California Court of Appeal Jan 7, 2026 No. E084696Unpublished
Filed 1/7/26 P. v. Salas CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084696
v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV21004537)
VICTOR MANUEL SALAS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Joseph B. Widman,
Judge. Affirmed.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Brendon Marshall,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Victor Manuel Salas appeals from the judgment entered after he pled no contest to
possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon. (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, subd. (a)(1),
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30305, subd. (a)(1); unlabeled statutory citations are to this code.) He contends that the
trial court erred by denying his motion to quash the search warrant that led to his arrest,
automatic handguns, machine pistols and any ammunition, holsters, carrying cases,
accessories, clips and magazines for the above listed items. (8) All documents
identifying co-conspirators. (9) Cameras, monitors, and all items related to video
surveillance equipment. [¶] And articles of personal property tending to establish the
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identity of persons in control of premises, vehicles, storage areas and containers being
searched, consisting of, but not limited to, utility company receipts, rent receipts,
addressed envelopes and keys and to SEIZE it if found and bring it forthwith before me,
or this court, at the courthouse of this court.”
The warrant was issued on June 18, 2021. The search pursuant to the warrant led
to recovery of the water pump, but the other stolen items were not found.
II. The second search warrant
On June 19, 2021, Falconieri sought a second search warrant to recover “several
outstanding stolen power tools that were taken from the victim’s property.” In his
supporting affidavit, Falconieri attested that “[a]pproximately two weeks ago, the victim
advised his construction site was burglarized, and several power tools and vehicles were
stolen.” “The victim stated approximately two days prior to the burglary, he observed a
very distinct GMC truck with a black cab, white rear and front fenders, a ball hitch, and
large BF Goodrich tires driving slowly past his property for an unknown reason.” “Due
to the initial theft approximately two weeks ago, the victim placed a discreet tracker on
this power tool” on the property, and the power tool was stolen on June 18, 2021. The
victim tracked the power tool to an address in Fontana. Falconieri affirmed that he
observed “the site of the burglary, and [he] noticed several large tire tracks which
matched the tracks of a BF Goodrich tire”; the victim reported that “none of his
company’s trucks have BF Goodrich tires.” Falconieri surveilled the area of the Fontana
address, and he “immediately observed a full size GMC truck with a black cab, white
front and rear fenders, a ball hitch on the back, and large BF Goodrich tires. This truck
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was extremely distinct in its paint job and modifications, and [Falconieri had] never
observed any truck similar to it.” He believed that because the truck was parked near the
“ping of the tracker,” the truck “was possibly involved in the burglary of the power
tools.”
Falconieri stated that a records check of the GMC truck showed that it was
registered to Daniel Salas (Daniel) at an apartment with an address “directly next door” to
the residence where the water pump had been found pursuant to the first warrant.
Falconieri conducted a records check for Daniel and “discovered he has a history
of property theft,” and the address on his driver’s license was the same address where the
truck was registered. Falconieri attested that many of the missing power tools were
“small enough to be concealed inside [Daniel’s] apartment or truck.”
Falconieri described the property to be searched as the apartment with the address
on Daniel’s driver’s license, including “all rooms, attics, basements and other parts
therein, and the surrounding grounds and any garages, storerooms and outbuildings of
any kind located thereon. Vehicles described as follows: Any vehicles and persons
located within the property or on the property.” Falconieri described the property to be
seized in the same manner as described in the first warrant.
The warrant was issued on June 19, 2021. During the search pursuant to the
warrant, officers discovered a firearm and ammunition in a dresser in Salas’s bedroom in
the apartment.
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III. The preliminary hearing
At the preliminary hearing in March 2022, Falconieri testified that on June 25,
2021, he conducted the search pursuant to the second search warrant. Salas and a woman
were present in the apartment at the time. Falconieri testified that he searched the middle
bedroom and found “several pieces of mail addressed to Salas.” He also found “a
functioning firearm and it was operational. And it had 13 rounds of ammunition in the
magazine. And the magazine was inserted into the firearm when I located it.” He
testified that after he read Salas his rights, Salas admitted to “residing in the middle
bedroom” and that he knew “about the firearm in his dresser.”
On cross-examination, Falconieri testified that the investigation was related to
“[s]everal [stolen] power tools.” He testified that the dresser drawer where he found the
firearm and ammunition was “about two feet wide and a foot deep back into the dresser.”
He also testified that Daniel “lives at the location” and that “[t]he truck was registered to
Daniel.”
Following the preliminary hearing, the People charged Salas with one count of
possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of section 29800, subdivision (a)(1), and
one count of unlawful possession of ammunition in violation of section 30305,
subdivision (a)(1).
IV. Motion to quash the second search warrant
In March 2023, Salas filed a motion to quash the second search warrant. He
argued that the second search warrant “fail[ed] to establish probable cause for its
issuance, and a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the affidavit was
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insufficient and would not have applied for a warrant.” He contended that “[t]the
warrant, on its face, fails to establish probable cause because Officer Falconieri’s claim
that a BF Goodrich tire made the impression or track at the location of the alleged theft is
obviously false; the officer’s claim is without explanation and completely unsupported by
experience or expertise. Accordingly, the officer could not have acted in good faith in
either seeking or executing the search warrant.”
At the hearing on Salas’s motion, the court stated that its “tentative opinion on [the
motion to quash the second warrant] is that there is probable cause. That there was a
substantial basis for the magistrate to find probable cause in the four corners of the
warrant. Essentially, you have a situation where the victim gave a very, very detailed
description of the vehicle, that the victim told the officer two days prior to the earlier
burglary had slowly driven past his property and out of view. Plainly, the victim was
suspicious of the truck and was giving his information to the police as essentially a lead
in connection with that burglary from two weeks earlier, and also the new burglary which
had just taken place the same day as the report to the police June 18th. [¶] The
description of the truck was very detailed. It was described in the warrant as a very
distinct GMC truck with a black cab, white rear and front fenders, a ball hitch, and large
BF[ ]Goodrich tires. The officer I believe later described it as extremely distinct in its
paint job and modifications. Adding, ‘I have never observed any truck similar to it.’ So
the police go to where the tracker was beeping from or signaling from and of all the
places in the county or the world where this particular truck was parked, it was parked at
the same place basically where the tracker was beeping. [¶] Under the circumstances,
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the officer had good reason in the Court’s view to strongly suspect that that truck was
involved in one or both of these burglaries. Even putting aside the track marks. I agree
with the defense that there is a lack of foundation for the track marks statements made by
the officer in the affidavit. There is just insufficient foundation. The officer states he’s
done a hundred grand theft auto investigations including arrests and interviews, including
learning about how—trends of how cars are stolen, et cetera. But there’s nothing about
any expertise for tire mark identification. So I am not considering the track mark—the
tire mark evidence in deciding whether there is probable cause. I don’t give any weight
to it because I think it lacks foundation. But the rest of the warrant, I think does meet the
standard. [¶] Also, adding to the fact that this very distinct truck was at the same
location where it was beeping, subsequent investigation set forth in the affidavit stated
that the owner of the vehicle Daniel Salas has a history of property theft in the past
according to a records check.” The court concluded that “looking at the four corners and
discounting or basically reading out practically the tire mark issue, I still think that the
motion should be denied under the applicable standards. That’s my tentative.”
Defense counsel argued that the second warrant was “anything but specific. This
had absolutely no description whatsoever.” Counsel acknowledged that the victim and
Falconieri were “very descriptive” in depicting the truck, but counsel argued that “what
they’re looking for and they’re saying we had items stolen, they don’t even ask what
description. What items? What is stolen? No idea. Yet this search warrant is looking for
some unknown items. How possibly could this be handed to some unfamiliar officer and
he know what to search for? Which is the standard for a search warrant.”
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The court denied the motion, concluding that the warrant was not
“unconstitutionally vague in terms of the items to be seized.”
In September 2024, Salas pled no contest to both counts. The court sentenced him
to 180 days in county jail and two years of formal probation, with a three-year suspended
prison term.
DISCUSSION
Salas argues that the court erred by denying his motion to quash the search
warrant, because it was not supported by probable cause. We disagree.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and it
provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; Pen. Code,
§ 1525.) A magistrate ruling on a warrant application must determine “whether, given all
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis
of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (Illinois v. Gates
(1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238.)
“‘To satisfy the demands of the Warrant Clause, a warrant must comply with two
related but distinct rules. First, it must describe the place to be searched or things to be
seized with sufficient particularity, taking account of “the circumstances of the case and
the types of items involved.” [Citation.] Second, it must be no broader than the probable
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cause on which it is based. [Citation.] The particularity rule and the probable cause rule
serve a common purpose: to protect privacy by prohibiting “a general, exploratory
rummaging in a person[’s] belongings.” [Citation.] Although the two rules serve the
same ultimate purpose, they achieve the purpose in distinct ways.’” (Price v. Superior
Court (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 13, 35.)
“The magistrate’s determination will not be overturned unless the supporting
affidavit fails as a matter of law to support the finding of probable cause.” (Fenwick &
West v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1278.) “‘In reviewing the trial
court’s suppression ruling, we defer to its factual findings if supported by substantial
evidence. We independently assess the legal question of whether the challenged search or
seizure satisfies the Fourth Amendment.’” (People v. Meza (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 520,
536.)
Salas argues that “there was absolutely nothing connecting the theft of the water
pump and tools to [Salas’s] apartment,” because “[t]he water pump was located at
[Daniel’s] residence,” i.e., the single-story residence that was the subject of the first
search warrant. Because “Falconieri did no follow up on who rented the apartment” and
“did not conduct surveillance to see if Daniel . . . lived there or entered or exited the
apartment,” the second warrant application was based on “[n]othing more” than
“speculation that because Daniel . . . registered his truck there, police would likely find
stolen power tools there.”
The argument fails for two reasons. First, Salas cites no basis for his assumption
that Daniel lived at the residence that was the subject of the first warrant, and we are not
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aware of any. Second, Salas’s argument omits a relevant piece of evidence: The affidavit
supporting the second warrant application stated not only that Daniel’s truck was
registered at the apartment but also that the apartment’s address was the same address
listed on Daniel’s driver’s license. Given that Daniel registered his truck at the apartment
and listed the apartment as his address on his driver’s license, the magistrate could
reasonably infer that Daniel lived there. The connection between the thefts and the
apartment consequently was not speculative. Rather, the affidavit provided probable
cause to connect the thefts with the truck, the truck with Daniel, and Daniel with the
apartment.
Salas also argues that the warrant was impermissibly overbroad because the
“warrant sought to search for (and therefore seize) narcotics and firearms without a
scintilla of factual support in the affidavit.” The People concede that the warrant was not
supported by probable cause to search for firearms and ammunition, but they argue that
the discovery of the gun and the ammunition in Salas’s dresser drawer was inevitable.
We accept the People’s concession and agree that discovery was inevitable.
“The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule
and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence if the prosecution can establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the information would have been inevitably
discovered by lawful means, such as routine police procedures.” (People v. Banks (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 376, 383.) “The ultimate or inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule is closely related in purpose to the harmless-error rule of Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). The harmless-constitutional-error rule ‘[serves] a
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very useful purpose insofar as [it] [blocks] setting aside convictions for small errors or
defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.’ The
purpose of the inevitable discovery rule is to block setting aside convictions that would
have been obtained without police misconduct.” (People v. Nix (1984) 467 U.S. 431,
443, fn. 4.)
As previously discussed, the application for the second search warrant was
supported by a showing of probable cause to search the apartment for the missing power
tools. As the People concede, the application contained no facts showing probable cause
to believe that the police would find firearms or ammunition in the apartment, so the
warrant’s description of the property to be seized was overbroad as to those items. But
Falconieri’s affidavit stated that many of the power tools were “small enough to be
concealed inside [the] apartment or truck.” That description was sufficient to justify
searching the dresser drawer in Salas’s room in the apartment, and that is where the
firearm and the ammunition were found. Thus, the search of the apartment to locate the
tools, which was authorized by the warrant, would have inevitably led to discovery of the
firearm and the ammunition even if the warrant had not mentioned firearms and
ammunition.
Salas’s only response to the People’s inevitable discovery argument is that the
entire search was illegal because “the police never provided probable cause to search
appellant’s apartment at all.” For the reasons already explained, that argument lacks
merit. We therefore conclude that even though the warrant was not supported by
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probable cause as to firearms and ammunition, the firearm and ammunition found in
Salas’s room were admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Salas has not shown that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to quash.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the search warrant was supported by probable cause to search the defendant's apartment for stolen tools, and although the warrant was overbroad regarding firearms and ammunition, the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
Issues
Whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause to search the defendant's apartment.
Whether the search warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad regarding the items to be seized.
Whether the inevitable discovery doctrine applies to evidence seized under an overbroad warrant.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The magistrate could reasonably infer that Daniel lived there. The connection between the thefts and the apartment consequently was not speculative.”
“The search of the apartment to locate the tools, which was authorized by the warrant, would have inevitably led to discovery of the firearm and the ammunition even if the warrant had not mentioned firearms and ammunition.”