California Court of Appeal Jan 8, 2026 No. E085893Unpublished
Filed 1/8/26 In re A.S. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re A.S. et al, Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E085893
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPSW2400124)
v.
P.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In re A.S. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E086322
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPSW2400124)
v. OPINION
P.S. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
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APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean P. Crandell, Judge.
Affirmed.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant P.S.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant S.R.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Assistant County Counsel, and
Julie Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
To prevail in this juvenile dependency appeal, the parents must demonstrate that
the record compelled a finding that offering family reunification services would have
been in the children’s best interests. The record does not compel such a finding, so we 1 affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A.S. (born 2020), L.R. (born 2021), and H.R. (born 2023) resided with defendant
and appellant P.S. (Mother) in Hemet. L.R. and H.R.’s father is defendant and appellant
S.R. (Father), but A.S. has a different father who is not a party to this appeal.
In April 2024, plaintiff and respondent Riverside County Department of Public
Social Services (the department) was informed that two of Father’s other children—step-
siblings of L.R. and H.R.—had been removed from Father’s care in Orange County.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
Those step-siblings reported that Father sometimes punished L.R. by burning him with a
cigarette lighter. Mother said that although Father did not live with A.S., L.R., and H.R.,
he frequently took care of them while Mother was at work. A medical summary
following an urgent care visit indicated that L.R. had scars on his stomach and on both
legs. Mother gave inconsistent stories regarding those scars, telling the social worker that
L.R. obtained the injuries from getting “wrapped up in dog wire” in the backyard but
telling the urgent care clinic that she did not know where they came from.
The Department filed section 300 petitions alleging that A.S., L.R., and H.R. were
at risk of serious physical harm due to the parents’ failure to adequately supervise them.
(See § 300, subd. (b)(1).) Initially, L.R. was placed in foster care, while A.S. and H.R.
were allowed to remain at home. However, A.S. soon revealed that both her parents had
hit her with a belt and “put fire on her hand,” and a medical review of A.S. and L.R.
indicated scars and symptoms that the examiner suspected were the result of physical
abuse, so all three children were soon moved into foster care. Specifically, L.R. had
“numerous curvilinear and loop pattern scars consistent with past blows with a fold-able
object such as a cord, and it is likely that some of the line impacts caused the skin to
bleed,” and A.S. had blood settling in both eyes consistent with an impact to the
forehead. By May 2024, the Department had filed amended petitions alleging that A.S.
and L.R., both less than five years old, suffered severe physical abuse from a parent (see
§ 300, subds. (a), (e)) and that there was a substantial risk H.R. would be similarly abused
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(see § 300, subd. (j)). Second amended petitions were later filed to revise allegations
regarding A.S.’s father.
At the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing in June, the juvenile court
found all allegations to be true. It also bypassed family reunification services, finding 2 that sections 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (b)(6) applied. It accordingly set the matter
for a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.
In November, Mother filed section 388 modification petitions requesting family
reunification services. She alleged that she had completed a 16-week anger management
program, parenting classes, had enrolled in individual counseling, obtained employment,
and ended her relationship with Father.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court denied the petitions in March
2025. It terminated both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights over the children in June
2025.
2 Under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (b)(6), a juvenile court need not provide reunification services to a parent if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that “the child was brought within the jurisdiction of the court under subdivision (e) of Section 300 because of the conduct of that parent” or that “the child has been adjudicated a dependent pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of . . . the infliction of severe physical harm to the child, a sibling, or a half sibling by a parent or guardian . . . and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent.”
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II. DISCUSSION
Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in denying her modification petitions,
and Father filed an opening brief adopting Mother’s arguments without raising additional
claims of error. We thus focus on what section 388 requires.
“Section 388 provides for modification of juvenile court orders when the moving
party presents new evidence or a change of circumstance and demonstrates modification
of the previous order is in the child’s best interest.” (In re Malick T. (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1109, 1122; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570.) As is the case here,
when a party petitions to modify a bypass finding under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4),
(b)(5), or (b)(6), the court “shall modify the order . . . only if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the proposed change is in the best interests of the child.”
(§ 388, subd. (a)(2).) The burden of proof is on the moving party. (In re S.J. (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 953, 959.)
In denying the petitions, the juvenile court determined that Mother had not shown
by clear and convincing evidence that reunification services would be in the best interest
of the children. “We generally apply the familiar substantial evidence test when the
sufficiency of the evidence is at issue on appeal.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th
1517, 1527, disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th
989, 1010, fn. 7.) “But this test is typically implicated when a defendant contends that
the plaintiff succeeded at trial in spite of insufficient evidence. In the case where the trier
of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did
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not carry the burden and that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-
proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. This follows because
such a characterization is conceptually one that allows an attack on (1) the evidence
supporting the party who had no burden of proof, and (2) the trier of fact’s unassailable
conclusion that the party with the burden did not prove one or more elements of the
case.” (In re I.W., supra, at p. 1528.) “Thus, where the issue on appeal turns on a failure
of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically,
the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and
unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial 3 determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’” (Ibid.)
The record does not compel a finding that reunification services were in the
children’s best interests. “First, and probably most basic, any modification under section
388 must consider the seriousness of the reason for the dependency in the first place. Not
all reasons for initial dependency jurisdiction are equal from the point of view of a child’s
interests.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530.) As the juvenile court
noted when denying the petitions, the circumstances giving rise to court involvement
3 Broadly, the standard of review on a section 388 petition is abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) But because the petitions here could only have been granted if clear and convincing evidence supported a finding, and the petitions were denied, the standard of review we focus on here is whether that finding was compelled as a matter of law.
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were serious: “We have young children as little as two years of age being struck with
instruments like cords, belts, and reports that the parents utilized lighters or other hot
objects to burn them as punishment. The photographs attached to the various reports
show there were marks on the children’s bodies, some of which the expert indicated
would have been bleeding at the time they were inflicted.” Moreover, as the juvenile
court noted, “both parents actively participated in the abuse,” and both “[p]arents,
including mother, provided explanations that were inconsistent with the opinions of the
experts and forensic examiners.”
Although Mother has since completed multiple parenting programs and her visits
with the children generally went well—the juvenile court noted that Mother “was
exhibiting behavior that one would want her to during those visits”—the evidence on the
strength of Mother’s bond with the children is conflicting at best. (See In re Kimberly F.,
supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531 [“the strength of the existing bond between the parent
and child” is another “important factor”].) Mother emphasizes that in January 2025, A.S.
told the social worker that “she wanted to live with her mother as she missed her.” While
that statement is true, Mother fails to mention that A.S. quickly revised her answer to
state that she would prefer to live with the caregiver after L.R. stated that he preferred the
caregiver. According to one of the department’s reports: “On January 9, 2025, I spoke to
the children, [A.S. and L.R.], at their current placement. When [A.S.] was first asked
about her desire to return to her mother’s home, she paused and look[ed] confused. She
later commented that she wanted to live with her mother as she missed her. I asked
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[A.S.] what she likes about visits with her mother, and she reported she likes how the
mother brings toys and food to visits, and she likes seeing the mother. [¶] When I asked
[L.R.] if he wanted to live with his mother or the caregiver, he stated, ‘Marie’s House’
(which is the caregiver). Then [L.R.] proceeded to go to the caregiver and hug her.
Afterwards, [A.S.] revisited the conversation and indicated that she wanted to remain
with her caregiver. I asked her, ‘So do you want to live with mom or Marie’s house?’
She stated, ‘Marie’s House!’ As I documented her response in my notebook, [A.S.]
asked, ‘Does that say I want to live here?’ I said, ‘Yes.’ Then asked, ‘Is that okay? Is
that what you want?’ [A.S.] expressed, ‘Yes, that is okay.’”
Moreover, in a March 2025 report, the department noted concerns about the
children’s behavior: “[D]uring visitations, the children are always eager to see what the
mother brings them, and it is hard to differentiate whether they are happy and excited to
see the mother or the material things she provides to them. [A.S.], during every visit,
asks the mother if she brought toys for her and he[r] siblings. When the mother tells
[A.S.] she did not bring new toys, [A.S] appears sad. [L.R.] is constantly trying to open
all the items the mother brings for them. Also, [L.R.] appears to be rebellious against the
mother’s request for help or to behave. [H.R] had a tantrum while being taken to the
visitation room, to the point where her former caregiver had to pick her up and place her
in the room with the mother and the siblings. During that visit [H.R.] was seen looking
outside the door of the room and would constantly say what appeared to be ‘Marie,’
which was the former caregiver’s name. Additionally, during a visit on February 27,
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2025, [A.S] repeatedly slapped the mother . . . and had a tantrum, where the mother was
unable to comfort her and calm her down.” This shows that, as late as when the juvenile
court was deciding the modification petitions, Mother’s bonds with the children were
arguably dependent on whether she bought gifts for them, and Mother had difficulty
controlling their behavior.
Finally, the record suggests that Mother was not being fully transparent with the
department about her capacity to provide for the children. In a January 2025 report, the
department noted that Mother “reported that she would be relying on friends and
members of her church to watch her children while she [was] at work” but “refused to
provide the name of her church or potential church members who would interact and
provide care for her children.” Mother also “reported that she has been diagnosed with
anxiety and adjustment depression” but was “unable to provide any documentation as to
her diagnosis or the providers[’] contact information.” The department’s concerns grew
over the next two months. In its March 2025 report, it said Mother “has not been
forthcoming and has been evasive to the Department’s questions and requests[] regarding
her home assessment, employment, and availability.” Although the department
attempted to make unannounced home visits, Mother “provided excuses as to the reason
why she is not home or why she did not answer the door.” The department then detailed
two such instances, one where Mother texted the social worker to say that she had been
sleeping, and another where Mother said she was at an appointment (but “was evasive to
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answer” questions about appointment details). The department also noted that Mother
would be “dismissive” or “not respond” when asked about her work schedule.
In sum, “[t]his is simply not a case where undisputed facts lead to only one
conclusion.” (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1529.) Jurisdiction over the
children was premised on severe physical abuse, the evidence on the children’s bond with
Mother was mixed, and there were questions about mother’s honesty and ability to
provide for the children. The parents have not shown that the trial court erred in denying
Mother’s modification petitions.
III. DISPOSITION
The March 27, 2025 orders denying the section 388 petitions and the June 12,
2025 order terminating parental rights are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
MENETREZ J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the denial of the parents' section 388 modification petitions and the termination of parental rights, finding that the record did not compel a conclusion that reunification services were in the children's best interests.
Issues
Whether the juvenile court erred in denying the parents' section 388 petitions for modification to provide family reunification services.
Whether the evidence compelled a finding that reunification services were in the children's best interests as a matter of law.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The record does not compel a finding that reunification services were in the children’s best interests.”
“The parents have not shown that the trial court erred in denying Mother’s modification petitions.”