California Court of Appeal Jan 13, 2026 No. E084217Unpublished
Filed 1/13/26 P. v. Jones CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084217
v. (Super.Ct.No. FMB23000201)
AARON DONTE JONES, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Rasheed M.
Alexander, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Melanie L. Skehar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Caelle Oetting, Paige B.
Hazard and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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A jury convicted Aaron Donte Jones of one count of first degree burglary. (Pen.
Code, §§ 459, 460; unlabeled statutory references are to this code.) On appeal, he
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction and contends that the
trial court gave the jury an erroneous instruction. We correct an error in the abstract of
in favor of the judgment.” (Ibid.) “Matters of credibility of witnesses and the weight of
the evidence are ‘“‘the exclusive province’”’ of the trier of fact.” (Ibid.) “‘If the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing
court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding
does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117,
1124 (Perez); People v. Rodriguez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1106.)
Section 459 defines burglary as entering “any house . . . with intent to commit
grand or petit larceny.” There are two degrees of burglary. (§ 460, subds. (a)-(b).)
“Every burglary of an inhabited dwelling house . . . is burglary of the first degree.”
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(§ 460, subd. (a) (section 460(a)).) “All other kinds of burglary are of the second
degree.” (§ 460, subd. (b).) The statutory definition of the term “‘inhabited’” is
“currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.” (§ 459.)
“‘Dwelling house’” is not defined.” (Corona v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th
950, 955.)
Our Supreme Court has recognized that the term “‘inhabited dwelling house’” as
used in section 460(a) “means a ‘structure where people ordinarily live and which is
currently being used for dwelling purposes. [Citation.] A place is an inhabited dwelling
if a person with possessory rights uses the place as sleeping quarters intending to
continue doing so in the future.’” (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 776 (Cruz),
quoting People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 987 (Fleetwood).) “The
‘“‘inhabited-uninhabited’ dichotomy turns not on the immediate presence or absence of
some person but rather on the character of the use of the building.”’” (People v.
DeRouen (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 86, 91-92 (DeRouen), disapproved on another ground in
People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 864-866; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287,
355 (Hughes).) The issue of whether a dwelling is inhabited is a question of fact for the
jury to resolve. (People v. Burkett (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 572, 582 (Burkett).)
In DeRouen, the defendant argued that vacation or second homes that “were not
the victims’ ‘regular, primary living quarters’” did not qualify as inhabited under sections
459 and 460, because there was no evidence that any of the victims intended to return to
their homes for more than an overnight visit. (DeRouen, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 90-
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91.) The Court of Appeal disagreed. (Id. at pp. 91-92.) Each of the victims had testified
that they occupied their vacation or secondary home “sporadically.” (Id. at p. 92.) The
court concluded that “the occupant of a vacation home reasonably expects the same
protection from unauthorized intrusions as the occupant of any other residence.” (Ibid.)
The court also concluded that “[t]here was ample evidence to support the jury’s findings
the vacation or second homes were inhabited dwellings to sustain [the] defendant’s
convictions for multiple burglaries in the first degree.” (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence supports the jury’s determination that the Aspen Drive
residence was inhabited when Jones burglarized it. Nguyen testified that he and his
family used the home as a personal vacation home and had stayed there overnight,
sometimes for an entire weekend. The jury could reasonably infer from Nguyen’s
testimony about the total amount of time that he spent at the property that the family used
the property to vacation only occasionally or sporadically. But Nguyen testified that
when he last stayed at the Aspen Drive residence he planned to return to stay overnight in
the future. That testimony constitutes substantial evidence that the Aspen Drive
residence was an inhabited dwelling, because “‘a person with possessory rights use[d] the
place as sleeping quarters intending to continue doing so in the future.’” (Cruz, supra, 13
Cal.4th at p. 776; Fleetwood, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 987; see also People v.
Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052 [testimony of a single witness can constitute
substantial evidence].)
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Citing DeRouen, Jones acknowledges that “even if the owner is not presently
using the vacation home,” “a vacation home that the owner uses only occasionally”
“remains inhabited.” Nevertheless, Jones argues that the evidence showed that the Aspen
Drive property was “used solely as an Airbnb rental” and “that Nguyen operated the
Aspen Drive property as a short-term vacation rental, not a personal vacation home.”
The record is to the contrary. Jones does not mention Nguyen’s testimony that he
brought his family to the property “as a vacation.”
In his reply brief, Jones acknowledges that there is evidence that “on extremely
rare occasions” Nguyen used the Aspen Drive property for personal vacation purposes.
But Jones emphasizes that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that Nguyen spent
a very limited amount of time at the property in order to manage the property as a
vacation rental. Jones argues that because the Aspen Drive property was used primarily
as an Airbnb, it is more akin to a hotel or motel room and hence does not qualify as
inhabited unless it is occupied by a guest when burglarized. (See People v. Villalobos
(2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 310, 321 [“a hotel or motel room that is being used for purposes
of habitation, regardless of the duration of the habitation, is an inhabited dwelling for
purposes of first degree robbery and burglary”].) The record does contain substantial
evidence that the Aspen Drive property was used as a rental property and was not
occupied by a renter when burglarized, and the jury was free to disregard Nguyen’s
testimony that he also treated the property as a personal vacation home. (People v. Disa
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 654, 668.)
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But “that is not the test.” (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1143.) The issue
of habitation was a question of fact for the jury to resolve. (Burkett, supra, 220
Cal.App.4th at p. 582.) The issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the
jury’s determination. And in analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether substantial
evidence supports the verdict regardless of whether conflicting evidence might support a
contrary result. (People v. Riley (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1165-1166.) We do not
ask whether “‘the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary
finding.’” (Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1124; Ceja, at p. 1143.) Because substantial
evidence supports the jury’s determination, we reject Jones’s argument that the evidence
was insufficient because it could have supported a different result.
II. Alleged instructional error
The trial court instructed the jury with the form instruction on the degrees of
burglary as follows: “First degree burglary is the burglary of an inhabited house, or room
within a house. [¶] A house is inhabited if someone uses it as a dwelling, whether or not
someone is inside at the time of the alleged entry.” (CALCRIM No. 1701.) Over
defense objection, the court gave the following additional instruction: “A house is a
dwelling if an owner stays at the residence with the intent to stay in the future.” On
appeal, Jones contends that the added language misstates the law, so he argues that the
trial court prejudicially erred by giving the modified instruction. We independently
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review claims of instructional error. (People v. Rodriguez (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1062,
1066.)
Jones contends that the added language “misstated the law by suggesting that an
owner’s future intent defines inhabitation, which is incorrect.”1 The contention fails.
The modified instruction that “[a] house is a dwelling if an owner stays at the residence
with the intent to stay in the future” closely tracks the principle articulated in Fleetwood
that “[a] place is an inhabited dwelling if a person with possessory rights uses the place as
sleeping quarters intending to continue doing so in the future.” (Fleetwood, supra, 171
Cal.App.3d at p. 987.) The Supreme Court quoted that principle with approval in Cruz.
(Cruz, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 776.) The instruction is a simplified version of the
principle in that it replaces (1) “a person with possessory rights” (Fleetwood, at p. 987)
with “owner”, (2) “uses the place as sleeping quarters” (ibid.) with “stays at the
residence,” and (3) “intending to continue doing so in the future” (ibid.) with “with the
1 Jones also makes the following arguments: (1) “Had the jury been properly instructed that future intent does not equate to present inhabitation, it would have regarded the home in question as a vacation rental, analogous to a hotel, where actual guest occupancy for repose is necessary to establish that it is inhabited,” and (2) “[t]he jury needed to be informed that, contrary to the People’s statements, present use is determinative rather than past or future intended use and merely declaring an intent to stay at some point is insufficient.” Jones did not ask the trial court to give the jury such instructions, and the court does not have a sua sponte obligation to give the jury a pinpoint instruction on the defense’s theory of the case. (Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 361.) Jones therefore forfeited the issue. (People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1001.)
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intent to stay in the future.” Because the instruction closely tracks the language of
Fleetwood and Cruz, it is an accurate statement of the law.2
Relying on Burkett and People v. Marquez (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 797, Jones
argues that “case law unequivocally holds that an owner’s stated future intent does not
satisfy the requirement for establishing a dwelling as inhabited.” The argument fails
because the challenged instruction did not say that an owner’s future intent is sufficient
on its own to show that a house is inhabited. Rather, the instruction correctly explains
that if the owner stays at the house with the intent to do so in the future, then the house is
inhabited. Burkett and Marquez do not hold to the contrary. (Burkett, supra, 220
Cal.App.4th at p. 582; Marquez, at p. 802.)
III. Abstract of judgment
At sentencing, the court imposed two consecutive five-year enhancements for
prior serious felony convictions. (§ 667, subd. (a)(1) (section 667(a)(1)).) The People
point out that the abstract of judgment erroneously reflects that Jones received one 10-
year enhancement under section 667(a)(1) for a prior serious felony conviction. We
agree with the People’s characterization of the abstract. We accordingly direct the trial
court to prepare a corrected abstract reflecting that the trial court imposed two
2 In his reply brief, Jones argues that the instruction “merged ‘dwelling’ with ‘inhabited,’ making future intent dispositive, which is both legally incorrect and constitutionally impermissible.” The argument is meritless. Section 459 provides that “‘inhabited’ means currently being used for dwelling purposes,” and the principle stated in the jury instruction is a legally correct explication of “currently being used for dwelling purposes,” as explained in Fleetwood and Cruz.
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consecutive five-year serious felony enhancements. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26
Cal.4th 181, 185-187.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare a corrected
abstract of judgment to reflect that Jones received two consecutive five-year
enhancements for prior serious felony convictions under section 667(a)(1), rather than
one 10-year enhancement. The trial court is further directed to forward a copy of the
corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the first degree burglary conviction because the owner's occasional use of the property as a vacation home, combined with his intent to return, established it as an inhabited dwelling. The court also found no instructional error regarding the definition of an inhabited dwelling and ordered a correction to the abstract of judgment.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that the residence was an inhabited dwelling for purposes of first degree burglary.
Whether the trial court's modified jury instruction regarding the definition of an inhabited dwelling misstated the law.
Disposition. Affirmed as modified.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“A place is an inhabited dwelling if a person with possessory rights uses the place as sleeping quarters intending to continue doing so in the future.”
“Substantial evidence supports the jury’s determination that the Aspen Drive residence was inhabited when Jones burglarized it.”
“Because the instruction closely tracks the language of Fleetwood and Cruz, it is an accurate statement of the law.”