Riaz v. La Rocca CA5

Filed 1/23/26 Riaz v. La Rocca CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

SAMREEN RIAZ, F088880 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. VCU298300) v.

LAWRENCE LA ROCCA, OPINION Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Bret D. Hillman, Judge. Samreen Riaz, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance for Defendant and Respondent. -ooOoo- Samreen Riaz appeals an order dismissing her lawsuit filed against her former counsel. She contends the trial court erred in vacating defaults and in granting an anti- SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). As explained below, Riaz’s brief is too deficient to merit meaningful review. Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court’s order.

BACKGROUND In an earlier case—Riaz v. Altura Centers for Health (F085852, Jul. 30, 2024 [nonpub. opn.] (Altura))—we upheld a verdict entered against Riaz where she had sued her former employer for wrongful termination. In that matter, Riaz was represented by Raoul Severo and Lawrence LaRocca—the subjects of this litigation. Severo and LaRocca, in the Altura case, filed declarations expressing doubt as to Riaz’s mental competence. Indeed, the attorneys fervently sought permission to withdraw from the case and withdrawal was ultimately granted. We concluded withdrawal was properly granted on direct appeal from that case. (Altura, supra, F085852.) The declarations from Severo and LaRocca in the Altura case generally form the basis for the complaint in this case. Riaz primarily complained her lawyers conspired with opposing counsel to undermine her allegations against the former employer by establishing her mental incompetence, and otherwise rendered deficient or adverse representation. Defaults were entered against both LaRocca and Severo on the bases Riaz had personally served them with a complaint and summons. LaRocca moved “to set aside the default and permit an answer to the complaint” because he was not in fact served. The trial court examined the facts and found there was neither personal service nor substituted service. It accordingly granted the motion on the basis default was void (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d)) and allowed LaRocca to file his “proposed answer[.]” The case against Severo concluded with substantially similar procedure and rulings.