California Court of Appeal Jan 8, 2026 No. E082921Unpublished
Filed 1/8/26 Meza v. Shah CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ERIK MEZA,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E082921
v. (Super.Ct.No. CVRI2105350)
PRIYA UDAY SHAH, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Daniel A. Ottolia, Judge.
Affirmed.
Erik Meza, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Gates, Gonter, Guy, Proudfoot & Muench, LLP, Richard A. Muench and Jasmine
Ng, for Defendant and Respondent.
A jury returned a defense verdict in appellant Erik Meza’s personal injury action—
stemming from a car accident—against defendant and respondent Priya Uday Shah. On
appeal, Meza contends (1) the jury verdict is unjustified, (2) defense counsel misled the
jury with evidence of Meza’s pre-existing injuries from a 2017 incident, (3) his counsel
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presented a weak defense, and (4) this court should review the trial process for any legal
raised or only supported by authority on reply are deemed waived. (Li v. Superior Court
(2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 836, 865.) Moreover, the rules of appellate procedure apply to
appellants even though they are representing themselves on appeal. (Huang v. Hanks
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 179, 183, fn. 1.)
Applying these principles, we conclude Meza did not meet his burden as appellant
of overcoming the basic presumption that the defense verdict is correct.
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B. The Jury Verdict is Unjustified.
Meza contends the jury’s verdict was “unjustif[ied]” because (1) the defense
“misinformed the jury by using witnesses that were biased in this case supporting
[Shah],” (2) the defense filed motions regarding the bills and expenses, (3) the trial court
failed to admit the name of Shah’s insurance company, and (4) the “court did not admit
the bill of MedFin payments.”2 It appears Meza is challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence.
When an appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of
fact, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (Schmidt v. Superior Court
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581.) Under that standard of review, we accept all evidence
that supports the judgment, disregard contrary evidence, and draw all reasonable
inferences to uphold the judgment. (Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2015)
237 Cal.App.4th 193, 213.) “It is not our role to reweigh the evidence, redetermine the
credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the testimony, and we will not disturb
the judgment if there is evidence to support it.” (Ibid.)
The appellant has a duty to provide a fair summary of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the judgment. (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th
1640, 1658.) To meet this burden, the appellant cannot recite only favorable evidence but
2 He cites Uspenskaya v. Meline (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 996. In that case, the court of appeal held that evidence of unpaid medical bills is admissible to show the reasonable value of medical services, but the amount paid by a third-party factoring company (such as MedFin) is inadmissible unless there is a demonstrated nexus between the payment and the reasonable value of the services. (Id. at p. 1007.)
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must set forth all the material evidence on the point. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon
(1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881; Roemer v. Pappas (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 201, 208 [“A party
who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a particular finding must
summarize the evidence on that point, favorable and unfavorable, and show how and why
it is insufficient.”].) “As with all substantial evidence challenges, an appellant
challenging [a finding of fact] must lay out the evidence favorable to the other side and
show why it is lacking. Failure to do so is fatal. A reviewing court will not
independently review the record to make up for appellant’s failure to carry his burden.”
(Defend the Bay v. City of Irvine (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1266.)
Here, Meza offers little argument and no citations to the record. He has therefore
failed to make the demonstration required of a party who seeks reversal on the ground of
insufficiency of the evidence. His claim is waived.
C. Defense Counsel did not Mislead the Jury.
Meza contends defense counsel misled the jury with evidence of his pre-existing
injuries from a 2017 incident, and the trial court erred in admitting this evidence. We
reject his contentions. Evidence of prior injuries or claims of injury is admissible when
relevant on the issue of damages where the plaintiff claims similar injuries in the present
case. (Brown v. Affonso (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 235, 238-239; Prichard v. Veterans Cab
Co. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 727, 733-734.) Meza’s primary complaint from the accident was
that he suffered a back injury. Evidence of his prior back injury was relevant.
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D. Weak Defense for Meza.
This issue is difficult to understand; however, it appears Meza is arguing his trial
counsel was ineffective. He faults counsel for failing to successfully challenge the
admission of evidence of his previous injuries and expose Shah’s alleged mental
instability at the time of the accident suggesting she “was under some impaired driving
conditions.” However, he does not cite, and we are unaware of, any case law holding that
his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel constitute grounds for reversal of a
defense verdict in a personal injury case. Accordingly, he has not carried his burden on
this issue.
E. Unassisted Review of the Trial for any Legal Error that Could Change the
Outcome.
Finally, Meza asks this court “to review the trial process and see if there was any
legal information that was used mistakenly by the defendant party and confused the jury.”
We do not, nor will not, perform an independent, unassisted review of the record in
search of error. (McComber v. Wells, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 522.)
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III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is to recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MILLER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the defense verdict in a personal injury action, holding that the appellant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating error or providing sufficient legal analysis and record citations to support his claims.
Issues
Whether the jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.
Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the plaintiff's pre-existing injuries.
Whether ineffective assistance of trial counsel is a valid ground for reversal in a civil personal injury case.
Whether the appellate court must perform an independent review of the trial record for unassigned errors.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude Meza did not meet his burden as appellant of overcoming the basic presumption that the defense verdict is correct.”
“Evidence of prior injuries or claims of injury is admissible when relevant on the issue of damages where the plaintiff claims similar injuries in the present case.”
“We do not, nor will not, perform an independent, unassisted review of the record in search of error.”