issues
Did the trial court abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by excluding evidence of the victim's prior relationship with the defendant's uncle?
Did the exclusion of evidence regarding the victim's relationship with the defendant's uncle violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The court ruled that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice and/or the potential to confuse or mislead the jury.”
“The court’s routine application of Evidence Code section 352 generally does not implicate a defendant’s constitutional rights.”
“The claimed link between the excluded evidence (C.M.’s relationship with Uncle) and any motive to lie about the abuse by Torres was tenuous at best.”