B.E. v. Superior Court CA4/2 (2026) · DecisionDepot
B.E. v. Superior Court CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jan 15, 2026 No. E087024Unpublished
Filed 1/15/26 B.E. v. Superior Court CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
B.E.,
Petitioner, E087024
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIJ118486)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OPINION RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
Respondent;
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petitions for extraordinary writs. Malvina K.
Ovanezova, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, §21.) Petition denied.
Kathleen M. Peach for Petitioner B.E.
No appearance for Respondent.
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Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell and Larisa R-McKenna, Deputy
County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest
B.E. (mother) petitioned for an extraordinary writ after the juvenile court bypassed
family reunification services.1 Mother disputes the court’s finding that she failed to make
reasonable efforts to resolve the problems that led to her first child’s removal and argues
the court did not properly consider the children’s best interests. We deny the petition.
standard . . . is not synonymous with ‘cure.’ ” (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 1450, 1464.) “If the evidence suggests that despite a parent’s substantial
history of misconduct with prior children, there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the
relationship with the current child could be saved, the courts should always attempt to do
so.” (Ibid.)
However “[w]e do not read the ‘reasonable effort’ language in the bypass
provisions to mean that any effort by a parent . . . will constitute a reasonable effort.”
(R.T. v. Superior Court, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 914.) “It is certainly appropriate for
the juvenile court to consider the duration, extent and context of the parent’s efforts, as
well as any other factors relating to the quality and quantity of those efforts, when
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evaluating the effort for reasonableness. And while the degree of progress is not
the focus of the inquiry, a parent’s progress . . . may be considered to the extent it bears
on the reasonableness of the effort made.” (Ibid.)
“A court reviews an order denying reunification services under section 361.5,
subdivision (b) for substantial evidence.” (Cheryl P., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 96.)
“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional
findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court;
we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.]
“We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely
determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.
[Citations.] ‘ “[T]he [appellate] court must review the whole record in the light
most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [that the order is
appropriate].” ’ [Citations.] ” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Here, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support the court’s decision
to bypass reunification services. Mother had her parental rights to her first child
terminated in part because of her drug use and in part due to general neglect. Thereafter,
in 2013, she continued to have similar problems with L.E., who tested positive for
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methamphetamine upon birth. While the record contains no details of mother’s efforts to
get and remain clean after that, there was sufficient evidence that she did not do enough
to treat the problem. Mother admitted to the department that she was a “functioning
addict,” that she used fentanyl three or four days before the department first contacted her
in person, and that she was using during the course of this dependency. Mother appears
to be sober now, but the evidence of her continued struggles with drug use was sufficient
to allow the trial court to conclude this was too little, too late. Her neglect continued
through her daughter’s 2025 pregnancy. Accordingly, we conclude there was sufficient
evidence to allow the court to bypass reunification services under section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(11).
We also conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
reunification services were not in the best interests of the children.
Section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2) states “[t]he court shall not order reunification
for a parent or guardian described in paragraph . . . (11) . . . of subdivision (b) unless the
court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of
the child.” As noted above, “[w]hen the court determines a bypass provision applies, the
general rule favoring reunification is replaced with a legislative presumption that
reunification services would be an unwise use of governmental resources.” (In re S.B.
(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 612, 622.) Therefore “[t]he burden is on the parent to show that
reunification would serve the best interests of the child.” (Id. at p. 623.) “A court called
upon to determine whether reunification would be in the child’s best interest may
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consider a parent’s current efforts and fitness as well as the parent’s history. [Citation.]
Additional factors for the juvenile court to consider when determining whether a child’s
best interest will be served by pursuing reunification include[:] the gravity of the
problem that led to the dependency; the strength of the relative bonds between the child
and both the parent and caretakers; and the child’s need for stability and continuity,
which is of paramount concern.” (Id. at pp. 622-623.)
“We review the juvenile court’s findings for substantial evidence, and the juvenile
court’s decision[-]making process based on those findings for abuse of discretion.” (San
Joaquin Human Services Agency v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 215, 223.)
“The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect
the child’s interests and to fashion a dispositional order accordingly. On appeal, this
determination cannot be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (In re Baby Boy H.
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.)2
The court did not abuse its discretion by denying mother reunification services. It
was mother’s burden to convince the court to do otherwise. In arguing she met that
burden, mother points to the children’s wishes, as communicated by the maternal aunt’s
2 In her petition mother argues the court should have considered the factors outlined in section 361.5, subdivision (h). However, it appears mother intended to reference section 361.5, subdivision (i). Regardless, neither applies here. Subdivision (h) is not relevant in this case, and subdivision (i) only applies when the court is contemplating bypassing reunification services under subdivisions (b)(6) or (b)(7). Though the department recommended bypassing reunification services under subdivision (b)(6), the court ultimately bypassed reunification services under subdivision (b)(11). Therefore, the court did not need to consider the factors outlined in section 361.5, subdivision (i).
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July letter expressing their desire to be reunified. However, a child’s bond with their
parent cannot be the sole basis for finding that further services would be in their interest.
(In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229.) On the other hand, there was
affirmative evidence that reunification would not be in the children’s best interests. The
court was concerned about mother’s failure to protect L.E. despite warning signs that she
was being abused. In particular, the court said “the part I can’t get over . . . [t]hat picture
of [L.E.] sleeping in the bed with an unrelated adult, at least without a top, is rather
concerning, and [mother] didn’t do anything about it.” The court’s reasonable concern
that mother was not sufficiently protective of L.E. or skeptical of R.G. is itself sufficient
basis to believe that mother had not met her burden to demonstrate reunification would be
in her children’s best interests. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that reunification would not be in the children’s best interests.